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“[A]lthough the cliché says that power always corrupts, what is sel-
dom said, but what is equally true, is that power always reveals. When a
man is climbing, trying to persuade others to give him power, conceal-
ment is necessary: to hide traits that might make others reluctant to give
him power, to hide also what he wants to do with that power; if men
recognized the traits or realized the aims, they might refuse to give him
what he wants. But as a man obtains more power, camouflage is less
necessary. The curtain begins to rise. The revealing begins.”’
– Robert A. Caro, The Passage of Power, 2013
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Preface
This is an article-based dissertation. It seeks to answer the following overarching
research question:
How does the extent of governments’ power over policy outcomes shape patterns
of electoral accountability?
It consists of a project frame (chapters 1-5) and the following four research articles
(chapters 6-9):
A. “Is the Relationship between Political Responsibility and Electoral Accountabil-
ity Causal, Adaptive and Policy-specific?”
B. “Clarity of Responsibility and Incumbent Behavior.”
C. “Incumbent Tenure Crowds out Economic Voting.”
D. “A Self-serving Bias in Attribution of Political Responsibility.”
The research articles are self-contained and can therefore be read without reading
the project frame. The goal of the project frame is threefold. First, to lay out the
themes and approaches that cut across the different articles. Second, to summarize
and distill the central findings from the research articles. Third, to discuss what
implications these findings have for electoral accountability.
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“[O]ne of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive [...] is,
that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. [Blame] is shifted
from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible
appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real
author. [T]he plurality of the Executive [therefore] tends to deprive the
people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise
of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose
their efficacy, [...] and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with
facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order
either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases
which admit of it.”
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 70.
2 | Introduction
Murals in Sienna
Quality of government is reflected in our everyday life. It resides in the fact that we
can walk safely on the street, that the streets we walk safely on are well kept, and that
the well-kept streets are populated by a prosperous people. One might argue that
the importance of good government for the life of ordinary citizens is, in essence, the
reason why studying politics is worthwhile. For if the actions of politicians did not
have an important bearing on the life of these citizens, why should we care about
the intricacies of politics at all?
The relationship between quality of life and quality of government has long been
recognized by philosophers, political thinkers and artists. A particularly poignant
example of the latter lies in the frescoes painted by Ambrogio Lorenzetti in the
Palazzo Pubblico in Sienna, Italy. In these frescoes, Lorenzetti depicts Sienna in
two different states of being: under good government and under bad government.
Under good government, Sienna is ruled by justice and laws, with peace, prosperity
and happiness as a result. Under bad government, Sienna is ruled by a tyrant, with
war, famine and debauchery as a result. Under good government, Sienna seems
light and inviting. Under bad government, Sienna is literally crumbling. Politics, in
Lorenzetti’s view of the world, makes all the difference.
Within the realm of modern political science, several theories have taken the same
position as Lorenzetti, surmising that the quality of social and political outcomes
reflects the quality of government (e.g., Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein, 2009). One
such theory is retrospective voting. Basically, this theory argues that the competence
of governing politicians ’rubs off’ on society in transparent ways. Fiorina, an early
scholar of retrospective voting, put it this way:
“[People] need not know the precise economic or foreign policies
of the incumbent administration in order to see or feel the results of
those policies. [...] If jobs have been lost, something is wrong. If sons
have died in foreign rice paddies, something is wrong. If thugs make
neighbourhoods unsafe, something is wrong. If polluters foul food, water,
or air, something is wrong.” Fiorina (1981, 5).
This view of the world is startlingly close to the one presented in Lorenzetti’s mu-
rals: bad outcomes can be ascribed to bad (incumbent) governments, good outcomes
to good government. Retrospective voting, however, is not really a theory about the
extent to which the quality of government is reflected in society – it takes this as a
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given. Instead, it posits that because quality of government is reflected in observable
social and economic outcomes, people can make inferences about the quality of their
government from the state of such outcomes (Fiorina, 1981). That is, at election time,
when citizens in representative democracies have to decide whether they want to
support the incumbent government, they can look back at whether important social
and economic indicators have changed for the better or for the worse, inferring that, if
they have changed for the better, this is probably because the incumbent government
is competent. In this way, the voice of the people can be understood as an echo of
the performance of the sitting government (Key, 1966).
From a normative standpoint, this is an appealing theory of how voters relate to
their government, because it suggests that when citizens are given the opportunity
to hold elected officials formally accountable through free and fair elections, they
will tend to re-elect politicians that increase voter welfare and discard politicians that
decrease voter welfare (Ashworth, 2012). This gives re-election minded politicians
an incentive to pursue the type of policy outcomes that voters prefer. It also means
that incumbent politicians who cannot or will not obtain the policy outcomes that
voters prefer will be relieved of their duties. Ideally, retrospective voting thus implies
that voters use elections to hold governments accountable, in the sense that they
use retrospective performance to “discern whether governments are acting in their
interest” and then make sure that “those incumbents who act in the best interest
of citizens win reelection and those who do not lose them” (Manin, Przeworski
and Stokes, 1999, 40). That is, under some circumstances, retrospective voting will
create what Manin, Przeworski and Stokes calls “electoral accountability” (see also
Ashworth, 2012; Hellwig and Samuels, 2008).
Retrospective voting is not just a normatively appealing theory; it is also, broadly
speaking, descriptively accurate. A large number of studies have found that the
electoral success of governing politicians is intimately related to the conditions they
provide for their electorate (Healy and Malhotra, 2013). These studies have typically
examined the relationship between economic conditions and incumbent support,
finding that good economic conditions translate into electoral success for incumbents
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013).1 However, the basic pattern of voters punishing
and rewarding politicians based on past performance is not limited to the economic
1The prevalence of studies that examine economic performance have lead some to use the term
“economic voting” instead of retrospective voting. This is largely a question of semantics. The project
frame of the dissertation opts for the term retrospective voting, because, in some cases, the dissertation
will examine types of retrospective performance that are not directly about the state of the economy
(e.g., public service provision). In the research articles that only examine retrospective economic
performance, I use the term economic voting.
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sphere (for some recent studies that go beyond economic conditions, see Burnett and
Kogan, 2017; Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Howell, 2005; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).
Imperfect Unmasking
Retrospective voting implies that politicians are held to account for increases or
decreases in voter welfare; however, most people would probably recognize that the
government’s ability to affect voter welfare is limited.
One account of the limitations politicians face in controlling the welfare of their
subjects is found in the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. In his historical analysis,
Machiavelli insisted that he had found systematic differences in the fate of Italy’s city
states based on the virtú of their princes, i.e., their competence or quality. Even so, he
recognized that the fate of a given prince was not determined by the virtú alone. An
equally strong force was the whimsy of the goddess of luck fortuna (Machiavelli, 1975
[1532]) . By fortunaMachiavelli meant something along the lines of the unalterable
circumstances the prince had to work under. While princes with particularly strong
virtúmight cancel out the woes of fortuna for a short while, Machiavelli suggested
that the fate of any prince was inextricably linked to both forces; to their inherent
quality and to the circumstances under which they governed. Put differently, even
though the quality of the government (or prince) is reflected in the quality of the life
the government provides for its citizens, this reflection is not perfect.
So exactly how important is the quality of government in producing social out-
comes? Machiavelli suggested that, on average, virtú was about as important as
fortuna, with the latter perhaps being slightly more important (Machiavelli, 1975
[1532], 166). If one looks at contemporary representative democracies, however, it
is clear that any such average assessment makes little sense, because polities vary
greatly in the extent to which the quality of executive governments translates into
policy outcomes.
To see this, contrast a British Prime Minister facing some kind of crisis which
requires passing legislation with an American President facing a similar crisis. The
British Prime Minister, who operates in a textbook majoritarian system, can simply
devise the legislation they deem appropriate and rely on their majority in the House
of Commons to pass it. If the American President wants to pass a similar piece of
legislation, they will need to compromise with a majority of legislators in both the
House of Representatives and in the Senate, who might be interested in seeing the
President’s plan fail. This means that even if the President and the Prime Minister
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have the same virtú, it is only the latter who will be able to easily translate this virtú
into good legislation without help from the goddess of luck (i.e., co-operation from
a combative legislative branch).
Other factors can also play a role in shaping the extent to which the quality of
government is translated into policy outcomes. For instance, many economists would
argue that politicians in more open economies, where capital and goods flow freely
in and out of the country, will be more constrained with respect to what fiscal and
monetary policies are feasible, and more generally, will have a harder time regulating
the economy. These constraints attenuate the relationship between the quality of
government and the quality of the economy, as even the most skilled economic
manager will struggle to stave off the adverse effects of a global recession in an
open economy, whereas even exceptionally incompetent economic managers will
see economic outcomes improve during a global economic boom.
These examples illustrate that the reflection of government quality in policy
outcomes, that is imagined in Lorenzetti’s frescoes, as well as in the theory of retro-
spective voting, is not just imperfect, it also varies with the political and economic
context. This variation in the extent to which the quality of government is reflected in
policy outcomes can be conceptualized in terms of the power over policy outcomes the
particular political and economic context assigns to the government. While power
is a contested concept, one can reasonably define it as “A has power over B to the
extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957,
202-203), and in this context it makes sense to say that differences in the extent to
which the government can shape policy outcomes can be defined as the extent to
which the government has power over policy outcomes.
Following this, we can say that typical majoritarian parliamentary systems gives
the incumbent more power over legislative outcomes than the typical presidential
system does, and that incumbent governments have less power over economic out-
comes in open economies than they have in closed economies. More generally, we
can say that the more power a government has over policy outcomes, the more the
quality of these policy outcomes will reflect the government’s quality. Thus, less
power over a policy outcome muddles the extent to which politicians are responsible
for this outcome. More power, on the other hand, reveals.
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Research Question
It seems intuitive that variation, in the extent to which incumbent politicians have
power over important policy outcomes is relevant in the context of retrospective
voting. If voters hold their government accountable for changes in voter welfare
in contexts where the government has limited power over voter welfare, they risk
electorally rewarding and/or punishing the “wrong” politicians. In particular, they
risk treating an unlucky high-quality government the same way they do a lucky
low-quality government. This naturally puts the normative appeal of retrospective
voting into question, because it is no longer clear that governments will be held
accountable for how they perform in office (Achen and Bartels, 2016).
This tension between the variation in governments’ power over policy outcomes
and the extent to which retrospective voting will produce effective electoral account-
ability motivates the following research question.
How does the extent of governments’ power over policy outcomes shape patterns
of electoral accountability?
As already established, the obvious answer to this question is that when a gov-
ernment’s power over policy outcomes is more limited, the prospects for effective
electoral accountability will be limited. However, seemingly obvious answers are
often worth exploring, and while this dissertation will to some extent find that the
obvious answer is also the right one, it will also find that in some cases the obvious
answer needs to be amended, if not discarded entirely.
Answering this particular research question is important, because it tells us
something about the conditions under which representative government will lead
to good government. That is, if the dissertation finds that diluting governments’
power over policy outcomes is harmful to electoral accountability, then it provides
some normative justification for a specific set of political institutions (i.e., those
who consolidate the political power of central governments). Further, exploring
the consequences that governments’ power over policy outcomes have for electoral
accountability will give us some insight into the pressures that governments face
when it comes to delivering high quality policy outcomes, and about voters’ abilities
to draw appropriate inferences about the quality of their government. These insights
are valuable if one wants to form a realistic ‘mental picture’ about the inner workings
of contemporary representative democracies. In essence, this dissertation attempts
to answer the call made by Healy and Malhotra (2013, 287) for a “rich and accurate
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model of voter behavior” that accounts for “the conditions under which retrospective
voting achieves effective democratic accountability and when it fails to do so.”
Grappling with the consequences that the dilution of political power has for
electoral accountability is also timely. For one, the value of increased economic and
political globalization has become a hotly contested topic in most Western countries,
something which has only been spurred on by the anti-trade sentiment of American
P Donald Trump, and by Great Britain’s decision to secede from the European Union.
One important implication of globalization is that national governments’ power
becomes more diluted (Hellwig and Samuels, 2007; Hellwig, 2001), and by exploring
what implications this dilution has for electoral accountability, this dissertation can
contribute to this debate. In addition to this, the status of electoral accountability
is also contested within the political science literature. In a recent book, veteran
political scientists Achen and Bartels (2016) argue that representative governments
are essentially never held accountable by their electorates, because no electorate has
the capacity to rationally evaluate the state of policy outcomes or the extent to which
their government is responsible for these outcomes. The premise of this dissertation
naturally pushes back against this conclusion, since it wants to investigate differences
in patterns of electoral accountability, and in order for this to be interesting, one
needs to presume the possible existence of electoral accountability. Even so, the
dissertation could, in principle, end up concluding that governments’ power over
policy outcomes has no effect on electoral accountability, because it is impossible to
find any evidence of accountability.
Answering the Research Question
This dissertation does not represent the first attempt to try and understand the
relationship between governments’ power over policy outcomes and electoral ac-
countability, and while the next chapter will detail the received wisdom from the
researchers who have tackled this relationship in the past, one strand of research
deserves to be mentioned up front: the literature on clarity of responsibility. First
developed by Powell andWhitten (1993), the clarity of responsibility literature asserts
that voters’ propensity to hold governments accountable for economic performance
“will strongly reflect the nature of policymaking in the society and the coherence and
control the government can exert over that policy” (Powell andWhitten, 1993, 398; for
some earlier formulations of the same sentiment, see Lewis-Beck, 1990; Paldam, 1991).
A plethora of studies have found that this argument is, broadly speaking, correct (for
a recent review, see Silva and Whitten, 2017). If a government has coherent control
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over policy, then this government is more likely to be held accountable for policy
outcomes.
Since the coherent control over policy that Powell and Whitten (1993) speak of is
arguably similar to the notion of “governments’ power over policy outcomes” intro-
duced above, these findings speak directly to the research question.2 Accordingly,
the dissertation will use the clarity of responsibility literature as a stepping stone,
building directly on the findings from this literature. In particular, the dissertation
will try to advance our knowledge in four different ways.
First, it will try to characterize the relationship between governments’ power
over policy outcomes and electoral accountability more fully. While the clarity of
responsibility literature has identified an aggregate correlation between the extent
to which governments have power over policy outcomes and the extent to which
governments are held accountable for policy outcomes, several aspects of the rela-
tionship remain in question. Does the identified correlation, for instance, reflect a
causal relationship? If governments’ power over policy outcomes changes, does that
mean electoral accountability follows suit? If so, how long does it take? Does the
change in electoral accountability follow instantaneously or is the relationship more
sticky? And is the relationship policy specific? That is, if a government gets more
power over a specific policy outcome, will voters only hold them more accountable
for this specific outcome? Or does voter attribution work at a higher level of analysis?
In its effort to pin down the characteristics of the relationship between governments’
power over policy outcomes and electoral accountability, this dissertation is among
the first provide answers to all of these questions.
Second, it will look at what implications the relationship between governments’
power over policy outcomes and electoral accountability have for the behavior of
office holders. Incumbent behavior has typically not been studied in the clarity
of responsibility literature, however, if centralized power breeds electoral account-
ability, then centralized power might also affect the composition and incentives of
incumbents. In particular, the dissertation explores whether increasing governments’
2This dissertation uses the term ‘clarity of responsibility’ interchangeably with ‘power over policy
outcomes’. The two concepts might not sound that similar. In particular, clarity of responsibility
seems to be a concept that belongs at the ‘micro’-level, mapping whether individual voters perceive
the government to be more or less clearly responsible for economic outcomes. However, if one looks
at Powell and Whitten’s original definition (cf. above), and later iterations (e.g., Hobolt, Tilley and
Banducci, 2013; Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002; Whitten and Palmer, 1999), it is clear that the
clarity of responsibility concept maps onto governments, not individuals, indexing the extent to
which governments have power over policy outcomes in specific contexts. This becomes even more
clear if one looks at the empirical indicators of high and low levels of clarity of responsibility that
previous research works have used (cf. chapter 2).
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power over policy outcomes makes it more likely that incumbents obtain the type of
policy outcomes voters prefer.
Third, it examines whether and how incumbents’ time in office affects patterns
of electoral accountability. Time in office is interesting to single out for two reasons.
First, it has only receivedmodest attention in the existing literature (Singer and Carlin,
2013). Second, it might provide a corrective to the idea that if a government gets
more power over policy outcomes it will also be held more electorally accountable
for these policy outcomes. In particular, there might be another force at work which
washes out, or alternatively dominates, the increases in power over policy outcomes
that time in office almost surely entails: learning. As such, as a government’s time in
office increases, voters might learn something about this government, and this might
lead them to hold the government less accountable for the state of important policy
outcomes. If, for instance, a government has produced good policy outcomes seven
years in a row and then have a bad year, voters might be more inclined to think that
this bad year is a result of a single bad encounterwith the goddess of luck. Conversely,
a government that is just starting out might not be given the benefit of the doubt if
it starts out with a bad year, even if voters know that new governments generally
have less power to shape outcomes than more experienced governments. Against
this backdrop, this dissertation provides the most thorough empirical investigation
of the relationship between retrospective voting and time in office to date.
Fourth, going beyond the clarity of responsibility literature, the dissertation looks
at how voters hold their government accountable for policy outcomes that are partly
the result of government intervention and partly a result of individual voters’ own
actions (i.e., one’s own employment situation). In particular, following psychological
theories about self-servingness, the dissertation explores whether voters are more
likely to hold the government accountable for such outcomes if they are undesirable
as opposed to desirable.
The dissertation will be organized around these four focus points that each, in
their own way, advance the research frontier. It is important to note that while these
four focus points all follow from the research question, they are by no means the
only focus points one could have arrived at. They represent areas of research that are
necessary to touch upon if one want to answer the research question, but they are
not sufficient. Put differently, even though this dissertation presents the scholarly
literature with a more qualified answer to the question of how governments’ power
over policy outcomes shape patterns of electoral accountability, it still leaves plenty
of room for future research.
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Organization of the Dissertation
This is an article-based dissertation, and therefore each of the four focus points
listed above will be dealt with in individual research articles. Table 1.1 presents an
overview of the different articles. The theoretical discussions and empirical evidence
presented in these articles will be the heart of the dissertation, and it will be here
that the relation and contribution to the existing literature will be the most obvious.
Table 1.1 Overview of the Articles in the Dissertation
Short title Title Chapter Status
A: Responsibility and
Accountability
Is the Relationship between Politi-
cal Responsibility and Electoral Ac-
countability Causal, Adaptive and
Policy-specific?
6 Under Review
B: Incumbent Behavior* Clarity of Responsibility and Incum-
bent Behavior
7 Working Paper
C: Incumbent Tenure Incumbent Tenure Crowds out Eco-
nomic Voting
8 Under Review
D: Self-servingness A Self-serving Bias in Attribution
of Political Responsibility
9 Under Review
*Co-authored with Asmus Leth Olsen.
Before moving on with the articles, however, the dissertation will offer some
general remarks. In particular, the next chapter will detail the nature and limitations
of existing efforts to explain how electoral accountability works, and delineate how
the dissertation will try to expand upon these efforts in the individual articles. The
third chapter looks at some common methodological problems the articles face in
terms of research design, and detail how the articles attempt to overcome these
problems. The fourth chapter summarizes the results from the different articles. The
fifth chapter revisits the research question, and discusses what has been learned
from the different articles and what implications these lessons have. Chapters six
through nine contain the different research articles.
Chapter 2
Theory, Previous Work, and
Unanswered Questions
This chapter goes into detail regarding the dissertation’s key concepts, its relation to
the existing literature and the contributions it seeks to make. The chapter is split into
three parts. The first part of the chapter focuses on the dissertation’s main dependent
variable: electoral accountability. Expanding on the arguments presented in chapter
1, the theoretical and empirical relationship between electoral accountability and
retrospective voting is discussed. In particular, I argue that retrospective voting can
be used as an (imperfect) indicator of electoral accountability. The second part of
the chapter focuses on the main independent variable, power over policy outcomes,
discussing the existing attempts to understand how this variable shapes patterns
of electoral accountability. In doing so, the chapter draws heavily on the clarity of
responsibility literature which was briefly presented in the introduction. The third
and final part of the chapter details how this dissertation advances our understanding
of the relationship between governments’ power over policy outcomes and electoral
accountability, detailing the dissertation’s theoretical, empirical and methodological
contributions.
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Electoral Accountability and Retrospective Voting
The key dependent variable in this dissertation is electoral accountability. Electoral
accountability is a somewhat contested concept, however most would agree that it is
fundamentally about the extent to which voters can use elections to constrain politi-
cians so that they act in the voters’ best interests (cf. Franklin, Soroka and Wlezien,
2014; Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999). This notion of electoral accountability
has been a central part of normative and empirical democratic theory at least since the
Federalist Papers (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 2009 [1788]). Arguably, the key question
in the political science literature on electoral accountability has been: how can and
do voters use elections to constrain political action so that these actions are in the
voters’ best interest? (For a recent review of this literature, see Ashworth, 2012). One
answer to this question has been found in the extensive literature on retrospective
voting (e.g., Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013).
As mentioned in the introduction, the literature on retrospective voting suggests
that voters base their decision to reelect governing politicians on the quality of
key policy outcomes, such as the economic situation (Healy and Malhotra, 2013).
The retrospective voting literature, also known as the economic or performance
voting literature, is one of the largest and most successful empirical literatures within
political science, and there is strong evidence of retrospective voting in the US
(Fiorina, 1981; Kramer, 1971; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001), Western Europe (Duch
and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck, 1990), Eastern Europe (Tucker, 2006), and Latin
America (Singer, 2013a).1
There are two reasons why retrospective voting behavior might lead to electoral
accountability (i.e., to voters constraining government’s actions so that these actions
are in the voters’ best interests). The first is that retrospective voters will tend to
select ‘good’ types of governments, which produce the type of policy outcomes
voters prefer. To see this, imagine that an incumbent government is incompetent
and therefore tends to produce poor policy outcomes (i.e., outcomes voters do not
like). If such an incumbent faces retrospective voters, who only reelect incumbents
that produce good outcomes, then this incumbent’s time in office will be cut short.
Conversely, a competent incumbent, which produces policy outcomes voters like,
will tend to be reelected. This process is often referred to as a selectionmechanism,
1There are a few detractors to the view that retrospective voting is widespread (e.g., Cheibub and
Przeworski, 1999; Evans and Chzhen, 2016; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007), however,
these run counter to the scholarly consensus reported in a number of recent review articles (i.e.,
Ashworth, 2012; Healy and Malhotra, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013).
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because the selection of a particular type of incumbent is what constrains incumbent
behavior (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fearon, 1999). The other reason is that
when incumbent governments face retrospective voters, they will work harder to
produce the kind of policy outcomes voters prefer. To see this, we need to make
the relatively weak assumption that it requires a good deal of effort to shape policy
outcomes. If this is the case, incumbents will need to be provided with some kind of
incentive in order to exert this effort. Retrospective voters create this incentive by
making re-election contingent on providing a specific set of policy outcomes. This
process is often referred to as a sanctioningmechanism, because the threat of electoral
sanctions constrain incumbent behavior (e.g., Barro, 1973; Besley, 2007; Ferejohn,
1986).
These selection and sanctioning mechanisms provide a strong theoretical link be-
tween retrospective voting and effective electoral accountability. Empirically, things
are, as always, a bit more murky. While some researchers have shown that the
sanctioning and selection mechanisms described above do constrain incumbent be-
havior in predictable ways (Alt, De Mesquita and Rose, 2011; Besley and Case, 1995a;
De Janvry, Finan and Sadoulet, 2012; Ferraz and Finan, 2011), others have remained
skeptical about the idea that retrospective voting will, in fact, lead to this type of
selection and sanctioning.
For one, some scholars have argued that while voters do punish and reward
incumbents based on the quality of policy outcomes, voters’ assessments of these
outcomes are regularly distorted by perceptual biases. Healy and Lenz (2014), for in-
stance, show that voters tend to over-emphasize recent trends in economic outcomes
when evaluating the state of the economy (see also Achen and Bartels, 2016; Healy
and Malhotra, 2009; Huber, Hill and Lenz, 2012). Others have found that partisans
adjust their views on the economy based on whether their preferred party is in power
(e.g., Evans and Andersen, 2006), and that all voters tend to over-emphasize negative
outcomes (e.g., Soroka, 2006).
Along the same lines, some have argued that voters have a hard time attributing
responsibility for policy outcomes in a reasonable way. As such, a number of studies
have found that voters punish and reward incumbent governments for outcomes that
the government has no control over (Achen, 2012; Busby, Druckman and Fredendall,
2017; Healy, Malhotra and Mo, 2010; Sances, 2017; for a criticism of some of these
findings, see Fowler and Hall, 2016; Fowler and Montagnes, 2015). Also, some have
found that partisans selectively attribute responsibility, letting their preferred party
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off the hook for poor policy outcomes when that party is in government (Bisgaard,
2015; Malhotra and Kuo, 2008; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).
These perceptual and attributional biases inhibit both selection and sanctioning.
It inhibits the selection mechanism in that governments are not selected based on
their actual record, but rather based on votersmisperception of this record. It inhibits
the sanctioning mechanism because it provides incentives for politicians to provide
policy outcomes that voters are not really interested in. For instance, if voters are
myopic, focusing more on recent policy outcomes, politicians will have an incentive
to divert resources from the beginning of the election period towards the end of the
election period (Kayser, 2005; Smith, 2003; Tufte, 1980).
There is no scholarly consensus about the extent to which these psychological
biases distort the translation of retrospective voting into effective electoral account-
ability. In their recent book, Democracy for Realists, Achen and Bartels (2016, 143)
conclude that the type retrospective voting that people actually engage in “is very
unlikely to provide much in the way of effective accountability”. On the other hand,
Fowler and Hall (2016, 26) conclude that “recent concerns about voter competence
[...] are overblown”. A balanced view is probably be that while misperceptions and
misattributions attenuate the relationship between retrospective voting and electoral
accountability, it does not undo it completely. This is also the conclusion Healy
and Malhotra (2013, 288) settle on in their recent review of the retrospective voting
literature.
Taking this balanced view has two implication for how this dissertation will go
about studying the relationship between government’s power over policy outcomes
and electoral accountability. First, the dissertation will conceptualize electoral ac-
countability in terms of retrospective voting, interpreting more retrospective voting
as an indicator of more electoral accountability. Second, while retrospective voting
will be interpreted as an indicator of electoral accountability, it will not be interpreted
as a sufficient indicator. As such, to the extent that the dissertation finds signs of
retrospective voting, it will try to tease out whether this reflects effective electoral
accountability and the extent to which it reflects misperceptions or misattributions.
Why Not Look at Issue Voting?
In terms of strategies voters can use to hold politicians electorally accountable, the
main alternative to retrospective voting is issue voting.2 Whereas retrospective voting
2This dissertation is not alone in arriving at this dichotomy (cf. Achen and Bartels, 2016; Lenz,
2012).
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is premised on voters responding to the performance of politicians, so that higher-
performing politicians are elected, issue voting is premised on voters responding
to the election programs put forward by the politicians running for office, so that
politicians who run on more popular policy platforms are elected (e.g., Downs, 1957).
So, do voters use such an issue voting strategy? And how does it compare to the
retrospective voting strategy?
On a theoretical level, the issue voting strategy is challenged by the commitment
problem that politicians face when communicating their issue positions to voters. No
matter what type of policy the politicians prefer when they are in office, politicians
will have an electoral incentive to tell voters that they will enact voters’ preferred
type of policy. If politicians want to pursue unpopular policies while in office, they
will have an incentive to lie to the voters (there is a “pooling” equlibrium, cf. Persson
and Tabellini, 2002). Note that a similar commitment problem does not exist in the
context of retrospective voting, because voters base their decision on what politicians
have done (i.e., the policy outcomes they have created), not on what politicians say
they have done (although see Bisgaard and Slothuus, 2017).
On an empirical level, it is not clear to what extent this commitment problem is a
factor. Politicians sometimes renege on their campaign promises, but more often than
not, they keep them (Pétry and Collette, 2009; Thomson et al., 2017). Even so, there
are other empirical challenges to the policy/issue voting strategy. First, a large body
of literature suggests that voters knowledge of parties’ positions on important issues
are limited (Andersen, Tilley and Heath, 2005; Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1992). Second,
to the extent that voters do know politicians’ issue positions, these do not tend to have
an independent effect on their decision to support a particular party. Lenz (2012), for
instance, shows that if people learn that their preferred party holds an issue position
that they disagree with, voters will change their position on the issue, not who
they intend to vote for. As such, politicians are, generally speaking, not constrained
by the voters when it comes to taking issue positions (see also Abramowitz, 1978;
Broockman and Butler, 2017; Jacoby, 1988; Minozzi et al., 2015; Slothuus, 2010).
There are some exceptions to this rule. For one, Tesler (2015) finds that some voters
will change their vote if a party takes an issue position that reflect long standing group
affiliations or other affectively charged predispositions (e.g., gay rights). Similarly,
Hall (2015) finds that if a party fields a very ideologically extreme candidate this
hurts their electoral prospects. However, outside of ideologically extreme candidates
and issues that are tied to some deeply held and widely-shared predisposition, there
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is only little persuasive evidence that voters use an issue voting strategy to hold
politicians electorally accountable.
As mentioned above, some argue that voters are just as ignorant and irrational
when it comes to drawing inferences from and about the state of important policy
outcomes as they are when it comes to issue positions (Achen and Bartels, 2016).
There are reasons to doubt this assertion. As discussed in the introduction, voters can
learn about policy outcomes without much effort. As Fiorina (1981, 5) puts it: “[Even
uniformed voters] typically have one comparatively hard bit of data: they know
what life has been like during the incumbent’s administration”. The same sentiment
is mirrored by Popkin (1991, 24) who says that “[P]olitical information is acquired
while making individual economic decisions and navigating daily life: shoppers
learn about inflation of retail prices; home buyers find out about mortgage-loan
interest rates; owners of stock follow the Dow-Jones averages”(see also Stevenson
and Duch, 2013). In this way, learning of policy outcomes can happen inadvertently.
This stands in contrast to knowledge of issue positions, which people only learn from
seeking out the information themselves or from watching political news; actions that
require some more effort on the part of the voter.
In addition to this more conceptual point, the causal evidence for an independent
effect of retrospective performance is also much stronger than the evidence for an
independent effect of issue positions. For instance, in the study by Lenz (2012)
mentioned above, he also analyses the effect of economic conditions. He finds that
if someone’s preferred party is in power, and they learn that the economy is doing
poorly, they will support one of the parties out of power. This is the opposite of
what was found for issue positions, where party choice remained stable while issue
positions changed. Others have found similar results using both quasi-experimental
(Healy and Malhotra, 2010) and experimental designs (Simonovits, 2015).
This dissertation does not engage further with the issue voting strategy, asserting,
based on the previous literature and the considerations laid out above, that the
most important way that voters hold politicians electorally accountable is by using a
retrospective voting strategy.3
3One of the research articles does engage with local income tax policy, however, even this article
does not look at the proposed income tax policy but rather the enacted policy.
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Clarity of Responsibility
The goal of this dissertation is to explore how governments’ power over policy out-
comes shapes patterns of electoral accountability. As mentioned in the introduction,
the first systematic analysis of this question was conducted by Powell and Whitten
(1993). In this seminal article, Powell and Whitten tried to explain why retrospec-
tive economic voting varied from one country to another. They came to investigate
governments’ power over (economic) policy outcomes because they asserted that
”the critical linkage of the voter’s assignment of responsibility to the government is
not merely an individual-level idiosyncrasy or rationalization.” Instead, they argued
that assignment of responsibility would “reflect the nature of policymaking in the
society and the coherence and control the government can exert over that policy”, so
that ”[t]he greater the perceived unified control of policymaking by the incumbent
government, the more likely is the citizen to assign responsibility for economic and
political outcomes to the incumbents” (Powell and Whitten, 1993, 398). Powell and
Whitten called this the ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis, signifying that in elec-
tions where the incumbent government has coherent control of the economy, they
are more clearly responsible.
Powell and Whitten made no additional theoretical arguments for this assertion,
nor did they explicitly link clarity of responsibility to electoral accountability. Sub-
sequent research has made amends on both counts, developing a more rigorous
theoretical justification with important implications for electoral accountability. The
most prominent example of this is Duch and Stevenson (2008, 2005, 2006, 2010) who
developed and tested a theoretical model which explains why clarity of responsibility
moderates retrospective voting, and in, turn electoral accountability. In particular,
their model finds that it is rational for voters to rely less on the economic situation
when deciding whether to vote for the incumbent government if the state of the econ-
omy situation is less sensitive on decisions made by the government. Their model
also shows that this has a detrimental effect on electoral accountability, because as the
effect of the incumbent government’s quality on the economy diminishes, it becomes
harder for voters to sort ‘high-quality’ incumbents from ‘low-quality’ incumbents on
election day (cf. the selection mechanism described above).
Duch and Stevenson are not alone in concluding that clarity of responsibility
moderates electoral accountability. In Besley’s (2006) canonical presentation of how
retrospective voting interacts with selection and sanctioning mechanisms in different
agency models, he argues that if there is a “problem of untangling responsibilities
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for outcomes” then “this may be expected to weaken the mapping from outcomes to
re-election decisions by individuals” (Besley, 2006, 105; see also Achen and Bartels,
2016; Persson and Tabellini, 2002, chap. 4).
In light of the already discussed criticisms levied against the normative potential
of retrospective voting, these theoretical models might sound implausible. If voters
have a hard time making meaningful assessments about the quality and causes
of policy outcomes, how can they be expected to make meaningful assessments
about the extent to which the government controls policy outcomes in different
contexts? In spite of this, a number of studies have found that voters do in fact
view their government as more responsible for economic and other policy outcomes
when objective conditions – such as economic and political institutions – assign more
power over policy outcomes to the government (Alcañiz andHellwig, 2011; Duch and
Stevenson, 2008; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Rudolph, 2003a).While this finding can be
hard to reconcile with studies which show that voters have substantial informational
shortcomings, it is important to note that the finding does not necessarily reflect
voters actively seeking out information about the relative power their government has
over policy outcomes. Instead, it might be explained in terms of political elites, such
as the media, focusing more on the types of policy outcomes that governments have
more responsibility for in public debates, and voters inferring from this that these
outcomes are subject to political manipulation (for evidence of this basic mechanism,
see Hart, 2016).
Empirical Evidence for the Clarity of Responsibility Hypothesis
Inspired by the devision into majoritarian and consensus governments laid out
by Lijphart (1984), Powell and Whitten operationalized clarity of responsibility in
terms of how the legislature was organized (i.e., party cohesion, strong legislative
committees, bicameral opposition) and how the government was organized (i.e.,
minority government, number of government parties). Based on these different
indicators they created an index, finding that economic conditions, such as GDP per
capita growth and inflation, had a larger effect on incumbent support in countries
that had a high score on their clarity of responsibility index.
Most empirical research on clarity of responsibility has basically used the same
approach as Powell and Whitten, estimating differences in the levels of retrospective
voting across contexts that assign different degrees of power over policy outcomes to
incumbent governments (for an extensive and recent review, see Silva and Whitten,
2017). These studies have replicated and refined Powell and Whitten’s findings,
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demonstrating the relevance of alternative indicators of clarity of responsibility,
for instance the effective number of parties (Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002),
volatility (Bengtsson, 2004), multi-level government (Anderson, 2006; León, 2011)
and globalization (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Hellwig and Samuels, 2008; Hellwig,
2001; Lobo and Lewis-Beck, 2012), and that some of the indicators used by Powell
and Whitten were probably not that important (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2017;
Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Royed, Leyden and Borrelli, 2000).
Almost all empirical tests of the clarity of responsibility hypothesis focus on
economic retrospective voting, tracking the extent to which clarity of responsibility
moderates the effect of economic conditions on support for the incumbent govern-
ment; however, a few studies have looked at other policy outcomes as well, finding
similar results. Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits (2016), for instance, look at corruption,
finding that incumbents are punished more severely for instances of corruption
when clarity of responsibility is high (see also Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013,
who study clarity of responsibility in relation to health care outcomes).
In sum, a lot of studies have found that if an economic or political institution
assigns more power over policy outcomes to the incumbent government, then the
presence of said institution will coinside with more retrospective voting. This sug-
gests that the clarity of responsibility hypothesis is basically right; however, some
more recent findings complicate this general conclusion.
In particular, some studies find that voters hold the government accountable for
outcomes politicians are not responsible for at all. Most notably, Healy, Malhotra
and Mo (2010) find that the results of local college football games have an effect on
support for the incumbent in US elections (see also Busby, Druckman and Fredendall,
2017). This is hard to square with the clarity of responsibility hypothesis in the sense
that the government’s power over the result of college football games is non-existent.
Similarly, Sances (2017) finds that voters hold the US president accountable for tax
increases which are enacted by way of local referenda, and Wolfers (2007) finds that
voters hold local incumbents accountable for economic shocks that can be attributed
to changes in the price of oil (see also Leigh, 2009).
While these results cannot be explained using the clarity of responsibility hy-
pothesis, they are not necessarily at odds with it either. To see this, imagine that
retrospective voting is driven by two separate forces. One is that voters decide to
hold the incumbent government accountable for the things that they believe the
incumbent is responsible for. The other is that when something bad happens, af-
fective contagion (or some other psychological mechanism) lead voters to like the
20 | Theory, Previous Work, and Unanswered Questions
incumbent less. To the extent that clarity of responsibility moderates the strength of
the former force (i.e., cognizant assignment of responsibility) but not the strength of
the latter (affective contagion), we would expect clarity of responsibility to moderate
retrospective voting, and for policy outcomes which are outside the government’s
sphere of influence to have some effect as well. This is the exact pattern identified by
the existing literature.
Another challenge to the evidence for the clarity of responsibility hypothesis
comes from Parker-Stephen (2013). He argues that clarity of responsibility does
not just moderate retrospective voting, it also moderates the strength of partisan
motivated reasoning, so that partisans are more inclined to let their partisanship
inform their evaluations of policy outcomes in a high clarity context. The proposed
explanation for this is that as the clarity of responsibility of some policy outcomes
increases, the status of this policy outcome becomes more central to evaluating
government performance, giving party identifiers a clearer incentive to engage in
directional motivated reasoning. If this is true, clarity of responsibility does not nec-
essarily increase or decrease the level of retrospective voting, it simply increases the
appearance of retrospective voting, because it polarizes government and opposition
partisans’ perceptions of retrospective performance.
Parker-Stephen’s argument provides an important corrective to the clarity of re-
sponsibility literature; however, as he himself recognizes, it has limited implications.
For one, it is hard to empirically disentangle increased partisan polarization from
increased retrospective voting, as both are identified by looking at differences in
evaluations of retrospective performance across government and opposition sup-
porters. In addition to this, Parker-Stephen’s argument only applies to studies that
use voters’ perceptions of policy outcomes to identify levels of retrospective voting.
Several studies of clarity of responsibility, including Powell and Whitten’s original
study, use objective indicators such as inflation, GDP growth and unemployment
rates. Government and opposition partisans can obviously not ‘polarize’ on these
objective economic indicators.
Some Important, Yet Unanswered, Questions
Having laid out the existing evidence on how governments’ power over policy
outcomes shapes patterns of electoral accountability, the next task will be identifying
some pressure points where this dissertation can move the literature forward. In
particular, I lay out, in turn, four different questions that the existing literature has
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left unanswered, and which this dissertation will try to answer. The four different
questions map onto the four different research articles that are presented in the final
four chapters of the dissertation.4
A: What characterizes the relationship between governments’ power over policy
outcomes and electoral accountability? While the existing literature has convincingly
shown that there is an aggregate level correlation between governments’ power
over policy outcomes and electoral accountability, it has left several aspects of the
relationship under-illuminated. In particular, it is not clear whether the relationship
is causal, adaptive or policy-specific.
• It is not clear whether it is causal, because the existing literature relies almost
entirely on cross-country observational correlations between the presence of
specific institutions and the extent to which the incumbent government is
held accountable for the quality of policy outcomes, and since institutions
are ‘unnatural experiments’ (Besley and Case, 2000), this correlation could
potentially be spurious (more on this in chapter 3).
• It is not clear whether the relationship is adaptive, because previous research has
focused on institutional differences that change slowly, making it impossible to
determine whether the aggregate level relationship reflects a long-term process
where accountability slowly adjusts to the changes in governments’ power over
policy outcomes (i.e., adapts slowly), or a short-term process in which voters
instantly adjust their behavior (i.e., adapts more quickly).
• It is not clear whether the relationship is policy-specific, because the previous
literature has generally only examined differences in clarity of responsibility
for policy outcomes as such, not clarity of responsibility for specific policy
outcomes (although see Arceneaux, 2006; Ruder et al., 2014). As such, we do
not know whether increasing political responsibility for an individual policy
outcome leads voters to hold the incumbent more accountable for only this
outcome, or whether increasing responsibility for an individual policy outcome
lead voters to hold incumbents more accountable for other outcomes as well.
Getting at these features of the relationship between governments’ power over
policy outcomes and electoral accountability is important, because they all tell us
something about the extent to which incumbent governments are held exclusively
4Parts of what follows in this section are taken more or less directly from the different research
articles.
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electorally accountable for the outcomes they had a hand in shaping, and, in turn,
how adept voters are at identifying and (re)electing governments who are able and
willing to produce the type of policy outcomes they prefer.
B: Does clarity of responsibility constrain incumbent behavior? As stated above,
electoral accountability can be defined in terms of the extent to which voters can
use elections to constrain incumbent politicians’ behavior so that they act in voters’
best interest. In spite of this, the literature on clarity of responsibility has almost
exclusively been interested in whether clarity affects voter behavior and paid little
attention to incumbent behavior (for a possible exception, see Tavits, 2007). Instead,
previous literature has, implicitly, assumed that when voters’ mode of selection
changes (i.e., when voters become more electorally responsive to the quality of policy
outcomes), selection and sanctioning mechanisms automatically kick in, changing
incumbent behavior along the way.
This is not an unreasonable assumption. As was discussed above, politicians
do seem to respond to changes to their re-election incentives (cf. Alt and Lassen,
2006). Even so, different factors might prevent the effect of voter behavior from
translating into changes in incumbent behavior. For one, even if centralization of
power increases levels of retrospective voting, the effect might not be big enough to
leave a mark on incumbent behavior (for an argument along these lines, see Cheibub
and Przeworski, 1999). Another possibility is that the type of retrospective voting
behavior that the electorate engages in is to myopic and haphazard for it to change
incumbent behavior (for an argument along these lines, see Achen and Bartels, 2016).
At present, however, we do not know.
C: Does the length of an incumbent government’s time in office affect the extent
to which voters hold this government electorally accountable for policy outcomes?
Only a small number of studies have dealt with the relationship between time in
office and retrospective voting. These studies have generally conceptualized tenure
as a component of clarity of responsibility (Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002),
asserting that incumbents’ influence on policy outcomes increases with their time in
office, and therefore one should expect retrospective voting to be more prevalent in
elections which feature more experienced incumbents and less prevalent in elections
which feature less experienced incumbents (Carey and Lebo, 2006; Lebo and Box-
Steffensmeier, 2008; Singer and Carlin, 2013). Even so, it might not be rational for
voters to let policy outcomes count for more as time in office increases.
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To see why this is the case, we need to consult models of Bayesian learning. These
models tell us that beliefs which are based on more information are generally less
likely to be moved by a single new piece of evidence (e.g., Gerber and Green, 1999).
In the context of retrospective voting, one can conceptualize this “information” as all
of the relevant cues about the quality of the incumbent obtained before one takes
the present state of policy outcomes, the “new piece of evidence”, into account.
Information naturally accumulates with time in office. That is, voters will always
have more information about their incumbent at t = x+ 1 than they have at t = x,
because all of the information accumulated by t = x is also available at t = x + 1.
Accordingly, as an incumbent’s time in office increases, voters’ stock of relevant
information about the incumbent also increases, strengthening voters’ beliefs about
the incumbent, leaving these beliefs less malleable, and potentially attenuating the
effect the (current) state of policy outcomes have on these beliefs.
Note that Bayesian learning thus suggests that it might be rational for voters
who want to select the most competent incumbent to focus more on the quality of
policy outcomes when the incumbent has less power to shape these outcomes. This
implication makes time in office an interesting limit case to explore in the context
of this dissertation’s research question, because it suggests that some factors which
increase governments’ power over policy outcomes might not have the effect on
electoral accountability that the clarity of responsibility hypothesis suggests.
D: Can a lack of clarity of responsibility create a self-serving bias in how voters
attribute responsibility? As mentioned above, Parker-Stephen (2013) argues in a
recent article that high levels of clarity of responsibility for policy outcomes make
partisan-motivated reasoning about policy outcomes – an important perceptual bias
(cf. Campbell et al., 1960) – more prevalent. This represents one of the only attempts
to examine whether clarity of responsibility affects voters’ political cognition. This
dissertation continues in this vein, considering a different, and hitherto unexplored,
psychological bias.
In particular, drawing on the social psychological concept of a self-serving bias
in attribution, it seems reasonable to surmise that if it is hard for voters to find out
whether the government or they themselves are responsible for a particular policy
outcome, then they will attribute responsibility for this outcome self-servingly. If
voters, for instance, face increasing mortgage payments, they will tend to blame the
government’s reckless policies; however, if mortgage payments are decreasing, they
will tend to credit their own prudent real-estate investment. More generally, one
might expect that voters tend to over-emphasize the government’s role in producing
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undesirable outcomes, exculpating themselves from any potential blame, and under-
emphasize the government’s role in producing desirable outcomes, taking personal
responsibility instead.
By exploring the self-serving bias in attribution of political responsibility, it is
also possible to get at a broader question: namely whether unclarity of responsibility
simply leads voters to rationally reduce the extent to which they hold incumbents
accountable, or whether the ambiguity might sometimes interact with voters’ psy-
chological biases, leading them to hold the incumbent more accountable than the
traditional clarity of responsibility literature would predict. If such a pattern is iden-
tified, it might explain why voters sometimes hold incumbent politicians accountable
for outcomes they are only tangentially responsible for.5
From Four Questions to One Dissertation
These four different questions might seem disparate and a little scattered. This is a
result of the fact that this is an article based dissertation, which means that there is a
limit to how logically connected the over-arching argument can be, as the individual
research articles need to serve their own particular ends. Even so, each of the four
questions laid out above follow from the dissertation’s research question laid out in
chapter 1.
To illustrate how the different questions relate to each other, figure 2.1 draws a
stylized path model of how electoral accountability works. In the model, the govern-
ment affects policy outcomes, which then affect the life of the voters, who then decide
whether to support the government. A decision that determines which government
is allowed to affect policy outcomes. At the center of the model is the key depen-
dent variable of the dissertation, namely, governments’ power over policy outcomes.
Three arrows go from this variable to different parts of the accountability process.
Next to the arrows are letters signifying which question looks at the relationship
between governments’ power over policy outcomes and this particular part of the
accountability process. A brief justification for the placement of each question in the
model follows below:
1. Question A and C both deal with how governments’ power over policy out-
comes condition voters decision to either support or reject the incumbent
government on election day, and are therefore placed next to the arrow in the
bottom right corner.
5For a whimsical example of this, see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDocnbkHjhI&t=1m0s.
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2. Question B deals with how governments’ power over policy outcomes condi-
tions which policy outcomes the governments pursue, and is therefore placed
next to the arrow in the top left corner.
3. Question D deals with how limitations to governments’ power over policy
outcomes create a self-serving bias in how the voters interpret policy outcomes,









Figure 2.1 How the different contributions of the dissertation fit into a stylized
electoral accountability model. Letters refer to the different research articles: A
‘Responsibility and Accountability’, B ‘Incumbent Behavior’, C ‘Incumbent Tenure’,
and D ‘Self-servingness’.
The model is, of course, an abstraction. In reality, each question also touches
upon different aspects of the accountability process than the one displayed in figure
2.1. This will become apparent once the dissertation gets to the individual research
articles which try to answer these questions. For instance, the article which deals
with question A also examines whether governments’ power over policy outcomes
changes voters perceptions of policy outcomes, and the article which deals with
question B also looks at how votersmode of selection changes. Even so, the placement





The dissertation faces two major inferential problems when it comes to exploring
how the extent of governments’ power over policy outcomes shapes patterns of
electoral accountability. First, governments’ abilities to influence policy outcomes is
not randomly assigned across contexts. There are reasons why some political systems
grant extensive power over policy outcomes to the government, while other political
systems impose limits on executive discretion. This presents a serious challenge
to causal identification, because one might mistake the effect of factors that make
power-sharing institutions more likely for the effect of power sharing. Second, in
some instances, the dissertation wants to identify the effect of governments’ power
over policy outcomes on the extent to which voters hold incumbent governments
accountable for the quality of policy outcomes. This presents a separate type of causal
inference problem, as we need to estimate the effect of one variable (government
power) on the effect of another variable (quality of policy outcomes). This chapter
lays out these inferential problems and explains how the research designs employed
in the different research articles address these problems.
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The Key Inferential Problem: Causal Identification
The goal of this dissertation is to explore how the extent of governments’ power over
policy outcomes shapes patterns of electoral accountability. In particular, as laid out
in chapter 2, the dissertation wants to look at how the centralization of power over
policy outcomes in the hand of the executive affects the extent to which voters hold
this executive accountable for specific outcomes (articles A and C), how it affects
the policy outcomes pursued by the incumbent (article B) and how it affects the
attributions made by the voter (article D). How can one make inferences about the
effect of governments’ power over policy outcomes on these variables?
Let us say that we want to know what happens to some variable, R, if a govern-
ment’s power over policy outcomes, GP , increases. For simplicity, let us restrict the
government’s power to have two values, GP ∈ {0, 1}, and say that both R and GP
are measured for a specific incumbent government i. As a running example, letRi be
the tax policy enacted by some incumbent i, and let GP be an indicator of whether
the incumbent can set tax policy alone (GPi = 1) or whether the incumbent’s tax
policy has to be approved by another party before it is enacted (GPi = 0).
Using the potential outcomes framework (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Holland,
1986), we can imagine Ri in two states. One is R1i, which is the level of R for
incumbent iwhenGP = 1, and the other is R0i, which is the level of R for incumbent
iwhen GP = 0. We are interested in the difference between the two states, R1i −R0i,
which represents the causal effect of getting more power over policy outcomes on
R for incumbent i. Unfortunately, we cannot observe R1i − R0i directly, because
R1i is only realized for the subset of incumbents where GP = 1, and R0i is only
realized for the subset of incumbents where GP = 0. As such, we do not observe the
counter-factual outcomes.
In terms of our example, we observe the tax policy enacted by incumbents who
can set tax policy alone (i.e., R1i|GP = 1), but we do not observe the tax policy that
the same incumbents would have enacted if they had to set tax policy with another
party (R0i|GP = 1). Similarly, we observe the tax policy enacted by incumbents who
have to set tax policy with another party (R0i|GP = 0), but we do not observe the
tax policy these incumbents would have enacted if they could set tax policy alone
(R1i|GP = 0).
This is a problem, because this dissertation is, at a fundamental level, interested
in such counter-factual outcomes. We want to know what would happen to patterns
of accountability if the government had more (or less) power over policy outcomes.
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Since the counter-factual outcomes are not observed, we are forced to compare
the average of Ri for incumbents where GP = 1 to the average Ri for incumbents
where GP = 0. Following Angrist and Pischke (2008, 14), it is possible to relate this
average difference to the average causal effect of GP on R, which is the aggregate
level effect we are interested. This can be done by adding in and subtracting the
average level of R that incumbents with more power over policy outcomes would
have had if they had less power over policy outcomes (E(R0i|GPi = 1)). This gives
us
E(R1i|GPi = 1)− E(R0i|GPi = 0) = E(R1i|GPi = 1)− E(R0i|GPi = 1)+
E(R0i|GPi = 1)− E(R0i|GPi = 0)
(3.1)
The right hand side of this equation consists of two average differences. The first
average difference is the average effect of GP on R among the subset of incumbents
for whom GP = 1 (in the language of experimental research this corresponds to
the average treatment effect of the treated).1 The second is the average difference
in R between the incumbents for whom GP = 1 and the incumbents for whom
GP = 0, which would have existed if GP = 0 for all incumbents. Angrist and
Pischke (2008) label this term the selection bias, because it captures the extent to
which incumbents with specific levels of R select into (or are selected into) specific
levels of GP independent of any effect R might have on GP . So, how does this to
relate to the running example?
If we look at the average difference in tax policy between incumbents who can
set tax policy alone and those who have to set tax policy with another party, then
equation 3.1 tells us that this difference will reflect (1) the average effect that the
ability to set taxes independently has on tax setting, and (2) the average difference
in tax policy between those who set tax policy alone and those who do not, which
would have existed even if all incumbents had to set tax policy with another party.
This discussion reveals the key inferential problem this dissertation faces: when
comparing governments who have more power over policy outcomes with those
who have less, one risks confounding the effect of power over policy outcomes with
differences which would have been there in the absence of any disparity in power
over policy outcomes.
1While not the effect for the individual incumbent i, getting at this average causal effect gets us
closer to answering our research question.
30 | Research Designs
At the same time, the discussion also reveals how this inferential problem can be
solved. In particular, if it is possible to argue that the following inequality holds
E(R0i|GPi = 1) = E(R0i|GPi = 0), (3.2)
then the average observed difference will reflect the average causal effect of
governments’ power over policy outcomes.2
This equality states that if more power over policy outcomes had not been as-
signed to incumbents, then there would have been no difference, on average, in
R between incumbents assigned more and less power over policy outcomes. Ac-
cordingly, equality 3.2 will only hold if the assignment to more power over policy
outcomes is independent of R: that is, if the factors that make the assignment of
more power over policy outcomes more likely are unrelated to levels of R.
Equality 3.2 will probably not hold in most cases, because forces that affect the
extent of governments’ power over policy outcomes will tend to have an independent
effect on relevant Rs as well. Box 3.1 argues this point using our running exam-
ple. This does not mean, however, that equality 3.2 never holds; it just means that
when examining the effect of governments’ power over policy outcomes, one needs
to devise an empirical strategy that makes it possible to plausibly claim that this
equality holds, so that causal identification is possible. Below, it is detailed how the
dissertation uses randomized vignette survey experiments and quasi-experiments
set in Danish municipalities to devise such identification strategies.
Using Randomized Survey Experiments
In article D, ‘Self-serving Bias’, the dependent variable is voters’ attributions about
various policy outcomes. The independent variable is the nature of the policy out-
come; in particular, whether the relative role played by the government and the
voter in producing this outcome is ambiguous, and whether the outcome is positive
or negative. Using a survey experimental design, a population based sample of
Danish voters are presented with different hypothetical outcomes, and then asked to
evaluate how responsible the government would be if these hypothetical outcomes
were realized. In order to make sure that equality 3.2 holds, the different hypothetical
outcomes are randomly assigned to participants. Using random assignment ensures
that the participants assigned to different outcomes are – in expectation – equal on
2If the effect size depends on assignment to ´treatment’ (GP = 1), then the average difference will
only reflect the causal effect of GP on R among those for whom GP = 1.
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Box 3.1: Illustrating why equality 3.2 rarely holds
Say we wanted to look at whether the scope of executive discretion with respect
to fiscal policy (GP ) has an impact on tax policy (R). To that end, we compare tax
levels across the following indicators of executive discretion: economic openness
(more open ctr. more closed), type of government (coalition ctr. single party), and
federalism (federalist ctr. unitary). Would differences in tax policy across these
different indicators reflect the causal effect of executive discretion? To answer this
question, we need to evaluate whether equality 3.2 holds.
• Levels of economic openness: Equality 3.2 probably does not hold, because coun-
tries that select into more economic openness are probably also more economi-
cally libertarian, leaving tax levels uneven across levels of economic openness
even in the absence of any independent effect of openness on tax setting.
• Coalition ctr. single party governments: Equality 3.2 probably does not hold
because opposition parties that select into coalition governments might only do
so if they expect some public spending to come their way, driving up public
spending and, in turn, taxes. This makes tax levels uneven across types of
governments even in the absence of any independent effect of government type
on tax setting.
• Federalist ctr. unitary political systems: Equality 3.2 probably does not hold
because countries that select into federalism might do so because of strong
regional political identities, which could curtail public spending at the national
level. This will leave tax levels uneven across types of political system even in
the absence of any independent effect of federalism on tax setting.
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all observed and unobserved characteristics, including how inclined the participants
would be to hold the government responsible for policy outcomes.
While the controlled setting of the survey experiment allows for a simple and
strong identification strategy, the control comes at a cost. For one, people cannot
be exposed to actual policy outcomes in the context of a survey, forcing us to use
hypothetical outcomes. In addition to this, people are asked to evaluate outcomes
in a serene survey setting, rather than in a real-life setting, where their attributions
might be affected by conversations with friends and family as well as messaging from
political elites. These abstractions probably distort the type of conclusions that can be
drawn from the survey experiment (cf. Barabas and Jerit, 2010); however, it is hard to
know howmuch and in what way they do this. In order to ameliorate these concerns,
article D supplements the survey experiment with several observational studies,
which look at associations between the policy outcomes experienced by voters and
the attributions voters make. By using this data, the article explores whether it
is possible to recognize the well-identified effect from the survey experiment in a
setting where voters evaluate actual policy outcomes.
Using Danish Municipalities as Laboratories
One way to meet the identifying assumption laid out in equation 3.2, while retaining
somemeasure of ecological validity, is to look for quasi-experiments: instances where
nature assigns governments’ power over policy outcomes in away that is independent
of factors that affect the dependent variables we are interested in (Dunning, 2012).
This is the main approach taken in articles A, B and C, which examine the effect of
governments’ power over policy outcomes on levels of retrospective voting (A, C)
and incumbent behavior (B).
The quasi-experiments examined in the dissertation have a common backdrop:
they examine subnational variation, in the extent to which local governments in
Denmark have power over local policy outcomes. Interestingly, while subnational
variation has often been leveraged to study electoral accountability (e.g., Alt and
Lowry, 1994; Alt, De Mesquita and Rose, 2011; De Janvry, Finan and Sadoulet, 2012;
Mouritzen, 1989; Sances, 2016, 2017), it has rarely been used in the context of studying
how governments’ power over policy outcomes affects patterns of electoral account-
ability. This is somewhat surprising, as many of the potential confounders that
threaten causal identification are at the country level (cf. box 3.1). This is partly a
reflection of the fact that there is no force constraining between country differences
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in political institutions, whereas considerations related to equal protection typically
limit the institutional differences between subnational units. Further, national level
institutions rarely change dramatically, in part because of constitutional constraints.
In contrast, local governing structures are often tweaked and altered at the whims
of central governments. This make local governments fertile ground for identifying
potential quasi-experiments.
Since Danishmunicipalities provide the empirical context for three of the research
articles in the dissertation, box 3.2 provides some context on their function, history
and political system.
Three Quasi-experiments
Having discussed their shared empirical backdrop, I now turn to laying out the
details of the specific quasi-experiments.
The quasi-experiment used in article B, ‘Incumbent Behavior’, identifies the effect of
incumbents’ power over policy outcomes on a specific type of incumbent behavior (tax
setting) by comparing city councils where the largest party narrowly won a majority
of the seats, giving them the opportunity to select the mayor and the chairmen of all
committees unilaterally, with city councils where the largest party narrowly lost the
majority, forcing them to collaborate with other parties.This type of quasi-experiment
is called a regression discontinuity design (RDD), because it relies on the fact that
there is a discontinuity in some continuous variable (i.e., proportion of votes) where
the treatment (more power over policy outcomes) is assigned (cf. Dunning, 2012;
Lee, 2008). The identifying assumption here is that equality 3.2 holds when the
assignment to single party majority status is based on a small number of votes. This
is a reasonable assumption to make since the exact vote totals parties receive at
elections are influenced by as-if random forces that are unrelated to levels of electoral
accountability, such as the weather or traffic patterns (for evidence of this, see Eggers
et al., 2015).
The quasi-experiment used in article A, ‘Responsibility and Accountability’, takes place
in the wake of a 2007 reform. In particular, it looks at the effect of a labor market
reform that gave 14 (out of 98) Danish municipalities more power over a specific
policy outcome: unemployment services.3 The article identifies the effect of the
3In Denmark, active labormarket policies have played an important role in efforts towards reducing
structural unemployment (Torfing, 1999). This reform gave the selected municipalities the sole
responsibility for managing the provision of these services, a responsibility which was shared before
the reform. Responsibility for unemployment services was eventually transferred to all municipalities.
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Box 3.2: Some Context About The Danish Municipalities
Municipal tasks
• Denmark is a decentralized welfare state where municipalities can affect their
local revenue and set a yearly budget.
• Municipal tasks and services include the core welfare services of the Danish
welfare state and municipal spending amounts to 35 percent of GDP, which is
more than half of all public spending. The tasks include primary education,
child care and care for elderly people, libraries, local sports facilities and other
cultural activities, granting and payment of cash assistance, anticipatory pension
and certain other social benefits, job activation and employment projects for
unemployed persons (unemployment services), public utilities, environmental
measures and emergency services.
Political System
• Danish municipalities are governed by local councils which are elected at propor-
tional elections and with a multi-party system which, to a large extent, mirrors
the party system at the national level (Blom-Hansen, Elklit and Kjær, 2017).
• Elections are fixed to take place every four years and do not usually coincide
with elections at the national or EU level. Turnout is high with an average of
around 70 percent since 1970.
• The work in the local council is structured by a a number of committees. The
number and size of the committees is determined by the council. Committee
membership is allocated proportionality between the political parties which
means that there is broad political representation in all committees. The com-
mittees can decide on matters in their area and the administrative responsibility
across areas is essentially divided.
• Following each municipal election, a majority in city council elects a mayor,
and the chairmen of the various committees (Serritzlew, Skjæveland and Blom-
Hansen, 2008). Mayors are the only full time professional politicians in the city
councils and have a number of formal obligations (Kjaer, 2015). Mayor are also
responsible for the day-to-day business of the administration and chairs the
important economic committee which sets taxes and the budget.
Organization and History
• There have been two large municipal reforms in the last 50 years.
• The first was conducted in 1970 as the Danish welfare state started to expand.
Here the number of municipalities were reduced from more than 1000 to 275.
(Although it was 277 the first two years.) so that the municipalities were able to
efficiently provide a more complex portfolio of public services (Ingvartsen, 1991).
• The second reform was conducted in 2007 and further reduced the number of
municipalities from 275 to 98. Once again, the increasing complexity of public
service provision was a key argument for the reform (Christiansen and Klitgaard,
2008).
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increased power over policy outcomes on electoral accountability by comparing the
extent to which the mayoral party was held electorally accountable for the quality of
unemployment services in the 14 ‘treatment municipalities’ and in the 84 ‘control
municipalities’. It is not obvious that this comparison satisfies equality 3.2; however,
the article argues that it does, because the national government, which assigned
municipalities to treatment and control, were interested in designing two very similar
groups for political reasons. The article backs up this claim by showing that: (1) there
were no differences between treatment and control municipalities on observables
that might be correlated with electoral accountability before implementation of the
reform, (2) there were no difference in how electorally accountable mayoral parties
were held for policy outcomes unrelated to unemployment services, and (3) there
were no apparent differences across treatment and control municipalities in the
extent to which mayoral parties were held electorally accountable for unemployment
services before the reform.
The quasi-experiment used in article C, ‘Incumbent Tenure’, also takes place in the
wake of the municipal reform in 2007. In particular, it exploits the fact that, as a
result of the reform, some municipalities were amalgamated. In some of the recently
amalgamated municipalities’ parts of the electorate had a long history with the
incumbent mayoral party, whereas others, as a result of the amalgamation process,
had to evaluate the incumbent mayoral party for the first time. Comparing the extent
to which incumbents were held electorally accountable for recent local changes in the
unemployment rate by ‘new’ ctr. ‘old’ voters, the article tries to identify the effect that
the length of voters’ prior experience with an incumbent has on the extent to which
they hold these incumbents accountable for the current state of policy outcomes.
Two things are of note here. First, the article does not look directly at the effect of
the individual local government’s power over policy outcomes, but, instead, at the
effect of the length of voters’ prior experiences with the incumbent. This logic behind
this is explored further in the article; however, the logic behind this inferential strategy
is as follows: if we can show that the length of voters’ experience with an incumbent
has an effect on electoral accountability, then it follows from this that incumbent
tenure, which is perfectly collinear with the length of voters’ experience with an
incumbent, also affects electoral accountability. Second, while the amalgamations
were exogenous, in the sense of being unrelated to the voting decision of individual
voters, the amalgamation process did not happen randomly or as-if randomly, raising
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the possibility that equation 3.2 does not hold.4 To address both the fact that we
do not look directly at differences in governments’ power over policy outcomes,
and the fact that the identifying assumption might not hold, the article includes
two additional country-level studies. Both compare the extent to which the same
incumbent is punished for economic conditions early contra late in their term.
A Note on Generalizability
Onemight contend that relying so heavily on quasi-experiments from a single setting
severely delimits the dissertation’s scope of inference. This is true in the sense that it
would be better to have quasi-experiments that covered other political systems as
well, a point I return to when discussing the overall limitations of the dissertation in
chapter 5. However, it is not clear that the dissertation would have been well served
by focusing less on these quasi-experiments and more on cross-country comparisons.
For one, as should be clear from the discussion in chapter 2, the clarity of respon-
sibility literature, which has been the main vehicle for studying how governments’
power over policy outcomes shapes electoral accountability, has seen its share of
cross-country studies. Accordingly, in the context of the larger research program, the
marginal returns from another such study is probably limited. By contrast, the type
of study conducted in this dissertation, which looks at more local, well-identified
effects is less common in the literature.
Further, while conventional wisdom tells us that if we focus on a more diverse set
of cases (e.g., a dataset which includes a large number of different countries), then
the prospects for generalizability increase, a recent article by Samii (2016) argues
that this is in fact not the case.
“This type of generalizing reflects a presumption that by using a data
set representative of some target population [...] the study will produce
findings generalizable to that population. [...] Statistically speaking,this
line of reasoning is completely misguided. [..] There is no clear ordering
of experiments, quasi-experiments, and observational studies that use
regression or other control methods in terms of the generality of their
findings.” – Samii (2016, 943-945)
4It is unclear to what extent this is a problem. Bhatti and Hansen (2011) find that political and
economic homogeneity, factors which are probably related to electoral accountability, did not play a
large role with respect to which municipalities were amalgamated.
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Samii reaches this conclusion by arguing that when standard observational stud-
ies use some form of statistical control (e.g., control variables) they also limit the
kind of variation in the independent variable which is used to identify the effect on
the dependent variable, and, as a result, the estimated effect will often be just as
‘local’ (i.e., derived from a similarly limited set of cases) as it is in experimental or
quasi-experimental studies. If one, for instance, examines the effect of government
type (single ctr. multi-party government) on the extent of retrospective voting using
a cross-country regression model with a large battery of controls, including year
and country fixed effects, then the identified effect of government type will only be
ascribable to the variation in government type that is independent of these controls.
Say that government type only varies very little in one country (e.g., the UK) and in
other countries it is very closely related to other controls (e.g., to the effective number
of parties), then observations from these countries will not contribute to the effect
estimate and, as a result, the effect cannot be generalized to these countries (see also
Aronow and Samii, 2016).
In summary, it is not clear that the dissertation loses more generality by looking
at Danish municipalities than it would have if it did a well-controlled cross-country
study, and it is pretty clear that the marginal returns, in terms of new insights, from
looking at Danish municipalities will be higher than if the dissertation contributed
to the existing literature by employing yet another set of cross-country studies.
Measuring Retrospective Voting
Research articles A ’Responsibility and Accountability’ and C ‘Incumbent Tenure’
both examine the effect of governments’ power over policy outcomes on the extent
of retrospective voting. That is, whether voters hold their government more or less
accountable for policy outcomes when their government’s power over these policy
outcomes increase. This adds a layer of complexity, because measuring the level of
retrospective voting is tantamount to identifying a causal effect; namely, the casual
effect of policy outcomes on support for the incumbent. What implications does this
have for our analyses?
To explore this, let us first define the retrospective voting a group of incumbents
face as the average difference in electoral support (Y ) these incumbents would face
if policy outcomes (PO) were of a high quality (E(Y1i)) as opposed to a low quality
(E(Y0i)). When measuring retrospective voting, we cannot get at this counter-factual
directly, forcing us to look at the average difference in electoral support between
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incumbents who oversee high-quality policy outcomes (E(Y1i|PO = 1)) and incum-
bents who oversee low-quality policy outcomes (E(Y0i|PO = 0)). Applying the
potential outcomes framework, this average difference can be described as
E(Y1i|POi = 1)− E(Y0i|POi = 0) = E(Y1i|POi = 1)− E(Y0i|POi = 1)+
E(Y0i|POi = 1)− E(Y0i|POi = 0),
(3.3)
which reflects actual retrospective voting (i.e., the effect of policy outcomes on support
for the incumbent), as well as some ‘selection bias’ (the extent to which incumbents
with higher levels of electoral support select into high-quality policy outcomes).
This dissertation, however, is not interested inmeasuring the level of retrospective
voting. Rather, it is interested in measuring the effect governments’ power over
policy outcomes (GP ) has on retrospective voting (i.e., an interaction effect). This
complicates the analysis, because we now have four potential states of the world
(PO ∈ {0, 1}×GP ∈ {0, 1}), only one of which is realized. To describe these different
states, we define the electoral support of an incumbent i as Yjti, where the subscript j
relates to whether the incumbent is in a state where government’s power over policy
outcomes is high (Y1ti) or in a state where it is low (Y0ti), and the subscript t denotes
whether the incumbent is in a state where policy outcomes are high quality (Yj1i) or
in a state where they are low quality (Yj0i).
For each individual incumbent i, we are interested inwhether the quality of policy
outcomes has a larger effect when the government’s power over policy outcomes is
large as opposed to when it is small. In effect, we are thus interested in the following
difference-in-difference: Y11i − Y10i − (Y01i − Y00i).
Since only one outcome for each i is observed, this difference-in-difference term
will include several counter-factual components for each incumbent, and we are
therefore forced to look at the observed average levels of electoral support across
incumbents with different levels of power over policy outcomes, and who oversee
policy outcomes of varying quality. In particular, we can estimate the following
average difference-in–difference without relying on any counter-factuals
E(Yi|GPi = 1, POi = 1)− E(Yi|GPi = 1, POi = 0)−
(E(Yi|GPi = 0, POi = 1)− E(Yi|GPi = 0, POi = 0)).
(3.4)
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To find out what relationship this estimate has to the average causal interaction
effect, we can add in and subtract the relevant counter-factual outcomes.5 If we do
this and assume that equality 3.2 holds across levels of PO,6 we find that
E(Yi|GPi = 1, POi = 1)− E(Yi|GPi = 1, POi = 0)−
(E(Yi|GPi = 0, POi = 1)− E(Yi|GPi = 0, POi = 0)) =
E(Y11i|GPi = 1, POi = 1)− E(Y10i|GPi = 1, POi = 1)−
(E(Y01i|GPi = 1, POi = 1)− E(Y00i|GPi = 1, POi = 1))︷ ︸︸ ︷
Average effect of GP on effect of PO for is with GP = 1 & PO = 1
+E(Y10i|GPi = 1, POi = 1)− E(Y10i|GPi = 1, POi = 0)−
(E(Y00i|GPi = 0, POi = 1)− E(Y00i|GP = 0, POi = 0)).︷ ︸︸ ︷
Difference in selection bias into Y across PO
(3.5)
This equation tells us that if we look at the observed differences in the level of
retrospective voting incumbents face across levels of government power over policy
outcomes, then we end up with the causal interaction effect (the first two right hand
side lines), as well as a “difference in selection bias” term (the final two lines).
The “difference in selection bias” subtracts (1) the extent to which powerful
incumbents (GP = 1) with higher levels of electoral support select into high quality
policy outcomes; from (2) the extent to which less powerful incumbents (GP = 0)
with higher levels of electoral support select into high quality policy outcomes. If (1)
and (2) are equal, it means that the difference in electoral support across incumbents
assigned to high – as opposed to low – quality policy outcomes, which would have
existed if all incumbents were assigned to low-quality policy outcomes, is the same
for more and less powerful incumbents.
5In particular, we add in and subtract −E(Y10i|GPi = 1, POi = 1) − (E(Y01i|GPi = 1, POi =
1) − E(Y00i|GPi = 1, POi = 1)) and −E(Y00i|GPi = 0, POi = 1) − (E(Y00i|GPi = 1, POi = 0) −
E(Y00i|GPi = 0, POi = 0)).
6We assume that E(Y01i|GPi = 1, POi = 1) = E(Y01i|GPi = 0, POi = 1) and E(Y00i|GPi =
1, POi = 0) = E(Y00i|GPi = 0, POi = 0). Substantively, this assumption means that assignment
to GP = 1 is unrelated to the average electoral support that incumbents would have gotten if all
incumbents had been assigned to GP = 0 both when policy outcomes are high quality (PO = 1) and
when policy outcomes are low quality (PO = 0).
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Importantly, if (1) and (2) are equal, they cancel each other out, leaving us with an
unbiased estimate of the average effect of governments’ power over policy outcomes
on the effect of policy outcomes on incumbent support (i.e., the causal interaction
effect). This is the additional identifying assumption that one needs to make in
order to identify the causal effect of governments’ power over policy outcomes on
retrospective voting. The assumption can be expressed formally as
E(Y10i|GP = 1, POi = 1)− E(Y10i|GPi = 1, POi = 0) =
E(Y00i|GPi = 1, POi = 1)− E(Y00i|GPi = 1, POi = 0).
(3.6)
This equality can hold even in contexts where there is some selection by incum-
bents into policy outcomes of a particular quality. As long as the selection pattern is
the same for incumbents with more and less power over policy outcomes, it does
not bias the estimate of the causal interaction effect.
It will, therefore, sometimes be possible to estimate an unbiased effect of govern-
ments’ power over policy outcomes on retrospective voting in contexts where one
would normally overestimate or underestimate the level of retrospective voting. In
particular, if the amount of over- or underestimation is constant across different levels
of governments’ power over policy outcomes, then causal identification is possible.
How can this be the case? One can think of the issue as one of measurement error in
the dependent variable: as long as it is uncorrelated with the independent variable,
it will generally not bias the causal estimate (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, chap.
5).7 Similarly, even if the level of retrospective voting is estimated with some error,
it will not bias the causal estimate if this error is uncorrelated with governments’
power over policy outcomes.
When might equality 3.6 not hold? Increasing an incumbent’s power over a set
of policy outcomes might increase the extent to which voters rely on their partisan
predispositions when evaluating these policy outcomes (for evidence of such a
mechanism, see the study by Parker-Stephen, 2013, which was discussed at length
in chapter 2). That is, voters who like the incumbent might select into positive
perceptions of policy outcomes, whereas voters who do not might select into negative
perceptions, and they might do so to a greater extent when incumbents have more
7The issue can also be compared to the parallel trends assumption in difference-in-difference
models, where base-line differences in the dependent variables across the treatment variable may
differ for reasons that are unrelated to the treatment, as long as the trends in the dependent variable
are independent of factors that affect the likelihood of being assigned to treatment (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008, 230).
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power over policy outcomes. This means that voters’ evaluations of the quality of
policy outcomes will reflect whether voters support the incumbent (i.e., selection
bias), and that this reflection will be stronger when governments’ power over policy
outcomes is more extensive (i.e., difference in selection bias). If this is the case, one
will tend to over-estimate the level of retrospective voting more when incumbents
have more power over policy outcomes, and equality 3.6 will therefore not hold.
Articles A and C, which use levels of retrospective voting as the dependent
variable, are sensitive to these issues and try to examine whether equation 3.6 does
– in fact – hold. For instance, in article A, I look at whether there are any signs
that voters’ evaluation of policy outcomes depend more on their attachment to the
incumbent party when the incumbent party has more control over policy outcomes
(see section S8 of the supplementary materials in chapter 6 for details). If this is the
case, equality 3.6 will not hold, because the level of retrospective voting will be over-
estimatedmorewhen governments’ power over policy outcomes is higher. In article C,
I address similar concerns by using an instrumental variables approach. In particular,
I instrument voters’ evaluation of a policy outcome using a set of objective indicators
of this policy outcome’s quality, thereby mitigating any differences in the strength of
voters’ partisan “perceptual screens” (see section S13 of the supplementary materials
in chapter 8 for details).
In summary, if equalities 3.2 and 3.6 hold, then observed differences in the level
of retrospective voting faced by governments with different levels of power over
policy outcomes will reflect the causal effect of governments’ power over policy
outcomes on the effect that the quality of these policy outcomes have on support for
the incumbent. We are sensitive to this set of more extensive identifying assumptions
in articles A and C, which examine the effect of governments’ power over policy
outcomes on the extent of retrospective voting.
An Overview of Data Sources and Research Designs
Table 3.1 summarizes this chapter by providing an overview of the data sources and
identification strategies employed in the individual research articles.











































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter gives an overview of the central findings from the four different research
articles. The chapter begins by discussing how governments’ power over policy
outcomes affects voter behavior. Then it turns to how governments’ power over
policy outcomes shapes the behavior of incumbent politicians. Finally, the chapter
discusses how voters’ attributions are affected by a specific type of constraint on the
governments’ power over policy outcomes. Note that the analyses presented in this
section have been simplified to make for a short and clear presentation. For more
elaborate and detailed analyses, as well as additional robustness checks, the reader
should consult the individual research articles (chapters six through nine).1
1As this chapter serves as a summary of the most important results in the different articles, parts
of what follows are taken more or less directly from the different research articles.
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Voter Behavior
As discussed at length in chapter 2, the literature on clarity of responsibility has
shown that in contexts where governments’ power over policy outcomes is more
extensive, voters tend to hold the government more electorally accountable for the
quality of important policy outcomes. The dissertation engages with this finding in
two ways. First, it re-examines the relationship between electoral accountability and
governments’ power over policy outcomes in a setting where governments’ power
over a specific policy outcome changed abruptly and exogenously. Second, it exam-
ines incumbent tenure, a variable that is related to how much power governments
have over policy outcomes, exploring whether this variable moderates voter behavior
in the way the clarity of responsibility hypothesis would predict.
Governments’ power over policy outcomes has a causal, adaptive and
policy-specific effect on the extent of electoral accountability
Will voters hold an incumbent government more electorally accountable for the
quality of a policy outcome when the incumbent’s control of the underlying policy
increases? Article A, ‘Responsibility andAccountability’, tries to answer this question
by studying the electoral consequences of a labor market reform in Denmark that
gave 14 municipal mayors more power over unemployment services (i.e., active labor
market policy).
This case has three appealing features when it comes to furthering our under-
standing of the relationship between governments’ power over policy outcomes and
electoral accountability. First, the reform only affected the municipalities’ power
over a single policy outcome, making it possible to find out whether the relationship
between governments’ power over policy outcomes and electoral accountability is
policy-specific or whether it resides at a more general level. Second, the reform
was implemented abruptly, from one election to another, giving us a chance to see
whether voters adapt quickly to changes in power over policy outcomes. Third, the
national government, which decided what municipal mayors were assigned more
power over unemployment services, had no incentive to select municipalities based
on extant or potential levels of electoral accountability. In fact, they were under
political pressure to pick a set of municipalities that were balanced on observables
(i.e., geography and size). As such, it is reasonable to assume that the article can use
this reform to estimate the average causal effect of power over unemployment services
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on electoral accountability for these and other services. Additional quantitative and
qualitative evidence for this key assertion is provided in the article (chapter 6).
To study the effect this reform had on voter behavior, the article utilizes the
Danish Municipal Election survey from 2009 (Elklit and Kjær, 2013), examining the
extent to which the incumbent mayoral party was held electorally accountable for
unemployment services in the 14 ‘treatment municipalities’ that got more power
over unemployment services, and in the 84 ‘control municipalities’ that did not.
Figure 4.1 presents the main results from article A. As panel (a) of the figure
shows, electoral support for the mayor was more closely related to voters’ perception
of the quality of unemployment services in the treatment municipalities. Those
who thought unemployment services were doing poorly were less likely to support
the mayor in the treatment municipalities, and those who thought unemployment
services were doing well were more likely to support the mayor in the treatment
municipalities. Accordingly, the increase in the local incumbent’s power over un-
employment services seems to be associated with an increase in the extent to which
voters punished and rewarded the local incumbent for the quality of these services.
Panel (b) of figure 4.1 shows that while there was a difference across treatment
and control municipalities with respect to how electorally accountable the mayor was
held by voters for unemployment services, there was no corresponding difference
with respect to another policy outcome (i.e., the quality of elderly care services).
Substantively, this tells us that electorates respond to policy-specific shocks to gov-
ernments’ power over policy outcomes by adjusting accountability in a policy-specific
way. That is, if incumbents get more power over a specific policy outcome, then
voters hold the incumbent more electorally accountable for this outcome; but they
do not hold the incumbent more accountable for other policy outcomes as well.
Overall, the evidence from article A implies that the electorate moderates the
extent to which local governments are held electorally accountable for specific out-
comes based on the extent to which local governments had a hand in crafting and
implementing the policies that shape this outcome. More broadly, the article implies
that if an incumbent is clearly responsible for a clearly demarcated outcome, then
voters will hold the incumbent electorally accountable for the quality of this outcome.



























































(a) Solid lines reflect the predicted probability with 95 pct. confidence intervals of voting for the
mayoral party across satisfaction with unemployment services in treatment and control municipalities.
Predictions are derived from a linear probability model with a treatment by unemployment services
interaction. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. Interaction estimate is statistically
significantly different from zero (t(1521) = 2.08, p = 0.04). Dots are conditional probabilities esti-




























































(b) Solid lines reflect the predicted probability with 95 pct. confidence intervals of voting for the
mayoral party across satisfaction with elderly care services in treatment and control municipalities.
Predictions are derived from a linear probability model with a treatment by elderly care services
interaction. Standard errors are clustered at themunicipal level. Interaction estimate is not significantly
different from zero (t(1521) = 0.44, p = 0.44). Dots are conditional probabilities estimated from the
sample (n = 1522). The dashed line in the “Treatment” plot reflects the slope from the “Control” plot.
Figure 4.1Does the mayor’s power over unemployment services condition the extent
to which the mayor is held electorally accountable for the quality of these and other
services?
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Incumbents who have been in office longer are held less electorally
accountable for recent economic conditions
What is the relationship between incumbent tenure and retrospective voting? Intu-
itively, incumbents withmore tenure should have hadmore time to enact policies that
affect policy outcomes, and as such, following the clarity of responsibility hypothesis,
they should be held more electorally accountable for these policies. However, this
intuition is complicated by theories of Bayesian learning. Bayesian learning suggests
that when a person’s beliefs are weak, new evidence will have more of an impact
than when their beliefs are strong. Since voters’ beliefs about an incumbent are likely
to strengthen as this incumbent’s term proceeds, theories of Bayesian learning would
predict that voters’ beliefs about the incumbent would be more malleable to the
quality of policy outcomes at the beginning of an incumbent’s time in office.
As an incumbent’s time in office increases, clarity of responsibility might thus
increase the incentive for voters to hold the incumbent accountable for the quality
of policy outcomes while, at the same time, Bayesian learning might reduce this
incentive. To find out which of these countervailing forces dominate, article C,
‘Incumbent Tenure’, conducts an extensive empirical investigation of the long-term
relationship between incumbent tenure and retrospective voting.
The article begins by examining a dataset that covers country-level election returns
from 409 elections in 41 different countries. Measuring economic retrospective
voting as the correlation between economic conditions (i.e., economic growth) and
support for the executive party, the article finds that as incumbent tenure increases,
economic voting decreases. This finding is illustrated in figure 4.2, which compares
the relationship between growth and change in electoral support for incumbents
running for reelection in the first five years of their time in office with incumbents
running for reelection after the first five years.
The article examines the robustness of this finding in a number of ways, intro-
ducing various controls, alternative estimation strategies, etc. Most importantly, the
article conducts a conceptual replication, which also identifies a negative relationship
between time in office and economic voting. The conceptual replication utilizes a
pooled cross-section of 60 representative national surveys from 10Western European
countries, measuring the economic vote as the correlation between voters’ retrospec-
tive evaluations of the national economy and their intention to vote for the executive
party.
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(a) Relationship between change in electoral support and economic growth for executive parties
running for reelection. The plot on the left shows the relationship for executive parties running for
re-election the first five years after getting into office (n = 248). The plot on the right shows the
relationship for executive parties running for re-election after more than five years (n = 155). The
lines reflect the expected support with 95 pct. confidence intervals from linear regression of economic
growth on changes in electoral support. The dots represent elections. There is a statistically significant















































(b) Predicted differences in electoral support for the mayoral party between the precincts that had the
same incumbent before and after the municipal reform and the precincts that did not, across changes
in the municipal unemployment rate with 90 pct. confidence intervals. See chapter 8 for estimation
details. Histogram shows the distribution of increases in unemployment. Unemployment increased
in all municipalities, because elections were held one year after the great recession in 2008.
Figure 4.2What effect does the tenure of the executive party have on the extent to
which the incumbent party is held electorally accountable for economic conditions?
Evidence from a country-level dataset of elections (a), and precinct-level election
returns from the 2009 municipal elections in Denmark (b).
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Having established that there is a negative long term relationship between incum-
bent tenure and retrospective economic voting, the article zeroes in on the proposed
theoretical mechanism underlying the negative relationship: Bayesian learning. In
particular, the article focuses on a dataset of local elections in Denmark; local elec-
tions that, as described in chapter 3, were held in the wake of a large municipal
redistricting reform. The article takes advantage of the fact that, as a consequence of
the reform, a number of municipalities were amalgamated, which created within-
municipality differences in the amount of experience the electorate had with the
same incumbent mayoral party. Analyzing the election returns, the article finds that
voters who had less experience with an incumbent mayor were more likely to hold
the mayor electorally accountable for recent changes in local levels of unemployment.
This result is presented in panel (b) of figure 4.2.
Taken together, the analyses conducted in the article paint a uniform picture:
as incumbent tenure increases, retrospective (economic) voting decreases. This is
especially interesting because it goes against the clarity of responsibility hypothesis,
which predicts that incumbent tenure should stimulate, not depress, retrospective
voting. In terms of the dissertation’s research question, this means that, in some
instances, governments will actually be held less electorally accountable for the
current state of policy outcomes as their power over these outcomes increases. In
particular, it seems to be the case that if increases in power over policy outcomes are
accompanied by another factor (in this case a growing stock of prior experiences)
which makes policy outcomes less informative as to the incumbent’s type, then
voters will not hold the incumbent more electorally accountable. Put differently,
governments’ power over policy outcomes might only affect the extent to which
voters hold the government accountable when this power makes a difference in terms
of how easy it is for voters to identify whether the government is acting in the voters’
best interests. That is, power is only important to voters when it reveals. This is an
important corrective to the clarity of responsibility literature in general and to article
A in particular.
Incumbent Behavior
Governments’ power over policy outcomes shapes voter behavior, but does this
change in voter behavior also lead to changes in how incumbent governments be-
have? Since the goal of this dissertation is to understand how governments’ power
over policy outcomes shapes patterns of electoral accountability, and since electoral
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accountability is fundamentally about the extent to which voters can use elections to
constrain incumbent politicians, this is an important question to address. In spite of
this, few existing studies have tried to engage with this question. The dissertation
tries to do this in article B, ‘Incumbent Behavior’.
Increasing government power over policy outcomes affects the type of
policies pursued by incumbent governments
Since governments’ power over policy outcomesmoderates electoral accountability, it
is only natural to assume that it will also moderate incumbent behavior by changing
the type of incumbents that are elected, and the re-election incentives these incum-
bents face once they are elected. To see this, imagine that governments have extensive
power over policy outcomes, so that voters hold them very electorally accountable
for the state of these outcomes. In this case, governments who are (not) able to
produce the type of policy outcomes that voters prefer should stand a better (worse)
chance of getting re-elected (i.e., a selection effect), and governments who are not
immediately willing to obtain the type of policy outcomes voters prefer get an extra
electoral incentive to do so (i.e., a sanctioning effect). Conversely, when governments
have little power over policy outcomes, their re-election chances will not depend as
strongly on the policy outcomes they produce, minimizing their incentive to obtain
the type of policy outcomes voters prefer, and maximizing the probability that in-
cumbents who are not willing or able to produce the type of outcomes voters prefer
will be re-elected. Following this, we might expect that as governments’ power over
policy outcomes increases, so will the frequency and intensity with which incumbent
governments pursue the type of policy outcomes that their electorate prefers.
In article B, ‘Incumbent Behavior’, which is co-authored with Asmus Leth Olsen,
we explore this theoretical expectation by studying income tax policy in Danish
municipalities. We leverage three important aspects of this context:
1. Local income tax increases are unpopular with the average voter, and can
therefore be used as ametric of whether incumbent politicians act in accordance
with the interests of local electorates.
2. When the largest party controls a majority of the seats, this party can set the
municipal income tax rate without coalescing with other parties. Single party
majority status can therefore be used as an indicator of the largest party’s power
over policy outcomes.
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3. Assignment to single party majority status is the result of an electoral discon-
tinuity, and can therefore be used to identify the causal effect of single party
majority status on income tax policy around the discontinuity (cf. chapter 3).
We lay out these different aspects of the Danish context at length in the article,
however the assertion that local income tax policy can be used as a metric of whether
incumbent politicians act in accordance with the electorates preferences might need
some additional justification up front. Municipal income taxes in Denmark are broad-
based, substantial in magnitude, and highly salient. Further, previous literature has
shown that income taxes are unpopular with the average voter: if a municipality
raises taxes, the mayor generally loses electoral support (Bhatti, Hansen and Olsen,
2012; Frandsen, 1998). This is a finding we also replicate in our article. Accordingly,
it seems reasonable to assume that, other things being equal, the electorate would
prefer municipal income tax rates to be lower.
Figure 4.3 presents the central findings from our article. As can be seen from this
figure, there is no evidence of an immediate effect of single party majority status
on tax rates, but there is evidence of a long-term effect. As such, whether or not a
party wins a single party majority, does not seem to have an effect on the tax rate set
at the next election (t=1), but there does seem to be a negative effect of about half a
percentage point if one looks at the subsequent election (t=2). In particular, if we look
at the distributions of tax rates, we can see that there are almost no municipalities
with high benchmarked tax rates (> 1) among single party majorities at this latter
election. This tells us that when the largest party in the city council gets a single
party majority, increasing this party’s power over tax policy, there is no evidence that
this leads the largest party to seek lower taxes. However, if the largest party has a
majority of the seats going into an election, then the type of city-council that gets
elected will be more prone to seek lower taxes.
The selection-mechanism, described in detail in chapter 2, might explain this
delayed effect. As such, if the largest party holds a majority of the seats, it is easier for
voters to identify and reduce the political influence of parties that are not interested
in lowering taxes, and, by extension, they are able to empower parties who are able
and willing to lower taxes. In the article, we provide additional evidence for this
mechanisms, showing that parties who have a single party majority are in fact held
more electorally accountable for their tax policy.
These results go nicely with what was found in article A; namely that voters’
mode of selection is affected by their government’s power over policy outcomes.
However, the results also go beyond confirming what we found in article A, because
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we can now see that this change in voter behavior also affects the type of policies
pursued by local incumbents.
Voter Attributions
So far, this chapter has discussed how governments’ power over policy outcomes
affects voter and incumbent behavior. Now it delves into whether and how gov-
ernments’ power over policy outcomes affects the way voters attribute political
responsibility.
Ambiguity about the causes of policy outcomes can create a self-
serving bias in attribution of political responsibility
As described in chapter 2, a number of studies have found that voters who iden-
tify with or feel close to the government party attributes responsibility selectively,
believing the government to be more (less) responsible for economic outcomes if
these outcomes are good (bad). This pattern of behavior reveals an instinct, among
some voters, to adjust their perceptions of who is responsible based on what makes
their preferred party look good. This type of ‘directional’ thinking (Taber and Lodge,
2006), where political cognition is adjusted to arrive at predetermined goals, might
interact with ambiguity about a government’s role in shaping policy outcomes to
create a self-serving bias in attribution of political responsibility.
To see this, imagine that a voter loses his or her job. Arguably, this is, in part, a
result of polices enacted by the national government; however, it is also, in part, a
result of the voter’s own behavior. If voters want to make themselves look better,
then they are motivated to over-emphasize the role the government played in getting
them laid off, and under-emphasize the role they played themselves. That is, a self-
serving motive leads voters to hold governing politicians more responsible for policy
outcomes if these outcomes are negative than if it they are positive. Importantly,
this self-serving bias will only kick in if voters can plausibly assign responsibility to
themselves for the policy outcome. If they cannot do this, then voters’ self-image
will not be affected by the result of the attributional process, and there is no role to
play for a self-serving bias.
Article D, ‘Self-servingness’, examines whether there are signs of such a self-
serving bias in the way voters’ attribute political responsibility. One of the article’s
approaches to this question is a vignette survey experiment on a population-based
54 | Key Findings
sample of Danish voters. In the survey, respondents are asked to evaluate the extent
to which the government would be responsible for a set of hypothetical outcomes
related to either housing or (un)employment. The valence (positive, negative or
neutral) of the outcome, and whether voters can reasonably assign responsibility
themselves for the outcome, varies randomly across respondents. Whether voters
can assign responsibility to themselves for the outcome is manipulated by presenting
voters with outcomes at either a personal or at a national level.
Figure 4.4 presents the results from the experiment. In line with what we would
expect if there is a self-serving bias in political attribution, the figure shows that if
respondents can assign responsibility to themselves for an outcome then they are
more likely to hold the government responsible for the outcome if it is negative than
if it is positive if the respondent is in panel (a). There is no such asymmetry for the
national outcomes in panel (b).2
In addition to this, the article looks for signs of a self-serving bias in a number of
election surveys (i.e., the Danish National Election Studies, the American National
Election Studies and the Latinobarómetro). Consistent with the self-serving bias in
attribution, the article finds that participants in these election surveys who think their
personal economic situation is improving are no more or only slightly more likely to
support the incumbent government than voters who think their economic situation
has stayed the same, while those who think their personal economic situation is wors-
ening rather than stagnant are markedly less likely to support the incumbent. The
article does not identify a similar valence asymmetry in support for the incumbent
across evaluations of the national economic situation. Finally, the article utilizes a
population-based survey of Danish voters, asking respondents to evaluate the extent
to which the government can affect their personal economic situation, and look at
how these correlate with voters’ evaluations of their personal economic situation.
The article finds that the voters who believe their own economy is doing better are
less likely to believe the government can affect this.
Taken together, the different analyses in article D all point to the existence of a
self-serving bias in attribution of responsibility, which is driven by voters’ uncertainty
about the extent to which the government, and they themselves are responsible for
certain policy outcomes.
2The article conducts a second survey experiment with a convenience sample to validate the results
from this experiment.






























































(a) Voters’ beliefs about government responsibility for randomly assigned hypothetical economic
outcomes (n = 1, 002). Vertical lines are 95 (thin) and 90 (thick) pct. confidence intervals. See
chapter 9 for details. Housing outcomes: “Imagine that the price of your or your family’s house
[increased/decreased/increased or decreased].” Employment outcomes: “Imagine that you or






























































(b) Voters’ beliefs about government responsibility for randomly assigned hypothetical economic
outcomes (n = 1, 002). Vertical lines are 95 (thin) and 90 (thick) pct. confidence intervals. See chapter
9 for details. Housing outcomes: “Imagine that the price of houses in the country as a whole [in-
creased/decreased/increased or decreased].” Employment outcomes: “Imagine that unemployment
in the country as a whole [increased/decreased/increased or decreased].”




This chapter presents a cohesive answer to the research question presented in chapter
1, summarizing the key theoretical and empirical arguments made in the rest of
the dissertation. Broadly speaking, the chapter concludes that a key impediment to
electoral accountability is that power over policy outcomes is often spread out over
several disparate political actors. When this is the case, it is hard for voters to figure
out who is responsible, and, in turn, who to hold accountable for the quality of policy
outcomes. As a result, voters will not let their decision to re-elect incumbents depend
on the state of policy outcomes and incumbents will be less inclined to pursue the
type of outcomes voters prefer. The chapter also discusses potential implications of
this conclusion for institutional design and voter competence.
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Power Reveals
One of themost widely replicated findings in political science is that electoral support
for incumbent politicians depend on incumbents’ ability to provide a good standard
of living for their citizens. This type of voter behavior is called retrospective voting,
because it implies that voters focus on how politicians have performed in the past.
Retrospective voting carries with it the promise of electoral accountability. Indeed, if
citizens only reelect governing politicians when social and economic conditions are
improving, they make sure that re-election minded politicians have an incentive to
pursue such improvements, and they make sure that politicians who are not able (or
do not care) to pursue them get voted out of office. This link between retrospective
voting and electoral accountability, however, is premised on politicians’ ability to
leave a clear mark on the societies they govern. If politicians do not have this ability,
retrospective voters end up holding politicians accountable for developments they
had little or no responsibility for.
At the same time, it seems clear that incumbent politicians’ power to make a
difference for their voters varies substantially across and within democracies. For
instance, in some cases, a single party can form a government alone, and in others
they have to collaborate with other parties. In some cases, the responsibility for
administering national programs lies with the national government alone, and in
others the national government has to work with local officials.
Taking these considerations as a starting point, the goal of this dissertation has
been to figure out whether and to what extent variation in governments’ power over
policy outcomes shapes patterns electoral accountability.
Through a series of research articles, the dissertation has come to the conclusion
that electoral accountability is concomitant with centralization of power over policy
outcomes in the hands of the government. In particular, the dissertation has found
that when an incumbent government gets more power over policy outcomes, voters
let their decision to re-elect this government depend more strongly on the state of
these outcomes, which then affects the extent to which the government tries to align
the state of policy outcomes with what the voters prefer. A change in incumbent
behavior which seems to be driven entirely by the fact that voters are more likely
to elect politicians that act in voters’ best interest, when governments’ power over
policy outcomes increases (cf. article B).
It is rational for voters to act in this way. As such, when the government’s power
over a policy outcomes increases it becomes easier for voters to identify whether
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the government is aligning the state of this policy outcome with what voters prefer.
Conversely, when the government’s power over a policy outcome decreases, this
policy outcome become less informative as to how the government behaved in office,
and accordingly, a less relevant metric to judge them by. Put differently, when
governing politicians have the power to change the life of the voters for the better or
for the worse, it is easier for voters to know whether they are — in fact – doing so. In
this way, power reveals to the voters what kind of politician they are dealing with,
and voters act on this revelation.
This conclusion is, broadly speaking, consistent with the clarity of responsibil-
ity literature presented in chapter 2, and the dissertation can thus be said to have
provided additional evidence for the clarity of responsibility thesis. In particular,
the dissertation has provided more methodologically rigorous tests of empirical
implications already laid out in the existing literature (e.g., whether clarity of re-
sponsibility plays a causal role in shaping electoral accountability), and explored
hitherto untested empirical implications (e.g., implications for incumbent behav-
ior). In addition to this, the dissertation has also painted a more nuanced picture of
the relationship between governments’ power over policy outcomes and electoral
accountability, than the one put forward in the existing literature.
For one, the dissertation has found that the relationship between responsibility
and accountabilityworks at the level of individual policy outcomes. That is, voters are
able to differentiate between the extent to which the same government has different
levels of power over different policy outcomes, and hold the government accountable
accordingly (cf. article A). If, for instance, an incumbent government is given more
power over a specific policy, then voters will hold the government more accountable
for the outcomes of this policy, but not for the outcome of other policies. This is
potentially quite important, because it means that to the extent that each political
actor is responsible for a clearly demarcated set of policy areas, power sharing across
political actors does not, necessarily, attenuate electoral accountability. More on this
in the next section.
Further, while it is rational for voters to hold their government less electorally
accountable as the government’s power over policy outcomes decrease, there are
also other, less rational, forces which attenuate electoral accountability as power over
policy outcomes diffuses. As such, the dissertation found that when government’s
power over a policy outcome is shared with the voters themselves (e.g., power over
voters’ personal economic situation), voters attribute responsibility for this outcome
in a self-serving way. In particular, to the extent that voters can reasonably hold
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both themselves and the government responsible, they tend to hold the government
more responsible for undesirable outcomes (thus exculpating themselves) and less
responsible for desirable outcomes (thus implicating themselves). Compared to a
rational benchmark, voters can thus be expected to reward politicians too little, and
punish them too much, for outcomes that are the result of government intervention
as well as an individual’s own behavior (cf. article D).
Finally, the dissertation found that as incumbent governments’ time in office
increases, voters’ inclination to hold these incumbents accountable for the present
state of the economy decreases (cf. article C). This runs counter to the clarity of
responsibility thesis, because when incumbents’ time in office increases, so does their
power to shape the current state of the economy. Even so, the negative relationship
between economic voting and incumbent tenure makes sense, if voters only act on
their government’s power over policy outcomes to the extent that more power means
that policy outcomes become more informative as to the government’s type (i.e.,
whether the government is willing and able to act in voters’ best interest). As such,
while governments’ ability to influence the current economic situation increases
with time in office, the overall informativeness of the current economic situation
might very well decrease over time, because voters stock of information about the
government’s type also increases with time in office, crowding out the effect of power
over policy outcomes. In essence, this finding suggests that power only matters when
it reveals.
Implications for Institutional Design
If we are interested in reinforcing electoral accountability, then a straightforward
implication of the conclusions laid out above is that we should prefer political in-
stitutions that centralize power in the hands of few(er) political actors. This type of
centralization will make it easier for voters to identify who is responsible for policy
outcomes, and, in turn, make it easier for voters to reject elected officials who seek,
or who are not able to avoid, undesirable outcomes. If we opt for institutions which
disperse power across a multitude of actors (some of whom might not be up for
election at all), it is hard for voters to know who is responsible for any undesirable
outcome, increasing the chances that elected officials who are unable or unwilling
to align policy outcomes with the electorates’ preferences are left in power by the
clueless, in the sense of not having been provided with a clue, voters.
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This dissertation is not the first to make this type of recommendation in terms
of institutional design. (See, for instance, the Alexander Hamilton quotation which
introduced chapter 1.) In particular, the American good government movement of
the late 19th and early 20th century had centralization of power as a central tenet of
their reform program (Caro, 1974, 59-170). One of the founders of this movement,
WoodrowWilson, expressed the virtues of centralized power as follows:
“And let me say that large powers and unhampered discretion seem to
me the indispensable conditions of responsibility. Public attention must
be easily directed, in each case of good or bas administration, to just the
man deserving of praise or blame. There is no danger in power if it only
be responsible. If it be divided, dealt out in shares of many, it is obscured,
it is made irresponsible” – Wilson (1887, 213)
This idea was powerful enough to have important consequences for institutional
reform in the American States. As such, when the New York constitution was
reformed in the beginning of the 20th century the main thrust of the reform was
centralization of power in the hands of the governor. In fact, the centralization was
proposed as a response to concerns that voters were not be able to hold the current
state government accountable. This is clear from the Reconstruction Commission’s –
which proposed the new constitution – report, which argued that: "It is clear that
if New York wants retrenchment and efficient government it must make some one
responsible who can be held to account and give him power commensurate with his
obligations. There is no other way." Alfred E. Smith, the governor at the time, was
even more direct in his preface to the report: “The people must give the Governor
authority if they want to hold him responsible.”1
The findings from this dissertation suggests that the assertion made by these
good government reformers were correct, and, to the extent that responsibility can
be understood as electoral accountability, the Wilson quote succinctly sums up
this dissertation’s main conclusion: Large powers and unhampered discretion are
indispensable conditions of accountability.
That institutions which centralize power over policy outcomes has a democratic
edge as opposed to those that disperse power is somewhat controversial in the
modern comparative politics literature. Most notably, Lijphart (1984, 1999) who
groups democracies into consensual democracies, where power is shared, and ma-
joritarian democracies, where power is more centralized, suggests that “the overall
1The report, including the governor’s preface can be found at
https://archive.org/details/cu3192401400510
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performance record of the consensus democracies is clearly superior to that of the
majoritarian democracies, [and] the consensus option is the more attractive choice for
countries designing their first democratic constitutions or contemplating democratic
reform” (Lijphart, 1999, 296).
This is the exact opposite recommendation from the one derived from this disser-
tation. However, Lijphart comes to this conclusion by looking at a different set of
indicators than electoral accountability. As such, it might be the case that, on some of
indicators of the quality of democracy, centralizing power has adverse effects, while,
at the same time, it reinforces electoral accountability. For one, Lijphart suggests
that power-sharing might ease tensions in countries with deep religious and ethnic
division (Lijphart, 1984, 295), by making sure that all groups are represented, to
some extent, in the countries’ government. A conclusion which seems reasonable.
It is outside the scope of this dissertation to examine Lijphart’s claims in detail
or to look at whether increasing governments’ power over policy outcomes affects
other aspects of democratic quality than electoral accountability. However, if any
adverse effects exist, then it might be worthwhile to consider whether the findings
in our dissertation might allow for some form of power sharing arrangement, which
does not dilute electoral accountability.
In research article A, we found that when some local governments in Denmark
became more responsible for unemployment services, voters were able to recognize
this and held local officials more accountable for the quality of unemployment
services, but no more responsible for the quality of other services. As mentioned
above, this suggests that voters are able to hold different layers of government
accountable for different policy outcomes, as long as power for specific policies is not
shared across the different layers of government. That is, in a system where local or
provincial governments control one set of policies (e.g., provision of public services)
while national governments control another set of policies (e.g., infrastructure and
national defense), voters should be able to hold officials at all levels accountable for
the policy outcomes they each have power over.
While this institutional set-up might be away to get at power sharing without
attenuating accountability, there is probably a limit to how much power sharing is
viable if one wants to keep the institutions comprehensible. The enormous web of
special purpose jurisdictions in the United States, for instance, probably obscure
accountability even though each jurisdiction, for themost part, only has responsibility
for one policy outcome (Berry, 2009). Even so, in countries like Denmark, where local
and national politicians share power in a number of important policy areas, such as
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provision of most public services, a more clear demarcation of who is responsible for
what, might very well increase electoral accountability, without changing the overall
distribution of political power (across policy outcomes) between the local and the
national level.
Implications for Voter Competence
The main hindrance to effective accountability identified in this dissertation is not
that voters are incompetent. In fact, this dissertation suggest that voters act in quite
sophisticated ways when assigning credit or blame for policy outcomes, recogniz-
ing and acting on the extent to which government has power over specific policy
outcomes. Indeed, the main culprit when it comes to the lapses in accountability is
not voters themselves but institutions which attenuate the relationship between the
behavior of elected officials and the quality of important policy outcomes.
This goes against parts of the existing literature which suggest that voters per-
ceptual and attributional biases are so severe that they can never hold politicians
effectively accountable (e.g., Achen and Bartels, 2016). Instead, this dissertation
suggests, that with the right set of institutions, electoral accountability is a real possi-
bility. Even so, the findings in this dissertation does not challenge the existence of
perceptual or attributional biases in accountability writ large. There is no contradic-
tion between the the presence of meaningful differences in the strength of electoral
accountability across contexts, and the presence of psychological biases which atten-
uate accountability across contexts by, for instance, making voters’ overemphasize
recent performance (e.g., Healy and Lenz, 2014).
Yet it might seem odd that voters can be led astray by perceptual and attribution
biases, while, at the same time, making and acting on fair assessments of their
government’s power over policy outcomes. In relation to this, it is important to note,
that this dissertation has primarily focused on how voters act in the aggregate, rather
than how individual voters attribute responsibility.2 Therefore, this dissertation can
only speak to whether the aggregate electorate, not the individual voter, is able to
hold incumbents accountable in proportion to how implicated they are. This is an
important distinction, because to the extent that voters actions are mediated by the
behavior of political elites, our findings are consistent with individual voters having
2Even in articles A and C, where we use individual-level data, we do not directly examine the the
extent to which voters find the government to be responsible for policy outcomes. In fact, when we
look at how individuals attribute responsibility, as we do in article D, we find that they fall victim to a
psychological bias.
64 | Conclusion
little to no information about the distribution of power over policy outcomes. If,
for instance, incumbents, challengers and the media focus their political attention
on outcomes the government has significant power over, then this might direct
voters (electoral) attention to these outcomes as well, creating a relationship between
government’s power over policy outcomes and the extent to which this government
is held electorally accountable for the quality of these policy outcomes.
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to identify whether the importance
of governments’ power over policy outcomes is, in fact, mediated by the behavior
of political elites, or by individual voters ability to correctly identify and act on
who has the power to shape specific policies. Instead, the point I want to make is
simply that the findings in this dissertation do not have strong implications for voter
competence at the individual level, and the findings should therefore not be seen
as a repudiation or corrective to studies documenting limits to the knowledge and
capacities of individual voters.
A Note on The Dissertation’s Scope of Inference
This dissertation has primarily, though not exclusively, relied on empirical observa-
tions of how politicians and voters behave in the context of local elections in Denmark.
Naturally, this means that one needs to be careful about drawing broad implications,
at least in the absence of corroborating evidence from other parts of the world as
well.
Such evidence is, in part, present in the clarity of responsibility literature dis-
cussed in chapter 2, but, as was also discussed in that chapter, there are limits to what
conclusions one can draw from the existing literature, making it unclear whether it re-
ally counts as corroborating evidence. For instance, it was unclear whether the effect
of power-sharing institutions on the extent of electoral accountability was causal (see
also article A), and it was unclear whether the presence of these institutions affected
the type of policies pursued by incumbent politicians (see also article B). As such,
we cannot know for sure whether the original results travel outside the context(s)
studied in this dissertation, until future studies find, or do not find, corroborating
evidence from other contexts.
Even though it is impossible to reach anydefinite answerswith respect to the scope
of inference of the dissertation, it might still worthwhile to think about whether there
are any features of the context studied here which inherently delimit the scope. The
most important feature in this regard is arguably that the Denmark is a consolidated
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democracy, wheremost political actors respect certain democratic norms. At the same
time, while the variation in Danish local governments’ power over policy outcomes
studied in this dissertation is substantial, the most powerful local government still
has severe limits on the extent of their power. These features of the Danish system
neutralize a potential concern that one might have in relation to centralizing power
over policy outcomes, namely, that if power becomes too concentrated, then the
government might be able to manipulate voters perception of the state of policy
outcomes by censoring the press, or, even worse, infringe upon the integrity of the
electoral process. Accordingly, if one wants to reinforce electoral accountability,
there probably is a limit to how much one would want to concentrate power, and
this limit might be lower in countries where breaches of democratic norms are less
consolidated. However, a large number of solidly democratic political systems should
be able to centralize power, without becoming vulnerable to such threats.
Research Articles
Chapter 6
Is the Relationship between Political Re-
sponsibility and Electoral Accountability
Causal, Adaptive and Policy-specific?
Will voters hold an incumbent more electorally accountable for the quality of a
policy outcome if the incumbent’s political responsibility for the underlying pol-
icy increases? To answer this question, this study exploits a reform of labor market
regulation in Denmark that exogenously assignedmore political responsibility for un-
employment services to some municipal mayors. The study finds that in subsequent
elections these mayors were held more electorally accountable for unemployment
services, but not more accountable for other policy outcomes. This suggests that the
relationship between political responsibility and electoral accountability is causal,
adaptive and tied to specific policies. On balance, the electorate thus seems to be
quite judicious when assigning electoral credit or blame, moderating the extent to
which incumbents are held accountable for specific outcomes based on the extent
to which these incumbents crafted and implemented the policies that shaped these
outcomes.
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Voters hold incumbent politicians accountable for how they perform in office by
making electoral support for these incumbents contingent on the quality of policy
outcomes (for a recent review, see Healy and Malhotra, 2013). These outcomes
include economic conditions (Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck, 1990; Van der Brug, Van der
Eijk and Franklin, 2007), public service provision (Burnett and Kogan, 2017; Tilley
and Hobolt, 2011), plus management of other problems which might arise during an
incumbent’s time in office (e.g., handling of natural disasters, cf. Healy and Malhotra,
2010). While this type of electoral accountability is widespread, it seems to be more
prevalent in some elections than it is in others (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Van der
Brug, Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007). In particular, a large number of studies have
found that the extent to which a political system concentrates or disperses political
responsibility, what is conventionally called ‘clarity of responsibility’, correlates with
the extent to which voters hold governing politicians electorally accountable for the
quality of policy outcomes (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Powell and Whitten, 1993;
Whitten and Palmer, 1999).
This correlation between responsibility and accountability is strong and con-
sistent across many different indicators of clarity of political responsibility. For
instance, studies have shown that voters are less likely to hold incumbents account-
able for the quality of the economic situation if the incumbent operates in an open
economy (Fernández-Albertos, 2006; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007; Hellwig, 2001), if
the incumbent is part of a coalition government (Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013;
Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002), or if the incumbent operates in a federal system
(Anderson, 2006; Cutler, 2008; León, 2011).
Broadly speaking, these studies have been used to infer that electoral accountabil-
ity will “strongly reflect the nature of policymaking in the society and the coherence
and control the government can exert over that policy” (Powell and Whitten, 1993,
398). While this does tell us something important about how political responsibility
relates to electoral accountability, it does not tell us everything.
For one, it is not clear whether the correlation identified in the previous literature
reflects a causal relationship between responsibility and accountability. We know
from the political economy literature that political institutions, like those dispersing
or concentrating political responsibility, are fundamentally endogenous (Acemoglu,
2005; Besley and Case, 2000). Accordingly, it is possible that the observational co-
occurrence between responsibility and accountability is partly or completely driven
by some extraneous, underlying factor. Further, because previous literature has
primarily focused on institutional differences in political responsibility that were
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established a long time ago, we do not know exactly how adaptive the relationship
between electoral accountability and political responsibility is. That is, we do not
know whether voters are quick to adjust to changes in political responsibility, or
whether the correspondence found in previous research is the result of a long-term
process that slowly adjusts levels of accountability to levels of responsibility. Finally,
we know little about the extent to which the relationship is policy-specific. That is,
whether voters recognize and act on differences in the extent to which the same
incumbent is responsible for individual policy outcomes (e.g., unemployment ctr.
inflation). We do not know this because previous research has primarily examined
institutional differences that implicate changes in incumbents’ responsibility for a
wide range of outcomes (e.g., federal contra unitary constitutions), making it impos-
sible to discern whether voters are sensitive to policy-specific differences in political
responsibility. Causality, adaptiveness and policy-specificity are important features
of the relationship between responsibility and accountability, because they all tell
us something about the extent to which voters only hold incumbent politicians elec-
torally accountable for the policy outcomes the politicians had a hand in shaping, and
thus whether voters are able to use elections to select politicians who can competently
manage the policies they are responsible for.
This article re-examines the relationship between political responsibility and
electoral accountability in a context where it possible to cast some light on these
different and largely unexplored features of the relationship between accountability
and responsibility: a reform of labor market regulation in Denmark. The reform
increased municipal mayors’ responsibility for unemployment services, and only
for unemployment services, by making the municipalities responsible for the ad-
ministration of active labor market policies. In 14 municipalities, the reform was
implemented three years before the 2009 municipal elections, and in the remaining
84 municipalities, it was implemented after these elections. The decision about
which municipalities had to implement the reform before the 2009 election was taken
practically unilaterally by the central government, and a closer examination of the
selection process reveals that the central government plausibly chose municipalities
independently of pre-reform levels of electoral accountability. In sum, this reform
presents a rare instance in which assignment of political responsibility for a specific
policy outcome changed abruptly and exogenously, making it possible to examine
whether the relationship between responsibility and accountability is policy-specific,
adaptive and causal.
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Using the Danish Municipal Election Survey (Elklit and Kjær, 2013), I show that
voters in the municipalities where the labor market reform was first implemented,
the treatment municipalities, held the mayor more electorally accountable for the
quality of unemployment services in the election following the reform. This finding
is robust to a number of different model specifications and a number of different
estimation methods. Further analyses show that the voters in these treatment mu-
nicipalities did not hold their mayor more electorally accountable for the quality of
services unaffected by the reform. This immediate adjustment in electoral account-
ability for unemployment services, and only for these services, in response to an
exogenous and recent change in political responsibility, suggests that the relationship
between political responsibility and electoral accountability causal, adaptive and
policy-specific.
This article extends the literature on how incumbents’ political responsibility
shapes voters’ assignment of electoral credit and blame for policy outcomes – a litera-
ture which has, broadly speaking, remained observational and paid little attention to
changes in political responsibility for discrete policy outcomes (e.g., Anderson, 2000;
Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Harding, 2015; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Powell
and Whitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999). Further, with a fairly consensual
multi-party system (Houlberg and Pedersen, 2015), which garners less attention
from voters than national politics (Elklit and Kjær, 2013), the Danish municipalities
provide a hard case in a literature that has mostly focused on national politics, where
sharp divides between opposition and government as well as higher levels of political
attention potentially amplify the relationship between responsibility and account-
ability (De Vries et al., 2011; Duch and Stevenson, 2008). By demonstrating that
voters are able to react in a reasonable way to a change in political responsibility from
one level of government to another, this study also challenges the scope of research
showing that voters have a hard time attributing responsibility in multi-level systems
(Cutler, 2008; Johns, 2011; Sances, 2017). Instead, voters seem, on balance, to be quite
judicious when assigning credit and blame for the quality of policy outcomes to local
politicians.
Challenges in the Study of Responsibility and Accountabil-
ity
When studying the relationship between political responsibility and electoral ac-
countability, existing research has typically: (1) indexed different elections according
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to how much political responsibility economic and political institutions assign to
the incumbent up for reelection; (2) measured how accountable the incumbent was
held in the same elections by correlating electoral support for the incumbent with
a subjective indicator (e.g., perceptions of the national economy) or an objective
indicator (e.g., economic growth) of the quality of policy outcomes; and (3) linked
the responsibility index with the measure of electoral accountability in a statistical
model. Using this approach, a number of scholars have explored the relationship
between responsibility and accountability using different indices of incumbent re-
sponsibility (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Carlin and Singh, 2015; Duch and Stevenson, 2008;
Hellwig and Samuels, 2007; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Nadeau, Niemi and
Yoshinaka, 2002; Paldam, 1991; Powell andWhitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999),
different policy outcomes (De Vries, Edwards and Tillman, 2010; Tavits, 2007; Tilley
and Hobolt, 2011) and different types of elections (Berry and Howell, 2007; Ebeid
and Rodden, 2006). Broadly speaking, these studies have found that in elections
where incumbents have more responsibility for policy outcomes, they are also held
more electorally accountable for the quality of these outcomes.1
This wealth of thorough and innovative studies has gotten us a long way when it
comes to understanding how political responsibility shapes electoral accountability.
However, if one wants to draw more detailed inferences about the relationship be-
tween responsibility and accountability from the extant literature, one faces several
challenges. In particular, based on previous studies, one would have a hard time eval-
uating whether political responsibility has a causal effect on electoral accountability,
a hard time evaluating how quickly voters adapt to changes in political responsibility,
and a hard time evaluating the extent to which voters are sensitive to differences in
how politically responsible incumbents are for different policy outcomes. That is, one
would have a hard time evaluating whether the relationship between responsibility
and accountability is causal, adaptive and policy specific.
1Another set of studies have examined which psychological processes lead voters to attribute
certain outcomes to incumbent politicians (e.g., Gomez and Wilson, 2001; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).
While this literature also examines responsibility in relation to retrospective voting, it does so in a
very different way than the literature discussed here. As such, in this more psychological literature,
responsibility is a subjective belief voters hold, whereas in the literature described above, responsibility
is an objective political condition determined by the mix of political and economic institutions that
characterize the nature of policy-making in a specific polity.
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Causality
Previous studies have almost exclusively analyzed the relationship between respon-
sibility and accountability by looking at the correlation between the presence of
institutions which manipulate incumbent responsibility and the extent to which
voters hold incumbents electorally accountable (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). At the
same time, however, most researchers agree that one can rarely estimate the causal
effect of institutions using standard observational studies (Aghion, Alesina and
Trebbi, 2004; Besley and Case, 2000; Meyer, 1995), because institutions are typically
endogenous to the outcomes of interests (Acemoglu, 2005; Przeworski, 2004). Accord-
ingly, it is possible that the relationship between responsibility and accountability is
confounded.
This possibility looms large if one takes a close look at some of the specific
institutions that have been used to get at the relationship between responsibility
and accountability. For instance, a number of studies have shown that a country’s
economic openness is negatively correlated with how electorally accountable its
executive is held for the economic situation (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fernández-
Albertos, 2006; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007; Hellwig, 2001). These studies argue
that this correlation is driven by the fact that economic openness decreases political
responsibility for economic outcomes. However, economic openness is also known
to be correlated with the extent to which countries provide social protection to those
who are unemployed (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1996), and we know from studies of
economic voting, that economically vulnerable voters are more likely to punish and
reward governing politicians for the state of the economy (Fossati, 2014; Pacek and
Radcliff, 1995; Singer, 2013b). Accordingly, when researchers find that voters are less
likely to hold their government electorally accountable for the economic situation
in countries with an open economy, this might be because open economies have
extensive social protections for their citizens, leaving citizens in these countries less
worried about short-term fluctuations in the economy.
Another example of a potentially endogenous institution can be found in studies
demonstrating that single party governments are more likely to be held electorally
accountable for the economic situation than multi-party governments (Anderson,
2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002). This
might be because it is harder to asses who is responsible for economic outcomes
in a coalition government, but it might also be the result of another difference be-
tween coalition and single party governments. However, a number of studies have
documented that partisans generally refrain from holding their own party elec-
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torally accountable for economic outcomes (Bisgaard, 2015; Kayser and Wlezien,
2011; Rudolph, 2006), attributing any poor performance to some other factor than the
competence of their preferred party (Tilley andHobolt, 2011). Coalition governments
are typically larger, electorally speaking, than single party governments. Accordingly,
there will probably also be more voters who feel attached to a government party in
a coalition government. When comparing the level of electoral accountability for
single and multi-party governments, one may therefore be picking up the effect of
differences in the number of government partisans rather than differences in the
levels of incumbent responsibility.
These examples are not exhaustive in the sense that they cover all institutions
which have been used to index how politically responsible the incumbent is for policy
outcomes. Even so, these examples hopefully illustrate how the existing literature is
challenged when it comes to identifying the causal effect of political responsibility
on electoral accountability.
Adaptiveness of Accountability
Another interesting feature of the relationship between responsibility and account-
ability is how adaptive it is. That is, whether voters respond swiftly to short-term
changes in political responsibility, continually adjusting how accountable incum-
bents are held for various outcomes, or whether this adjustment process works more
slowly.
Previous studies have not paid much attention to the question of adaptiveness,
mainly focusing on differences in incumbent responsibility which rarely change
or which change slowly and incrementally (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Ebeid
and Rodden, 2006). This makes it hard to know how voters respond to sudden
shifts in political responsibility. Some studies do examine more dynamic aspects
of political responsibility, focusing on institutions which allocate different degrees
of responsibility for policy outcomes to incumbent politicians over time within the
same political unit (e.g., Carlin and Singh, 2015; Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002).
By focusing on this type of time-sensitive variation in the assignment of political
responsibility, such studies could potentially tell us something about how adaptive
the relationship between responsibility and accountability is. Yet these studies have
rarely leveraged the dynamic nature of these institutions when examining how they
affect electoral accountability. Instead they pool, either completely or partially, the
within and between unit variation, making it impossible to get at whether the time-
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sensitive (within unit) variation in political responsibility correlates with the extent
to which voters hold incumbents accountable.
Adaptiveness is potentially quite important, because if voters are not adaptive,
they risk holding their incumbent accountable for the quality of some outcome the
incumbent is no longer responsible for – or they risk failing to hold the incumbent to
account for the quality of an outcome the incumbent has recently become respon-
sible for. Also, a lack of adaptiveness can give incumbents an incentive to neglect
policy areas where they have recently become more politically responsible, because
incumbents know that they will not be held accountable for their performance in
these areas.
Policy-specificity
The existing literature has primarily examined the relationship between responsibility
and accountability in terms of the economic and political institutions which affect
how responsible incumbents are for a large set of policy outcomes. For instance,
constitutional design (Anderson, 2006; Carlin and Singh, 2015), which broadly shapes
incumbents’ ability to affect economic and social outcomes, or different parliamentary
practices (Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Whitten
and Palmer, 1999), which shape incumbents’ executive and legislative discretion
across all policy areas. This focus on responsibility for a diverse and not clearly
demarcated set of outcomes has made it difficult to assess how policy-specific voters
arewhen they hold incumbents electorally accountable. In particular, we do not know
whether voters link responsibility to accountability at the level of individual policy
outcomes, weighing each outcome according to how responsible the government is
for that specific outcome, or whether voters link responsibility and accountability at
a more aggregate level, using different policy outcomes to form an overall evaluation
of how their polity is doing, and then weigh this overall evaluation based on how
responsible the incumbent is for policy outcomes in general.2
The previous literature cannot discriminate between a policy-specific and a more
general relationship, because it looks at differences in incumbent responsibility for a
diffuse set of policy outcomes (although for important exceptions, see Arceneaux,
2It is not theoretically straightforward to predict which of these approaches voters will adopt. On
the one hand, adopting a policy-specific strategy seems to be more rational if one simply wants to
learn more about the incumbent’s competence (for evidence of this, see the appendix of Achen and
Bartels, 2016). On the other hand, voters are often interested in employing heuristics and mental
shortcuts (Downs, 1957; Kuklinski, Quirk et al., 2000). One such mental shortcut might be to link
responsibility and accountability at an aggregate rather than a policy-specific level.
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2006; Ruder et al., 2014). If one wanted to make inferences about policy-specificity,
then one would need to examine a difference in political responsibility which only
covered a discrete set of policy outcomes. In this case, it would be possible to examine
policy-specificity by investigating whether voters only differed in how electorally
accountable they held the incumbent for the policy outcomes for which there was an
underlying difference in political responsibility, or whether electoral accountability
for other outcomes was affected as well.
The Contribution of this Study
By focusing on a reform which changed political responsibility for a specific policy,
the present study enables us to get at whether the relationship between responsibility
and accountability is policy-specific. That is, we can examine whether voters only
hold local incumbents more electorally accountable for the policy outcome affected
by the reform, or whether voters hold incumbents more electorally accountable for
other policy outcomes as well. Further, because we examine the effect of the reform
at the first election after its implementation, any effect that we do find will reflect a
relationship between responsibility and accountability which is reasonably adaptive.
Finally, as discussed in more detail below, the assignment of the implementation of
the reform which changed political responsibility was arguably exogenous, making
it possible to identify the causal effect of the reform of electoral accountability.
Analyzing the extent to which the relationship between responsibility and ac-
countability is causal, adaptive and policy-specific is important, because it tells us
something about how adept voters are at electing competent politicians. In particular,
all these factors make it more likely that voters only hold incumbents electorally
accountable for outcomes the incumbent had a hand in shaping, which should, in
turn, make it easier for voters to identify whether incumbent politicians have their
best interests in mind, and reward them with reelection if they do (cf. Achen and
Bartels, 2016; Anderson, 2006; Ashworth, 2012; Duch and Stevenson, 2008).3
3Too see this, note that if the relationship between responsibility and accountability is causal, then
voters respond to changes in responsibility by holding incumbents more electorally accountable. If
the relationship is policy-specific, then voters are more likely to shift their attention away from policy
outcomes which incumbents have little responsibility for, and towards outcomes incumbents have
more responsibility for. If the relationship is adaptive, then voters are more likely to act on the current
distribution of political responsibility when holding incumbents accountable.
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Research Design: Reform of Labor Market Regulation
In 2006, the administrative boundaries of Denmark were fundamentally redrawn,
both in terms of geography, as 271 municipalities became 98, but also in terms of
policy responsibilities, as the municipalities gained new responsibilities and lost
others. Unfortunately, from a research standpoint, most of this extensive reform was
implemented in all municipalities at the same time, making it hard to test how it af-
fected themunicipalities (although aspects of the reform have been leveraged in other
contexts: see Bhatti and Hansen, 2011; Blom-Hansen, Houlberg and Serritzlew, 2014;
Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011). One part of the reform, however, was not implemented
at once, but in two steps: a reform of labor market regulation, which transferred
the political responsibility for unemployment services from various agencies to
municipal mayors.
Unemployment services constitute an important part of public service provision
in Denmark. As such, Danish labor market policy has long been premised on the
idea that the day-to-day interaction with the unemployed individual is important for
reducing structural unemployment (Torfing, 1999). This idea is mirrored in spending
priorities. According to the OECD, expenditures towards unemployment services
(i.e., active labor market policies) represented 1.82 percent of the Danish GDP in 2013
compared to just 0.23 percent in the United Kingdom (OECD, 2016).
The labor market reform was first implemented in 14 municipalities (out of 98) in
the beginning of 2007 and then implemented fully in 2010 (Ministry of Employment
















Figure 6.1 Labor Market Reform timeline. Labor Market Reform I was in the 14
“treatment” municipalities, Labor Market Reform II was the remaining “control”
municipalities.
This reform provides a unique opportunity to investigate how voters react when
incumbents get more political responsibility. As such, we can use the municipal elec-
4The muncipalities were: Odense, Esbjerg, Vejle, Næstved, Herning, Sønderborg, Holbæk, Hels-
ingør, Skanderborg, Høje-Taastrup, Thisted, Brønderslev-Dronninglund, Rudersdal and Rebild (Order
1400, 2006).
Research Design: Reform of Labor Market Regulation | 77
tions that took place in 2009 to compare the beliefs and behavior of the voters in the 14
municipalities where the mayor got more responsibility for unemployment services
before the election – the treatment municipalities – with the beliefs and behavior of
the voters in the 84 municipalities where the mayor did not get more responsibility
until 2010 – the control municipalities. If the relationship between political responsi-
bility and electoral accountability is causal, adaptive and policy-specific, then voters
in the treatment municipalities should hold their mayor more electorally accountable
for unemployment services than voters in the control municipalities.
To draw such inferences, however, one needs to make two assumptions about the
reform. One is about the nature of the reform; that the reform exclusively affected
municipal mayors’ political responsibility for unemployment services. The other is
about the assignment of the municipalities to early implementation of the reform
(i.e., assignment to treatment); that assignment was independent of existing and
potential levels of electoral accountability.5 Below, I explain why it is reasonable to
make these assumptions about the reform, and then I present the data used to study
the effect of the reform.
The Reform Only Affected Responsibility for Unemployment Services
The reform of labor market regulation made municipalities politically responsible
for helping so-called ‘insured workers’ get back to work if they lost their job (i.e.,
the three-fourths of all workers who were members of an unemployment insurance
fund). Before the reform was implemented, the national government and the unem-
ployment insurance funds were responsible for the insured workers, whereas the
municipalities were responsible for uninsured workers. The reform removed the
unemployment insurance funds and the national government from the equation, and
gave each municipality unilateral responsibility for all those who were out of a job
in that municipality (Order 1400, 2006; Eskelinen 2008). After the reform, the munci-
palities were solely responsible for helping employers look for employees, finding
and financing retraining for all unemployed workers, assisting unemployed workers
with special needs, and for doing all this while maintaining efficient employment
agencies.
5These assumptions roughly correspond to the exclusion and independence (or exogeneity) as-
sumptions laid out by Dunning (2012) and Gerber and Green (2012). Along with the assumption of
non-interference between units, they constitute the central assumptions needed to draw causal infer-
ences. We do not discuss the non-interference assumption in detail, because political responsibility
could not spillover to neighboring municipalities.
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It is important to note that the reform did not simply increase local politicians’
‘functional responsibility’ for unemployment services (i.e., sense of obligation for
unemployment services), but also their ‘causal responsibility’ (i.e., opportunity to
affect the quality of unemployment services) (for details on these concepts, see
Arceneaux, 2006, 735). Put differently, after the reform, the municipalities had more
power – in the form of policy discretion and resources – to shape unemployment
services for the better or for the worse.
While the reform ostensibly had an effect on who was politically responsible for
unemployment services, reforms tend to be messy and have a very diverse set of long
and short term consequences. In light of this, one might suspect that the assignment
to the implementation of the labor market reform had important side-effects that
could pose threats to the inferences I want to make below. However, if one examines
the nature of the reform inmore detail, such potential side-effects are not forthcoming.
For one, the reform presents a very clean change in political responsibility for a
specific policy: no responsibilities outside the area of unemployment services were
conferred and no alternative regulation was implemented as part of the reform
(Ministry of Employment 2010; Act 483, 2009).6
The Change in Responsibility was Exogenous
If one wants to draw causal inferences based on the selection of some municipalities
for the early implementation of the labor market reform, then this selection process
should be independent of existing and potential levels of electoral accountability
(Gerber and Green, 2012). If it is not, one risks confounding the effect of the reform
with the effect of being the type of municipality which is assigned to early imple-
mentation. Several factors surrounding the assignment of municipalities to early
implementer status makes it likely that it was independent of existing and potential
levels of electoral accountability.
First, the selection process was confined to municipalities within a single coun-
try at a single point in time. This makes it possible to rule out a host of possible
confounders, such as macro-social developments and country-specific factors like
culture and history.
Second, the final decision about whichmunicipalities were assigned to implement
the reform early was made by the central government rather than the municipalities
themselves. In particular, employees at the ministry as well as the minister prepared
6See section S1 of the supplementary materials for some additional evidence of the fact that the
reform did not have any important side-effects.
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a list of municipalities which was then approved by the parties that voted for the
reform in Parliament (Ministry of Employment, 2006).
Third, and most importantly, it seems likely that the ministry’s assignment of mu-
nicipalities to early implementation was independent of the municipalities’ existing
or potential levels of electoral accountability for unemployment services. For one, it
is not clear that the ministry would have known what the level of electoral account-
ability for unemployment services was in the individual municipalities. Even if the
ministry knew the levels, it is not clear that the team would have had an incentive
to assign municipalities to early implementation based on these levels. There could
feasibly have been an incentive to pick municipalities which generally fared better
when it came to handling unemployment services, because these were more likely
to make the reform look like a success (although I do not find any such imbalances
between early and late implementers, cf. table 6.1), but it is unclear why the ministry
should be interested in implementing the reform in places where the level of electoral
accountability for unemployment services was particularly high (or low). Finally,
even if the ministry did know and, for some reason, favored types of municipalities
which had higher levels of electoral accountability, there were political forces at work
which, arguably, muted any political favoritism.
When the reformwas being negotiated, several actorswere highly critical of giving
the municipalities responsibility for unemployment services. As such, both the large
unions and employer organizations, as well as the minority government’s usual ally,
in parliament, the Danish People’s Party, were doubtful that the municipalities were
up to the task (Kristensen, 2008, 88). Accordingly, there was pressure on the Ministry
of Employment not to ‘cherry-pick’ municipalities based on past performance. As
a person close to the selection process expressed it: “We were allowed to send up
a test-balloon, but it was extremely important that they [the municipalities] were
balanced.”7 This sentiment is also mirrored in a a press statement published by the
Ministry of Employment, explaining how the 14 municipalities had been selected.
In the statement, the Minister of Employment was quoted as saying that the goal
had been to select “big as well as small municipalities, in cities as well as in rural
areas”. More generally, the Minister said “that the goal was to spread them out
across the country” (Ministry of Employment 2006, author’s translation). As such,
specific types of municipalities were not targeted in the selection process. This is
confirmed by looking at how the chairman of the organization Local Government
7Interview with Jan Handeliowitz, former employee at the Ministry of Employment. Author’s
translation.
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Denmark, an organization representing the municipalities, reacted to the selection
process. He said that the ministry’s decision insured that “a broad cross section of
municipalities [are represented], both size-wise and geographically.” (Ritzau, 2006,
author’s translation). Additional evidence suggesting that the selection process was
not politically motivated can be found if one looks at the reaction to the ministry’s
decision among those who were very critical of the reform: the unions and the
employer organizations. As far as I have been able to determine, none of these
political organizations officially criticized the government for having selected a
biased or problematic set of municipalities for early implementation.8
Taken together, these factors suggest that the selection of the 14 early implement-
ing municipalities was independent of existing and potential patterns of accountabil-
ity. That is, based on the evidence presented here, there is reason to believe that the
change in political responsibility for unemployment services was exogenous. This
assertion is revisited below, where we show that the municipalities were balanced
on important covariates.
Data and Measuring Electoral Accountability
To analyze the electoral consequences of the reform, I use the Danish municipal
election survey (Elklit and Kjær, 2013). The 2009 election survey is of special interest,
since this is where electorates in the treatment and control municipalities were
governed bymayors with different levels of responsibility for unemployment services
(cf. figure 6.1). Even so, the 2013 and 2005 surveys are used as well to test whether
the electorates of the treatment and control municipalities differed before treatment
(2005), and after all municipalities were treated (2013). Respondents in the municipal
election surveys were recruited within six weeks of the municipal election using
stratified random sampling in order to ensure that at least 30 respondents in each of
the 98 Danish municipalities participated in the survey. The surveys are conducted
partly via a web-survey and partly over the phone (for details about the surveys, see
Elklit and Kjær, 2013).9
To measure the extent to which the mayor was held electorally accountable for
unemployment services, I examine the correlation between voters evaluation of
unemployment services and their propensity to support the municipal mayor (a
8This conclusion is based on an examination of all newspaper stories mentioning the reform in the
month following the announcement of the assignment of municipalities to early-implementer status
in the three major Danish broadsheets (Jyllands Posten, Politiken and Berlingske).
9The 2005 survey differs in this respect as it is not stratified according to municipality.
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typical measure of electoral accountability, cf. Carlin and Singh, 2015; Duch and
Stevenson, 2008; Stevenson and Duch, 2013), interpreting a higher correlation as
evidence that the mayor is being held more electorally accountable for the quality
of unemployment services. To assess voters’ evaluation of unemployment services,
the following survey item is used: “How satisfied or unsatisfied are you in general
with the municipality’s efforts towards the unemployed?” Answers were recorded
on a five-point Likert scale going from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied”.10 To
measure support for the incumbent mayor, I look at whether respondents reported
voting for the incumbent mayor’s party at the municipal election. Respondents who
did not vote and respondents who could not remember which party they voted for
are omitted from the analysis.11
This measure of electoral accountability is not perfect, and will probably contain
some measurement error. In particular, the measure might also capture, at least in
part, the extent to which voters form beliefs about unemployment services based
on who they vote for (so-called motivated reasoning, cf. Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).
Accordingly, this measure might overestimate the level of electoral of accountability
in each municipality. Even so, we will still be able to get an unbiased estimate of the
difference between treatment and control, as long as this measurement error is not
correlated with treatment status (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, chap. 5).12
All survey items used in the analysis are described in section S2 of the supple-
mentary materials, and descriptive statistics on all variables can be found in section
S3 of the supplementary materials.
Analysis
The goal of this analysis is to find out whether voters in the treatment municipalities
held their mayor more electorally accountable for the quality of unemployment
services than voters in the control municipalities. The analysis will also explore
10The survey-item on unemployment services was not included in the 2013 survey. The large reform
in 2005 meant that a majority of municipalities had been amalgamated, and therefore most voters
did have an incumbent mayor in the 2005 election. Therefore, I can only effectively measure electoral
accountability for unemployment services in the 2009 election.
11Support for the mayoral party is used to measure support for the mayor, because voters do not
elect mayors directly in Denmark. Rather, they elect members of a city council, and the city council
then appoints a mayor right after the election (Houlberg and Pedersen, 2015). Municipal elections in
Denmark are held every four years in November. The electoral system is proportional representation
and in most municipalities there is a multi-party system which mirrors the national party system.
12In the section ’Alternative Explanations’, this assumption is discussed further and tested empiri-
cally (see also section S8 of the supplementary materials).
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whether mayors in treatment municipalities were held more electorally accountable
for the quality of other services as well. In addition to this, I examine the viability
of some alternative explanations. Before these analyses are presented, however, a
balance-test and a manipulation check is laid out in order to investigate whether
assignment to treatment (ie., early implementation of the reform) was exogenous to
electoral accountability, and whether being assigned to treatment had an impact on
voters’ beliefs about the distribution of political responsibility.
Balance Test and Manipulation Check
Table 6.1 compares treatment and control municipalities, before they were treated,
on a number of individual-level and municipality-level variables. For the individual-
level variables there are no statistically meaningful differences. Most importantly,
there are no differences across treatment and control on several variables that are
likely to be highly correlated with electoral accountability, such as knowledge about
municipal powers and interest in local politics (Vries and Giger, 2014). This is consis-
tent with the qualitative evidence, laid out above, which suggested that implementa-
tion of the reform was assigned to municipalities independently of existing levels of
electoral accountability. If particular types of electorates had a higher probability of
being assigned to early implementation, it seems likely that one would be able to
identify systematic differences across treatment and control municipalities, but no
such differences are identified.
The municipal level variables paint roughly the same picture. Across the different
variables, only one shows a significant difference between the two groups – the
treatment municipalities had a slightly larger number of inhabitants than the control
municipalities. Even so, examining the standardized differences for the remaining
municipal level variables, there does seem to be some substantial, though statistically
insignificant, differences across treatment and control. This is not that surprising.
The number of observations at the municipal level is relatively low, which means
that the random variation between treatment and control could be relatively high.
Nonetheless, these random imbalances might skew the results one way or another.
When analyzing the differences between the treatment and control municipalities
below, I take this issue into account by controlling for the municipal level variables
which have the largest standardized differences (i.e., proportion of national gov-
ernment voters/mayors, female office seekers, non-Western citizens and number of
inhabitants).
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Table 6.1Were the treatment and control municipalities different?
Variable Treatment Control Std. dif. p-value n
Individual-level variables (2005)
Informed 0.44 0.45 -0.07 0.16 1996
Interested 0.63 0.64 -0.06 0.31 1884
Unemployment performance 0.47 0.48 -0.03 0.68 1454
Knowledge about municipal powers 0.70 0.71 -0.05 0.37 2011
Elderly performance 0.64 0.67 -0.09 0.15 1534
Housing performance 0.74 0.75 -0.05 0.40 1944
Ideology 0.69 0.70 -0.00 0.97 2011
Apathy 0.14 0.15 -0.00 0.93 1988
Obligation 0.95 0.96 -0.07 0.25 2000
Satisfaction with municipal democracy 0.52 0.52 -0.02 0.71 1975
Pivotality 0.45 0.46 -0.00 0.95 1875
Municipality-level variables (2006)
Population density (log) 2.18 2.25 -0.12 0.60 98
More than high-school educ. (pct.) 23.10 21.54 0.19 0.51 98
Unemployment rate (pct.) 2.16 2.31 -0.14 0.48 98
Citizens with non-Western origins (log) 2.39 2.32 0.27 0.27 98
Female municipal office-seekers (pct.) 28.13 30.39 -0.46 0.13 98
Municipal tax rate (pct.) 24.55 24.77 -0.23 0.31 98
Social transfers (log) 4.13 4.13 0.03 0.91 98
Services contracted out (0-100 scale) 21.90 22.78 -0.22 0.35 98
Spending on active labor market (log) 3.21 3.20 0.06 0.77 98
Inhabitants (log) 4.82 4.58 0.69 0.00 98
National government voters 0.42 0.38 0.31 0.17 98
National government mayor 0.64 0.45 0.38 0.20 98
Individual-level variables from the 2005 municipal election survey, see Appendix A for
detailed description. Municipal-level variables taken from Statistics Denmark. p-values
from difference in means test. National government voters is the proportion of voters who
voted for parties in government at the municipal election in 2005. Standardized difference
computed as difference inmeans divided by standard deviation in the control group. Heavily
skewed variables presented on a logarithmic scale.
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Another relevant issue is whether voters in the treated municipalities actually
updated their beliefs about the mayor’s responsibility for unemployment services.
That is, whether the reform actually registeredwith the voters. Unfortunately, there is
no question in the municipal election survey that directly probes voters’ beliefs about
the extent of their mayor’s responsibility for unemployment services. However, there
are two questions which ask respondents about how much political responsibility
local politicians have for conditions in the municipality in general. The first of these
questions ask voters whether the mayor and other local officials (rather than national
politicians) has the primary responsibility for how the municipality developed in the
last four years. The second question asks voters about the extent to which the mayor
has had an effect on the well-being of the municipality. Analyzing voters’ responses
to these questions, I find that the voters in the treatment municipalities believed
that their local politicians were more responsible for and had greater a influence
on conditions in their municipality (p < 0.05; see section S4 of the supplementary
materials for details).
Electoral Accountability for Unemployment Services
Figure 6.2 plots the conditional probability of supporting the mayoral party in the
2009 election across voters’ satisfaction with unemployment services in the treatment
and in the control municipalities. The figure also plots a linear fit of the relationship
between voters’ satisfactionwith unemployment services and support for themayoral
party. This graphical analysis allows us to compare the extent to which voters’
evaluations of unemployment services shape incumbent support in the treatment
versus the control municipalities.
The figure shows that support for the mayoral party was more closely related
to voters’ evaluation of unemployment services in the treatment municipalities.
Accordingly, the increase in local political responsibility for unemployment services
seems to be associated with an increase in the extent to which voters punished and
rewarded local incumbents for the quality of these services.
To investigate further, I estimate a regressionmodelwhich sets the probability that
the respondent voted for the mayoral party as a logistic function of the respondent’s
evaluation of the municipality’s performance in the area of unemployment services,
an indicator variable determining whether the respondent lived in a treatment or
a control municipality, as well as an interaction between the two. The model also
includes a small number of control variables: voters’ satisfaction with elderly care




























































Figure 6.2 Solid lines reflect the predicted probability of voting for the mayoral party across satis-
faction with unemployment services in treatment and control municipalities with 95 pct. confidence
intervals. The predictions are derived from a linear probability model with a treatment by unemploy-
ment services interaction. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. Interaction estimate is
statistically significantly different from zero (t(1521) = 2.08, p = 0.04). Dots are conditional probabili-
ties estimated from the sample (n = 1, 522). The dashed line in the “Treatment” plot reflects the slope
from the “Control” plot.
about how powerful the municipal administration is.13 These variables are meant
to reduce the error term of the model, and control for trends in performance and
beliefs about how responsible local politicians are for economic and social outcomes.
Since the treatment was assigned to municipalities, standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level when estimating the model. The estimates from this model are
presented in column one of table 6.2.
The primary estimate of interest is the interaction between treatment and unem-
ployment performance. This coefficient indicates whether voters’ evaluation of the
quality of unemployment services was more or less closely tied to the propensity
to vote for the mayoral party in the treatment municipalities. The coefficient is sta-
tistically significant (p < 0.05) and positive. This means that satisfaction with the
municipality’s unemployment services mattered more in the municipalities where
the mayor had more political responsibility for unemployment services. The re-
maining coefficients in the model have the expected sign, and, apart from housing
performance, are all statistically significant.
13I also estimated a more simple logistic model, without any controls. The interaction estimate in
this simple model is also statistically significant, and of roughly the same size as the one presented in
column one of table 6.2.
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A similar picture emerges if one derives the average marginal effects (AMEs) of
satisfaction with unemployment services for the treatment and control municipalities
(for a description of the statistical properties of AMEs, see Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan,
2013). The AMEs are reported at the bottom of column one in table 6.2, and they
reveal that in the control municipalities, the result of going from one end of the
unemployment scale to the other end is an average increase in the probability of
voting for themayoral party of 17 percentage points. In the treatment group, the result
is an increase of 36 percentage points, a difference which is statistically significant
(p < 0.05) and quite large: the AME for voters in the treatment municipalities is twice
that for voters in the control municipalities.
Table 6.2 Logistic regression of probability of voting for the mayoral party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment performance 0.82∗ 0.83∗ 0.94∗ 0.85∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.36) (0.35)
Treatment -0.61 -0.59 -0.52 -0.63
(0.39) (0.40) (0.43) (0.41)
Treatment * Unemployment performance 1.00∗ 0.98+ 1.25∗ 1.33∗
(0.51) (0.52) (0.62) (0.58)
Administration controls municipality -0.36+ -0.46∗ -0.48∗ -0.43+
(0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24)
Elderly performance 0.76∗ 0.81∗ 1.03∗ 1.03∗
(0.23) (0.25) (0.33) (0.30)
Housing performance 0.38 0.31 -0.13 0.04
(0.29) (0.30) (0.38) (0.39)
Sociodemographic controls X X X
Political controls X X
Municipal level variables X
AME (Control) 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
AME (Treatment) 0.36 0.35 0.26 0.25
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)
Difference (T-C) 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.15
p-value of difference 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.41 0.42
Log likelihood -921 -894 -561 -552
Observations 1522 1500 1500 1500
Robust standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
These analyses indicate that there is a causal relationship between political re-
sponsibility and electoral accountability. In the municipalities where the mayor was
exogenously assigned more responsibility for unemployment services, the mayor’s
party was also held more electorally accountable for the quality of these services.
The analyses also imply that there is quite an adaptive relationship between responsi-
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bility and accountability. The reform which affected how responsible the municipal
mayor was for unemployment services was implemented just three years prior to
the election analyzed above. In spite this, voters did respond to the change, holding
their mayor more electorally accountable.
Below, I show that these results are quite robust. In particular, I addmore controls
to the regression model estimated above, then I try out some alternative estimation
techniques, and finally, I re-analyze the effects of the reform using a difference-in-
difference approach.
Additional controls: First, a number of socio-demographic variables are included
in the regression model (i.e., age, gender education, occupational status, and local
media consumption). The controls are included in the model estimated in the second
column of table 6.2. Introducing these controls only shifts the estimates slightly, and
the difference in AMEs between the treatment and control municipalities remains
statistically significant (p < 0.05). Second, a set of political variables are added to
the model. To gauge partisanship, I include a control for whether the respondent
would vote for the mayor’s party if a national election was held tomorrow, and
a variable indicating whether the respondent shares the ideological orientation
of the mayor. I also include a variable indicating whether the mayor was from
the same party as one of the governing parties at the national level, something
which might make the mayor susceptible to blame for unemployment services (cf.
Cutler, 2008). These political controls are included in the third column of table
6.2. Introducing the political controls reduces the overall AME of unemployment
performance, but does not substantially reduce the difference between the treatment
and control municipalities, which remains statistically significant. Finally, a battery
of municipal level control variables are included. The municipal level variables
included are the ones for which the balance test revealed a substantial imbalance (cf.
above). These controls are included in column four of table 6.2. The interaction effect
and difference in AMEs remain statistically significant in this specification as well.
Alternative Estimation Methods: Section S5 of the supplementary materials
examines whether the results are sensitive to alternative ways of estimating the inter-
action effect and its sampling variability. Specifically, I use a multi-level logit model
and a form of randomization inference. Using these alternative estimation methods,
the difference in the AME of unemployment performance between treatment and
control municipalities remains statistically significant (p < .05 for multi-level models,
p < 0.1 for randomization inference).
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ADifference in difference approach: Section S6 of the supplementary materials
examines whether similar results can be obtained using a difference-in-difference
approach. Here, data from the 2005 and 2009 municipal election surveys are pooled
in order to estimate a model which examines whether the difference in the effect
of unemployment services between treatment and control municipalities is differ-
ent across the two elections. This controls for any pre-treatment differences there
might have been in levels of electoral accountability for unemployment services. This
analysis reveals that there are no apparent differences across treatment and control
municipalities in 2005, and that the difference identified in 2009 is statistically distin-
guishable from the difference in 2005 (p < 0.1). In sum, the difference-in-difference
analysis reaffirms the findings from the more simple analysis presented in table 6.2.
It is important to note, however, that due to the large municipal reform in 2006 the
2005 and 2009 data are not perfectly comparable, making the cross-sectional 2009
analysis my preferred test of whether the reform affected electoral accountability for
unemployment services (see the supplementary materials for details).
Electoral accountability for other outcomes
If voters link responsibility and accountability at a general level, rather than at the
level of each specific policy, then changes in political responsibility for one policy
outcome should lead voters to hold elected officials more electorally accountable
for other policy outcomes as well. To investigate whether this was the case in this
context, I look at how electorally accountable voters in the treatment and control
municipalities held their mayor for the quality of two types of public services not
affected by the labor market reform: housing and elderly care. These two types of
services are privileged because they represent a key policy that local governments
typically deal with, housing, and a service which shares several features of the
unemployment services examined above, elderly care.14 In addition to this, I look at
ideological congruence with the mayoral party to see if voters are more electorally
responsive to their mayor’s ideological orientation in the treatment municipalities.
To examine electoral accountability for these alternative policies, an extended
version the model presented in the fourth column of table 6.2 is estimated. This
model adds interactions between the treatment indicator and voters’ satisfaction
14In particular, elderly care only directly affects a certain target population (i.e., the elderly), sim-
ilarly to how unemployment services only affect the unemployed. Elderly care is also similar to
unemployment services in that it is a public service which consists of direct contact with municipal
employees.
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with their municipality’s housing management, their municipality’s elderly care and
voters’ ideological congruence with their municipality’s mayor. Figure 6.3 graphs
the key estimates derived from this extended model – the AMEs of the alternative
policy variables across voters living in the treatment and control municipalities. For




































Figure 6.3 Average marginal effects of different variables on probability of voting
for the mayoral party in treatment and control municipalities. All average marginal
effects derived from an augmented version the model presented in the fourth column
of table 6.2 which includes interactions between each variable and the treatment
indicator; McFadden R2 = 0.41, n = 1, 500. Wald tests used to compare the different
AMEs. The vertical lines are 90 pct. (thick) and 95 pct. (thin) confidence intervals.
As can be seen from figure 6.3, there are no statistically discernible differences
across treatment and control municipalities for the AMEs of elderly care, housing and
ideology. This is in contrast to unemployment services, where there is a substantial
and statistically significant difference.15
In sum, there is no sign that voters held their mayor more electorally accountable
for other policy outcomes than the one for which additional political responsibility
15Section S7 of the supplementary materials analyzes the robustness of these results by running
similar analyses for a number of other policy areas. The results of these analyses are laid out in section
S7 of the supplementary materials. Among the seven additional policies examined, there is not a
single statistically significant difference between the treatment and control municipalities.
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was conferred, suggesting that the relationship between responsibility and account-
ability was policy specific.
In addition to policy-specificity, these findings also speak to the question of
whether the relationship between responsibility and accountability for unemploy-
ment services identified in table 6.2 is causal. If there were differences across treat-
ment and control municipalities in how accountable voters held their mayor for some
other type of performance, then this might have been because the electorates in the
treatment municipalities were more likely to attribute political responsibility for all
types of outcomes to the mayoral party in the 2009 election – irrespective of any
objective differences in political responsibility. In this sense, the analysis of the other
policy areas can also be interpreted as a placebo test.
Alternative explanations: Political attention and Priming
When a policy area is subject to increased political subjugation it seems natural that it
will become more politically contested. Accordingly, increased local political respon-
sibility for unemployment services in a municipality could have lead to increased
local political attention to this issue in the campaign, priming the issue in the minds
of the voter (Krosnick and Kinder, 1990). Based on this, one might wonder: is the
change in electoral accountability for unemployment services really based on the
fact that this issue was “primed” in the treatment municipalities?
This might be the case. More generally, priming may help explain why political
responsibility is related to electoral accountability: responsibility leads to attention
and attention leads to accountability. Some evidence suggests that priming can play
such a role (Hart, 2016; Ruder et al., 2014). It is important to note, however, that the
present investigation does not hinge upon figuring out whether this is the case. This
study remains agnostic about the mechanism underlying the relationship between
political responsibility and electoral accountability, and the reform studied here is
not well suited for figuring out whether priming is what is driving the relationship.
Instead, the focus of this study has been on whether the responsibility-accountability
relationship can be characterized as causal, adaptive and policy-specific. Even so, if
we accept that priming is the mechanism in the present context, which it might be,
then the increased attention to unemployment services, which any priming would
presuppose, might have other side-effects that challenge the inferences made above.
For one, increased attention to unemployment services might have lead to in-
creased polarization between mayoral-partisans and non-partisans in beliefs about
unemployment services. In particular, if unemployment services were framed by
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elite actors as a more important issue in the treatment municipalities, then mayoral
partisans would also bemore stronglymotivated to engage in partisan rationalization
when forming their beliefs about the quality of unemployment services (for evidence
of such a mechanism see Parker-Stephen, 2013). If this is the case, then the increased
correlation between voters’ assessment of unemployment services and support for
the incumbent mayor might not just be a result of voters holding the mayor more
electorally accountable, but also of voters relying more on their partisan preconcep-
tions (i.e., reverse causation from voting to beliefs about unemployment services
might be stronger in the treatment municipalities). To explore the viability of this
alternative explanation, section S8 of the supplementary materials examines whether
beliefs about unemployment services are more correlated with past support for they
mayoral party in the treatment municipalities. There is no evidence of this. As such,
support for the mayor at the last election does not seem to have a greater bearing on
voters evaluation of unemployment services in the treatment municipalities.
A related concern is that the increase in electoral responsibility is not simply the
result of a change in political responsibility but the result of a recent change in political
responsibility. That is, changes in the distribution of political responsibility might
have short lived priming-effects, which moderate voters attention to the policies
for which responsibility is changed in the immediate aftermath of this change. The
implication being that there was no permanent shift in how accountable the mayor
was held for unemployment services, and accordingly no lasting relationship between
responsibility and electoral accountability. This alternative explanation is hard to
test in the present context, as we cannot look at the long term differences between
the reformed (i.e., treated) and unreformed (i.e., control) municipalities. In the
election following the one examined above, all municipalities had implemented the
reform, which increased political responsibility for unemployment services. Even
so, we do at least know that if the results obtained above are the consequence of
priming, then this priming cannot have been very short-lived. After all, the election
examined above occurred a few years after the reform was first implemented in the
treatment municipalities, and while this is a short period of time compared to the
rate at which other political institutions change (cf. the section on adaptiveness),
it is not a short period of time compared to the news cycle of typical elections
(Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008). In addition to this more theoretical consideration,
there is one feasible empirical test of the short-lived priming explanation. This
test is based on the 2013 municipal election. In the 2013 election, responsibility for
unemployment services was constant across the treatment and control municipalities,
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because all municipalities had implemented the labor market reform; however, the
time since implementation varied. In the late-implementing control municipalities,
the reform was relatively new (implemented three years before the election); in the
early-implementing treatment municipalities the reform was not new (implemented
seven years before the election). Section S9 in the supplementary materials examines
whether this difference in time since implementation affected the extent to which
unemployment services were on the voters’ agenda in the 2013 election (i.e., whether
the implementation of the reform primed voters to focus on unemployment services),
but finds no evidence of such a short-lived priming effect.
In conclusion, there is no evidence to suggest that the side-effects of potential
increases in political attention – such as increased partisan polarization or short-lived
priming – can explain the local electorates’ behavior in the wake of the labor market
reform. This reaffirms the initial interpretation – namely, that the local electorates’
behavior in the wake of the labor market reform can be explained by a relationship
between political responsibility and electoral accountability which is causal, adaptive
and policy-specific.
Conclusion
This article examined a reform of Danish labor market regulation in which some
municipal mayors were assigned more political responsibility for a specific policy.
The article found that in the election following this reform, voters held these may-
ors more electorally accountable for the outcomes of this policy. This is especially
noteworthy because the increase in political responsibility was exogenous, because
the increase happened just a few years prior to the election, and because the article
also found that voters did not hold their mayor more electorally accountable for the
outcomes of policies unaffected by the reform. As such, the findings suggest that
when an incumbent’s political responsibility for a specific policy changes, this has a
practically immediate causal effect on how electorally accountable voters hold this
incumbent for the outcomes of this specific policy. This empirical characterization of
the relationship between political responsibility and electoral accountability consid-
erably advances the literature on this topic, because we knew little about the extent
to which the relationship was causal, adaptive or policy-specific prior to this study.
How generalizable is this characterization of the relationship between political
responsibility and electoral accountability? The change in political responsibility
examined in this study was abrupt and exogenous – this makes the case inherently
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special. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe the findings do generalize. Several
features of the elections studied here are relatively common. For instance, this
study focused on a multi-party system with proportional representation. Most
countries have multi-party systems with proportional representation. Some might
argue that Denmark is a likely case for identifying a relationship between political
responsibibility and electoral accountability, because of the relatively high levels
of political knowledge and interest (Hansen and Pedersen, 2014). However, this
potential threat to generalizability is arguably ameliorated by focusing on local
elections, which are generally followed less closely (Elklit and Kjær, 2013). That is,
a Danish voter in a local election might be more like an average voter in a national
election when it comes to political engagement. Even so, more studies in other
contexts investigating the extent to which the relationship between responsibility
and accountability can be characterized as causal, adaptive and policy-specific are
needed to pin down the exact scope of the article’s findings.
Turning to implications, a more causal, adaptive and policy-specific relationship
between political responsibility and electoral accountability should mean that voters
tend to elect more competent politicians. As such, if voters are able to hold politicians
more electorally accountable for the policy outcomes that the politicians are more
responsible for, then it will also be more likely that voters will select politicians
based on the quality of outcomes that accurately reflect these politicians’ efforts and
abilities (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Even so, a causal,
adaptive and policy-specific relationship between responsibility and accountability is
no panacea for effective democratic control. For one, as Ashworth (2012) and others
have argued, voters may end up holding politicians accountable for policy outcomes
which voters think are relatively unimportant, but which incumbent politicians are
clearly responsible for (e.g., Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg, 2017).
Nonetheless, the results suggest that to the extent that it is possible to sort compe-
tent politicians from incompetent ones, voters will try to do so by identifying how
responsible politicians are for the state of specific policy outcomes, and electorally
punish or reward them accordingly.
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Supplementary materials
S1: The Broader Legislative Context of the Reform
Above I argued that the reform of labor market regulation changed how politically
responsible municipalities were for unemployment services. A concern one might
have with this argument, is that the national government somehow undid the effects
of the reform by introducing detailed legislation instructing municipalities on how
they should administer unemployment services, leaving the municipalities with no
real administrative discretion. If this is the case, then implementing the reformwould
simply have meant trading a clear limit to the municipalities’ political responsibility
for an opaque limit. However, if one studies the reform legislation (Order 1400, 2006),
there is no sign of any such detailed regulation instructing municipalities on how to
administer unemployment services. Further, if one explores the amount of enacted
national legislation related to labor market regulation around the implementation of
the reform, one does not find any marked increase. On the contrary, an examination
of the legislation coming from the Ministry of Employment between 2005 and 2011
reveals that, while additional statutes and laws were being instated, fewer were
instated in this period than between 1998 and 2004 and between 1991 and 1997 (to
examine this, I used data from Jakobsen and Mortensen, 2014). As such, I find no
evidence suggesting that the national government tried to take back some or all of the
political responsibility for unemployment services delegated to the municipalities as
part of the labor market reform.
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S2: Variable Descriptions
Table S.6.1 presents a short description of the different survey items used in the
analysis.
Table S.6.1 Description of survey items from the municipal election surveys
Variable name Question Coding
Reelect mayor ‘Who did you vote for in the previous
election?’
1 is for mayoral party voters, 0
is for the other party’s voters.
Treatment ‘What municipality do you live in?’ 1 indicates 14 treatmentmunic-
ipalities, 0 the 84 control mu-
nicipalities.
Unemployment performance ‘How satisfied or unsatisfied are you in
general with your municipality’s efforts
towards the unemployed?’
Five point scale going from 0
“Very unsatisfied” to 1 “Very
satisfied”.
Elderly performance ‘How satisfied or unsatisfied are you in
general with your municipality’s efforts
towards the elderly?’
Five point scale going from 0
“Very unsatisfied” to 1 “Very
satisfied”.
Housing performance ‘How satisfied or unsatisfied are you in
general with your municipality’s efforts
towards private and public housing?’
Five point scale going from 0




‘In reality, the administration controls
the municipality, not the politicians’
Five point scale going from
0 “Completely disagree” to 1
“Completely agree”.
Partisanship ‘Who would you vote for if a national
election was held tomorrow?’
1 if respondent voted for may-
oral party, 0 otherwise.
Mayoral party in government Indicator variable of whether the
mayor’s party is in government
1 for mayors from the two gov-
erning parties in 2009, 0 for
other mayors.
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Ideology Measures congruence between respon-
dent’s ideology (left or right-wing) and
the ideology of themayor. Mayoral ideol-
ogy determined based on party (Conser-
vative and Liberal party as right wing),
respondent’s ideology based on question
about self-reported ideology.
Coded 1 if respondent shares
ideology with mayor, coded 0
if respondent does not.
News consumption - local ‘Thinking back, how important was local
media as a source of knowledge about
the municipal election campaign?’
Four point scale going from 1
“Not at all” to 5 “Very impor-
tant”.
Age ‘How old are you?’ Measured in years.
Employment status ‘Where are you currently employed?’ 11 different categories includ-




Five different questions about who has
responsibility for various policy areas.
Proportion of correct answers.
Interest ‘How interested would you say you are
in politics?’
Four point scale going from 0
“Not at all” to 1 “Very”.
Informed ‘How informed would you say you are
aboutmunicipal politics in your ownmu-
nicipality?’
Five point scale going from 0
“Not at all informed” to 1 “Very
informed”.
Influence ‘The mayor has a great deal of influence
on how the municipality develops’
Five point scale going from
0 “Completely disagree” to 1
“Completely agree”.
Responsible ‘Who do you think has the main respon-
sibility for things going as they have in
the past four years in yourmunicipality?’
Respondents answering “Lo-
cal politicians” or “TheMayor”
coded 1. Respondents an-
swering “National politicians”
coded 0.
Apathy ‘I cannot be bothered with the municipal
election’
Five point scale going from
0 “Completely disagree” to 1
“Completely agree”.
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Obligated ‘I feel obligated to vote at the municipal
election’
Five point scale going from
0 “Completely disagree” to 1
“Completely agree”.
Satisfied with democracy ‘How satisfied are you with the local
democracy?’
Four point scale going from 0
“Not at all satisfied” to 1 “Very
satisfied’
Pivotality ‘How likely is it that your vote will be
pivotal?’
Five point scale going from
0 “Basically zero” to 1 “Very
probable’
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S3: Descriptive statistics
Tables S.6.2, S.6.3 and S.6.4 present descriptive statistics on the survey items used in
the analysis of the 2005, 2009 and 2013 municipal election surveys.
Figure S.6.1 presents the distribution of the key unemployment performance













Figure S.6.1 Distribution of variable unemployment performance.
Table S.6.2 Descriptive statistics 2005
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Informed 0.45 0.19 0.00 0.40 1.00 1996
Interested 0.64 0.26 -0.33 0.67 1.00 1884
Unemployment performance 0.47 0.25 0.00 0.60 1.00 1454
Knowledge about municipal powers 0.71 0.28 0.00 0.80 1.00 2011
Elderly performance 0.66 0.31 0.00 0.75 1.00 1534
Housing performance 0.75 0.26 0.00 0.75 1.00 1944
Ideology 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 2011
Apathy 0.15 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 1988
Obligation 0.96 0.16 0.00 1.00 1.00 2000
Satisfaction with municipal democracy 0.52 0.17 0.00 0.50 1.00 1975
Pivotality 0.45 0.28 0.00 0.50 1.00 1875
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Table S.6.3 Descriptive statistics 2009
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Vote for mayoral party 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 2742
Vote for mayorak party at national elections 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 3199
Voted for mayoral party at regional election 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 3199
Voted for mayoral party at last municipal election 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 3199
Voted for mayoral party at last national election 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 3199
Influence 0.74 0.25 0.00 0.75 1.00 3175
Responsibility 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 2998
Unemployment performance 0.51 0.29 0.00 0.50 1.00 2296
treatment 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Housing performance 0.71 0.23 0.25 0.75 1.00 2920
Elderly performance 0.57 0.31 0.00 0.50 1.00 2771
Administration controls municipality 0.50 0.31 0.00 0.50 1.00 2895
Local media consumption 3.14 0.92 1.00 3.00 5.00 3336
Age 54.53 13.79 18.00 55.50 91.00 3272
Shares ideology with mayoral party 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Mayor is from the same party as national government 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 3199
Elementary school 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
High school 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Vocational high school 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Vocational school 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Shorter tertiary education 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Tertiary education 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Graduate degree 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Postgraduate degree 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Untrained worker 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Skilled worker 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Blue collar worker 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
White collar worker 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Self employed 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Home maker 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Student 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Not looking for work 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Unemployed 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Retiree 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Will not say 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Other 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 3336
Table S.6.4 Descriptive statistics 2013
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Responsibility 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 1.00 3968
Influence 0.72 0.22 0.00 0.75 1.00 4254
Unemployment services: most important 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 3205
Unemployment services: should be most important 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 3205
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S4: A Manipulation check
Mean responses for the two manipulation check questions are presented in the two
left-most columns of table S.6.5. It is important to note that while the differences
between treatment and control are not very large, these questions are about conditions
in the municipality in general, not just unemployment services. While I would expect
that voters in the treatment municipalities believe the mayor is substantially more
responsible for unemployment services, I would only expect that voters believe the
mayor is slightly more responsible for the overall conditions in the municipality.
Table S.6.5Manipulation check
2009 2013
Responsible Influence Responsible Influence
Control 0.66 0.74 0.78 0.72
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Treatment 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.72
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
p-value 0.03 0.03 0.39 0.25
Observations 2998 3175 3968 4254
Standard errors in parentheses, one-sided p-value from difference in means test.
Was the 2009 difference due to pre-treatment differences in voters’ beliefs? This
seems unlikely given the extensive balance-test presented in table 6.1, but we cannot
be sure because these questions were not posed in the 2005 survey. However, these
questions were part of the 2013 municipal election survey and we can utilize the 2013
data to conduct a post-treatment balance test. Recall that, when the 2013 election
came about, the reform was implemented in all municipalities. As such, if the
differences in the 2009 survey were due to the asymmetry in political responsibility
caused by the reform, these differences should have disappeared in 2013. The two
right-most columns of table S.6.5 report means across the treatment and control
municipalities from the 2013 survey. As expected, once all of the municipalities had
implemented the reform, there was no longer any difference in the mean responses
to the two manipulation check questions.
Supplementary materials | 101
S5: Alternative estimation methods
In the analyses conducted below, I show that the key findings presented in table
6.2 are robust to employing two alternative estimation methods. These methods
relax some of the assumptions made in order to estimate the models in table 6.2, and
accordingly, they provide a more complete picture of the statistical evidence for the
key conjecture of the analysis: that voters in the treatment municipalities held their
mayoral party more electorally accountable for unemployment services than voters
in the control municipalities.
The models estimated above did not take the hierarchical structure of the data –
individual voters nestedwithinmunicipalities – fully into account. In order to do this,
I estimate a set of mixed effects multilevel logit models with the same configuration
of variables used in table 6.2. Estimates from these models are presented in table
S.6.6. The important estimates remain practically unchanged, although the standard
error of the estimates increase slightly. Most importantly, the difference in AMEs
remains statistically significant in three out of four models (p ≈ 0.05). The logit
interaction coefficients also remain statistically significant, although only at the ten
percent level.
The tests used to asses the statistical significance of the interaction terms and
differences in AMEs in table 6.2 rely on a number of parametric assumptions. To get
around these assumptions, I tried to derive the statistical significance using a form
of randomization inference; a non-parametric method (cf. Gerber and Green, 2012).
In particular, I used the following procedure:
1. Draw a random sample of 14 municipalities, and create a dummy which was
equal to one if the respondent lived in one of these randomly drawn munici-
palities.
2. Estimate the models reported in column 1-4 of table 6.2, but substituting the
actual treatment variable for the dummy variable created in (1).
3. Store the estimated interaction effect between the simulated treatment dummy
and unemployment performance obtained for each logit model estimated in
(2).
4. Derive the the average marginal effect (AME) of unemployment performance
in the simulated treatment and control municipalities for each of the models
estimated in (2) and store the difference in AMEs.
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Table S.6.6Multi-level logistic regression of probability of voting for the mayoral
party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment performance 0.84∗ 0.84∗ 0.92∗ 0.88∗
(0.24) (0.25) (0.37) (0.36)
Treatment -0.60 -0.58 -0.49 -0.64
(0.41) (0.44) (0.45) (0.43)
Treatment * Unemployment performance 1.02+ 1.02+ 1.28+ 1.36∗
(0.55) (0.59) (0.66) (0.61)
Administration controls municipality -0.31 -0.42+ -0.44+ -0.41+
(0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24)
Housing performance 0.54+ 0.53+ -0.01 0.07
(0.30) (0.32) (0.40) (0.40)
Elderly performance 0.83∗ 0.92∗ 1.06∗ 1.05∗
(0.23) (0.25) (0.31) (0.30)
Sociodemographic controls X X X
Political controls X X
Municipal-level variables X
AME (Control) 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
AME (Treatment) 0.36 0.35 0.23 0.24
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
Difference (T-C) 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.15
p-value of difference 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02
Log likelihood -911.88 -881.73 -553.65 -550.06
Observations 1522 1500 1500 1500
Robust standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
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5. Repeat (1)-(4) 10,000 times resulting in 10,000 unique interaction coefficients
and AME-differences for each model.
6. Calculate p-values for each model by looking at the proportion of simulated
logit coefficients and AME estimates which are larger than the ones estimated
for the actual treatment and control municipalities.
A random sample of the 10,000 simulations is plotted in figure S.6.2 along with
the calculated p-values. These p-values signify how likely it is to get an interaction or
difference in AMEs of the size estimated in table 6.2 or larger if there was no effect of
being assigned to implement the labor market reform for any of the municipalities (a
sharp null). The p-values do become slightly larger using this method, however, the
p-values are still below 0.1 and thus reflect that the observed difference in the weight
voters put on unemployment service between treatment and control municipalities
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Difference in AME
Figure S.6.2A sample (n=1,000) of the simulated differences in AMEs and interaction
effects from each of the four different logit models estimated in table 6.2. These
are computed using randomization inference (RI). The black dot signifies realized
outcome, taken from table 6.2, and the number attached to it is the RI p-value.
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S6: Difference-in-difference
Conducting a difference-in-difference analysis is complicated by a few factors. Even
though the key unemployment performance and vote intention questions were asked
in both surveys, there is not a large overlap between the datasets when it comes to the
control variables used in table 6.2. As such, I cannot estimate a model with as large a
number of controls, however, this problem is somewhat offset by the difference-in-
difference approach’s ability to control for any pre-treatment differences between
treatment and control municipalities. A more serious challenge to including the
2005 data relates to the fact that some municipalities were in the process of being
amalgamated due to the large reform which was implemented in 2006 (cf. figure 6.1).
As a result, almost half of the respondents voted in an amalgamated municipality,
which was different from the one where their incumbent mayor had been elected,
blurring patterns of accountability. I deal with this problem by by defining the
dependent variable in ’05 as voting for the party which had the mayoralty in the
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Figure S.6.3 Average Marginal Effects of unemployment performance on probability
of voting for themayoral party across treatment status and time period. Derived from
logistic regression model described in the text; McFadden R2 = 0.032, n = 2, 582.
Wald tests used to compare the different AMEs. The vertical lines are 90 pct. (thick)
and 95 pct. (thin) confidence intervals.
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In figure S.6.3, I show the AMEs of unemployment performance on support for
the mayoral party in treatment and control municipalities in both 2009 and 2005.
The AMEs are derived from a logistic model estimated on a pooled dataset. This
model sets voting for the mayoral party as a function of a three-way interaction
between unemployment performance, treatment status and time period (’09 versus
’05). The model also controls for housing and elderly care performance as well
as for whether the mayor is of the same party as the national government. To
take the different patterns of accountability across amalgamated and continuing
municipalities into account (cf. above), I allow all performance variables to have
different slopes depending on whether voters lived in a municipality which was
amalgamated.
As can be seen from figure S.6.3 there is no difference in the effect of voters evalua-
tion of unemployment services on support for themayoral party across treatment and
control municipalities in 2005. Accordingly, before the reform of labor market regu-
lation was implemented, there was no apparent difference in electoral accountability
across treatment and control municipalities. In 2009, however, when the treatment
municipalities had gotten more political responsibility for unemployment services,
there is a statistically significant difference.The difference in difference estimate is
only statistically significant at the ten percent level. The slight drop in statistical
significance can be explained by the extra estimation error introduced by including
the more noisy 2005 data.
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S7: Analyzing additional policy areas
In this section, I examine differences in electoral accountability across the treatment
and control municipalities for some additional policy areas. As such, I investigate
whether voters in the treatment municipalities were more likely to electorally punish
and reward themayor for quality of services in nine different policy areas, whichwere
not affected by the reform of labor market regulation (including the two examined
in figure 6.3). In particular, I use the logit model presented in column 4 of table
6.2 as a template, swapping the unemployment performance variable for one of the
alternative policy variables. I do this for all policy variables. For each of these nine
new models, I then derive the AME of the policy variable on voters’ propensity to
vote for the mayoral party in both the treatment and in the control municipalities.
Finally, I test the AME in the treatment municipalities against the AME in the control
municipalities using a Wald test. The results of these analyses are reported in table
S.6.7.
Table S.6.7 Differences across treatment and control for other policy outcomes
Policy Area Treatment Control Standard error p-value
Housing 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.85
Daycare 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.94
Recreation 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.44
Schools 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.56
Library 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.47
Culture 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.28
Business 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.43
Elderly Services 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.79
Health Services 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.29
The models from which the average marginal effects are derived include the full set of controls.
As is revealed by looking at the right-most column of table S.6.7, the AME of
voters’ assessment of the quality of the services provided in these nine different
policy areas do not significantly differ across treatment and control municipalities.
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S8: No Evidence of Increases in Partisan Motivated Reasoning
An alternative explanation for our findings is that there are voters in the municipali-
ties who (dis)like the mayoral party, and when they find out that their mayor has
become more responsible for unemployment services, they increase (or decrease)
their estimate of service quality in this area accordingly. If this is the case, voters’ sat-
isfaction with unemployment services should be more strongly correlated with past
support for the mayor in the municipalities where the mayor got more responsibility
for unemployment services.
In order to examine this possibility, we re-estimate the four logistic regression
models from table 6.2 using self-reported support for the (current) mayoral party at
the previous election as the dependent variable. (The models are thus only estimated
using respondents who said that they could remember which party they voted for
at the last election.) Table S.6.8 presents the results from these analyses. In these
models, which predict past voting, the interaction effect between treatment status
and unemployment performance is negligible and statistically insignificant. So is the
difference in AMEs across treatment and control municipalities. From this, we can
conclude that the increased correlation between satisfaction with unemployment
services and support for the mayor is not be driven by voters who already supported
the mayor at the last election becoming more satisfied with unemployment services,
or by voters who did not support the mayor becoming less satisfied.
More broadly, these analyses show that there is no sign of increases in partisan
motivated reasoning when it comes to how satisfied voters are with unemployment
services in the treatment municipalities. This corroborates the initial conclusion that
voters hold theirmayormore electorally accountable for the quality of unemployment
services.
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Table S.6.8 Logistic regression of voting for the mayoral party at the last election
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment performance 0.53∗ 0.55∗ 0.45 0.43
(0.21) (0.23) (0.32) (0.32)
Treatment -0.18 -0.20 -0.17 -0.14
(0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34)
Treatment * Unemployment performance 0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.03
(0.51) (0.52) (0.76) (0.76)
Administration controls municipality -0.18 -0.28 -0.09 -0.11
(0.19) (0.20) (0.26) (0.26)
Elderly performance 0.10 0.22 -0.03 -0.04
(0.20) (0.21) (0.25) (0.25)
Housing performance 0.86∗ 0.74∗ 0.84∗ 0.87∗
(0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.36)
Sociodemographic controls X X X
Political controls X X
Municipal level variables X
AME (Control) 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
AME (Treatment) 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.05
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Difference (T-C) 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
p-value of difference 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.95
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.04 0.34 0.34
Log likelihood -965 -937 -644 -642
Observations 1476 1461 1461 1461
Robust standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
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S9: No Evidence of Short-lived priming
An alternative explanation for why voters increased the weight they put on unem-
ployment services in the election following the reform of labor market regulation is
that the reform briefly primed this issue (Krosnick and Kinder, 1990). That is, the
reform could have led to a brief period of increased political attention to unemploy-
ment services in the treatment municipalities, which, in turn, could have lead voters
to rely more on their evaluation of the quality of these services, when deciding whom
to vote for. I offer two pieces of evidence which counter this alternative explanation.
First, from the analysis conducted in section S4 (cf. table S.6.5), we know that
voters in the treatment municipalities, where the mayor got more responsibility
for unemployment services, did in fact believe the mayor was more responsible for
what happened in the municipality. This should increase our confidence that the
difference in behavior between the treatment and control electorates was, at least
in part, due to differences in beliefs about political responsibility, and therefore not
solely due to short-lived priming.
The second piece of evidence against the short-lived priming explanation can be
found by examining voters’ political agenda in the 2013municipal election. In 2013 all
municipalities had implemented the reform, leaving responsibility balanced across
treatment and control municipalities, but the control municipalities differed from
the treatment municipalities in that they had implemented the reform recently (in
2010). Accordinglly, if the short-lived priming explanation is correct, unemployment
services should be higher on the voters’ agenda in the 84 control municipalities in
2013.
To examine this empirical implication, I measured voters’ agenda in the different
municipalities at the 2013 election. Specifically, I examined open-ended answers
given to two questions: “When thinking back on the campaign in your own munici-
pality, what was the most debated issue?” and “What did you think should have
been the most debated issue?” Arguably, the content of these open-ended responses
should give us an indication of whether unemployment services were higher on the
agenda in some municipalities than in others. To analyze the responses, I coded
whether they mentioned at least one of four stemmed key words related to unem-
ployment services.16 I use this indicator as a rough measure of the extent to which
unemployment services were on the voters’ agenda in the different municipalities. If
16The four key-words were: *arbedj*, *job*, *erhverv*, *beskæf*. The key words are stemmed
versions of different synonyms for work (i.e. work, job, employ, occupation). For each of the open
ended answers, about ten percent of respondents used at least one key word.
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the short-lived priming explanation is accurate, unemployment services should be
higher on the voters’ agenda in the control municipalities. This does not seem to be
the case. I find very small and statistically insignificant differences in the percentage
which used at least one key word for both the question about what voters believed
was on the agenda (d = 0.07 percentage points, p = 0.34), and the question about
what voters thought should have been on the agenda (d = 0.04 percentage points,
p = 0.37). In sum, there is no evidence for the short-lived priming explanation.
Chapter 7
Clarity of Political Responsibility
and Incumbent Behavior
with Asmus Leth Olsen
A large body of literature suggests that clarity of political responsibility moderates
the extent to which voters hold incumbent politicians electorally accountable for
policy outcomes (i.e., retrospective voting). To the extent that incumbents’ actions are
shaped by voters ability to select incumbents who act in voters’ best interest, clarity
of responsibility should also affect incumbent behavior. In particular, we argue that
because diffusion of political responsibility dilutes effective electoral accountability,
clarity will increase the extent to which incumbent politicians pursue the type of
policy outcomes that their electorate prefers. We examine the empirical viability
of this argument by studying tax policy in Danish municipalities. Exploiting an
electoral discontinuity in clarity of responsibility, we show that high levels of clarity
goes hand in with local incumbents doing what the average voter prefers: lowering
taxes.
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Elections provide voters with an opportunity to unseat politicians who will not or
cannot adhere to the will of the people (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Ashworth,
2012; Besley, 2006; Besley and Case, 1995a; Ferejohn, 1986). Some elections, however,
seem to provide voters with a much better opportunity to hold politicians effectively
accountable. In some elections, it is pretty clear that the incumbent is responsible for
the divergence between what voters prefer and the political reality, while in other
elections it might be quite difficult for voters to find out who is responsible for any
such divergence. If, for instance, the incumbent is a prime minister in a coalition gov-
ernment, it is difficult for voters to know whether the policies enacted and outcomes
realized under this incumbent is the responsibility of the prime minister or whether
it is the responsibility of the coalition partners (Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013;
Whitten and Palmer, 1999).
More generally, diffusion of political responsibility challenges the effectiveness of
electoral control: if voters do not know whether their incumbent is responsible for
the state of important policy outcomes, then their ability to elect incumbents who are
able and willing to pursue the type of policy outcomes they prefer is compromised
(Achen and Bartels, 2016; Anderson, 2007). This is the premise behind a number of
studies of how voters react to differences in clarity of political responsibility. Broadly
speaking, these studies have found that in countries where economic and political
institutions disperse political responsibility, voters are less likely to hold incumbents
electorally accountable for how their country is doing economically (Anderson, 2000;
Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk
and Franklin, 2007).
An interesting implication of this pattern in voter behavior is that in elections
where clarity of responsibility is low, electoral incentives for incumbents to provide
the type of policy outcomes voters prefer are going to be correspondingly low. This
might have a substantial effect on incumbent behavior. Yet, in spite of this, the link
between clarity of responsibility and incumbent behavior remains largely unexam-
ined in the existing literature (for a notable exception, see Tavits, 2007). Instead,
studies of clarity of responsibility have almost exclusively examined voter behavior
(Healy and Malhotra, 2013, 301), whereas studies of how electoral incentives shape
incumbent behavior have focused on other factors, such as the competitiveness of
elections (Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2010), the quality and extent of information
available about the incumbent (e.g., Alt and Lowry, 2010; Snyder Jr and Strömberg,
2010) and whether the incumbent is eligible for re-election (e.g., Alt, De Mesquita
and Rose, 2011; Besley and Case, 1995a).
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In this article, we explore whether clarity of responsibility does affect incum-
bent behavior. In particular, since high levels of clarity of political responsibility
strengthens effective electoral accountability, we argue that high levels of clarity of
responsibility will make it more likely that incumbents enact policies and pursue
policy outcomes that are aligned with what the average voter prefers (i.e., policy
outcomes will be more aligned with what more voters prefer).
We examine the empirical viability of this argument by studying income tax
policy in Danish municipalities. We leverage three important aspects of this context.
First, we use local income tax rates, a salient policy outcome, as a metric of whether
incumbent politicians do what the average voter prefers. In particular, we show that
raising income taxes is unpopularwith the average voter, finding that if amunicipality
raises taxes, the largest party loses electoral support at the subsequent election (see
also Bhatti, Hansen and Olsen, 2012; Frandsen, 1998). Second, we use single party
majority status in municipal city councils as a measure of clarity of responsibility.
Historically, the largest party in the city council has controlled a majority of the seats
in one out of four Danish municipalities. If the largest party controls a majority of the
seats, then this party can set the municipal income tax rate without coalescing with
other parties. If the largest party only controls a plurality of the seats, then it needs
to cooperate with at least one other party in order to set the income tax rate. This
makes single party majority status a good indicator of clarity of responsibility for
tax rates. Third, we exploit an electoral discontinuity in order to identify the causal
effect of single party majority status on income tax policy. In particular, we use a
close elections regression discontinuity design, comparing municipalities where the
largest party narrowly won a majority of the seats in the city council to those where
the largest party narrowly lost a majority.
Guided by the literature on how voters hold incumbents electorally accountable,
we explore two potential mechanisms through which single party majority status
might influence the tax rate set by the city council (Alt, De Mesquita and Rose, 2011;
Duch and Stevenson, 2008). First, a sanctioning – or moral hazard – mechanism
which suggests that parties with a majority will refrain from raising taxes to avoid
getting punished by the voters. Second, a selection mechanism that suggests voters
will have an easier time (s)electing local politicians who are willing and able to lower
taxes, if it is clear who is responsible for tax policy. Studying the effects of gaining a
single majority on tax policy, we find robust evidence of the selection mechanism,
but no evidence of the sanctioning mechanism. As such, we find that single party
majority status does lead to lower taxes, but this is not because the largest party
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adjusts their behavior in anticipation of being more harshly punished for raising
taxes, but because the presence of a single party majority makes it possible for voters
to shift power away from the type of parties who do not keep income taxes low and
towards the type of parties who do.
This study broadens the scope of the literature on clarity of political responsibil-
ity – a body of research which has generally remained observational and paid little
attention to incumbent behavior (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Silva and Whitten, 2017;
Tavits, 2007). Further, with a strong consensual and non-partisan political culture,
where decisions often are based on over-sized multi-party coalitions (Blom-Hansen,
2002; Serritzlew, Skjæveland and Blom-Hansen, 2008), Danish municipalities consti-
tutes a hard case in contrast to a literature that typically focuses on two party systems,
where the political competition is stronger, and formal clarity of responsibility is
more clearly reflected in the norms and traditions of the political system (e.g., Alt,
De Mesquita and Rose, 2011; Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2010). By demonstrating
that dispersion of political responsibility leads to the adoption of policies that are
unpopular with the average voter, this study also re-emphasizes that elections will
not always serve as an effective check on incumbent politicians (see also Ashworth,
Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg, 2017; Healy and Lenz, 2014; Healy and Malho-
tra, 2009; Huber, Hill and Lenz, 2012). In particular, our results suggest that formal
electoral accountability only translates into effective electoral control if the political
context provides a certain degree of clarity of responsibility.
The Argument and The State of the Art
Voters often looks back at how incumbent politicians have performed in office when
decidingwhether to re-elect them (Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966; Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck,
1990; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007) While this type of retrospective
voting is prevalent to some extent in most elections (Lewis-Beck, 1990), its exact
scope varies substantially from election to election (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). One
popular explanation for why retrospective voting varies is that electoral contexts
vary in the extent to which they assign clear responsibility for political performance
to the incumbent government. In particular, this clarity of responsibility explana-
tion suggests that “voters’ assignment of responsibility to the government [...] will
strongly reflect the nature of policymaking in the society and the coherence and
control the government can exert over that policy” (Powell and Whitten, 1993, 398).
This explanation has been empirically powerful with studies showing that factors like
The Argument and The State of the Art | 115
coalition government (Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshi-
naka, 2002) and federalism (Anderson, 2006; Arceneaux, 2006; León, 2011) moderates
retrospective voting by dispersing responsibility for policy-making across multiple
actors. Similarly, other studies have found that, more broadly, an incumbent’s ability
to influence the welfare of the electorate moderates the extent of retrospective voting
(e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007; Hellwig, 2001).
At the same time, research on the nature and scope of electoral accountability
has found that the presence of retrospective voting behavior constrains incumbent
behavior in two ways (Ashworth, 2012). First, if incumbents know that they will not
be re-elected by retrospective voters unless they produce the type of policy outcomes
these voters prefer, incumbents will exert more effort to produce such outcomes.
This is sometimes called a sanctioning effect (e.g., Ferejohn, 1986). Second, by only
retaining incumbents who produce policy outcomes they like, retrospective voters
shift the composition of incumbents towards the types who produce outcomes that
they like, and away from the types who produce outcomes that they do not like.
This is sometimes called a selection effect (e.g., Fearon, 1999).1 While the underlying
mechanisms are distinct, both selection and sanctioning have a similar effect on
incumbent behavior, in that they make incumbents pursue policy outcomes that
voters want.
This brings us to our key argument: Since clarity of responsibility moderates
retrospective voting by making it either easier or harder for voters to find out who
is responsible for policy outcomes, we expect that clarity of responsibility will also
moderate incumbent behavior by making incumbents’ re-election chances more or
less dependent on the quality of the policy outcomes they oversee. In particular, we
expect that if clarity of responsibility for a certain policy outcome increases, then
incumbents overseeing this outcome will try harder to align the state of the outcome
with what the average voter prefers.2
How might this work in practice? Imagine a minority government who cannot
pass legislation without bringing in opposition parties, blurring the extent to which
the government is actually responsible for the legislative output. If some piece of
1The terminology used here is from Duch and Stevenson (2008), but the division into these two
types of effects is widely used (e.g. Alt, De Mesquita and Rose, 2011; Ashworth, 2012; Ashworth,
Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg, 2017)
2When we say incumbents will try to align the state of the policy outcome with what the average
voter prefers, we mean that they will pursue outcomes that leaves a majority of the voters better
off. Accordingly, we expect that a majority of voters would prefer the policy outcomes pursued by
incumbents when clarity of responsibility is high to the policy outcomes pursued by incumbents
when clarity of responsibility is low.
116 | B: Incumbent Behavior
unpopular legislation gets passed into law, voters will have a hard time figuring
out whether the governments or the opposition is responsible. Perhaps, the voters
reason, the legislation would have been much better if the government did not have
to deal with the opposition. The government knows that voters will not be able to
determine the extent to which they are responsible, and this reduces their incentive
to design the best possible legislation. If voters will not credit us, the government
thinks, why put in the effort? At the same time, governments who are actually
interested in producing good legislation will tend to get re-elected at near the same
rate as governmentswho are not particularly interested in producing good legislation,
because the oppositions’ interference makes it difficult for voters to find out whether
the government is interested in producing good legislation. Contrast this with a
situation where the incumbent government can pass legislation without coalescing
with the opposition. If unpopular legislation is passed into law, voters will know
who to blame. The government knows this and therefore has a strong incentive to
produce popular legislation, and governments who pass unpopular legislation will
be re-elected at a much lower rate than those who pass popular legislation. In sum,
the popularity of the legislation pursued by the government will depend on whether
the government is clearly responsible for the legislation or not.
Interestingly, only a few studies have looked at the link between clarity of re-
sponsibility and incumbent behavior (e.g., Tavits, 2007), and no study has looked at
whether clarity of responsibility affect what policies incumbents pursue. Even so, a
number of different findings from the previous literature motivates and informs our
argument.
One set of studies, which is relevant in this regard, compare incumbents who are
term-limited with incumbents who are not term-limited in order to study the effect
of re-election incentives on incumbent behavior. Using this method different studies
have found that being up for re-election makes it less likely that incumbents engage
in corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2011), more likely that incumbents enact popular
economic policies (Besley and Case, 1995b) and leads to the provision of better social
and economic conditions (Alt, De Mesquita and Rose, 2011; De Janvry, Finan and
Sadoulet, 2012). These studies tell us that re-election incentives can have a size-able
effect on incumbent behavior, making it plausible that clarity of responsibility, which
arguably moderates these re-election incentives, might have an effect as well.
Another set of studies looks at the role of information. Examining variations in
the level of media scrutiny (e.g., Howell, 2005; Snyder Jr and Strömberg, 2010), or
formal rules that make policy outcomes more transparent (Alt, Lassen and Skilling,
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2002; Alt and Lowry, 2010), these studies have found that incumbents are more
likely to exert an effort to align policy outcomes with what voters prefer when voters
have more information about the state of these policy outcomes. Even though this
article is concerned with variations in political responsibility and not information,
these studies lend credibility to the idea that incumbents take stock of their electoral
context when deciding what policy outcomes to pursue.
Finally, a number of studies have found that unified government at the state level
in the US is correlated with incumbent behavior. This is relevant in the context of our
argument, because unified government increases clarity of responsibility, and has
been shown to moderate retrospective voting (Lowry, Alt and Ferree, 1998, although
see Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001; Norpoth, 2001). The results from these studies,
however, are mixed. Some find that unified government leads governors to enact
policy that is more in accordance with their party’s ideology (Alt and Lowry, 1994;
Clarke, 1998), whereas others find that unified government make governors more
responsive to changes in their state’s policy mood (Coleman, 1999). Still others find
that unified government makes little to no difference for responsiveness (Lax and
Phillips, 2012). The inconsistency of these results challenge our argument – since
unified government increases clarity of responsibility, we would expect that unified
government makes incumbents uniformly more responsive. However, these studies
tend to suffer from problems related to causal inference: states that have unified
government are very different from states that have divided government on a number
of different parameters (e.g., ideological cohesion of the electorate). This might, in
part, explain the inconsistent results. Below, we make sure to examine a context
where it is possible to derive a more plausibly causal estimate of how clarity of
responsibility affects incumbent behavior.
Taken together, this brief review of the existing literature shows that while there
is plenty of research which would suggest clarity of responsibility could make in-
cumbents more responsive to the electorate, there is little research directly on this
topic, and the studies that comes closest to studying this question have mixed results.
Empirical Context: Tax Policy in Danish Municipalities
To examine the empirical tractability of our theoretical argument, we zoom in on
Danish municipalities. Denmark is a decentralized welfare state where municipal-
ities can affect their local revenue and set a yearly budget. Municipal tasks and
services include the core welfare services of the Danish welfare state and municipal
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spending amounts to 35 percent of GDP.3 In 1970 a municipal reform was introduced
which dramatically reduced the number of municipalities. In 2007 the local level
experienced yet another major reform which reduced the number of municipalities
once again. The time in between these two reforms is the period we study.4
This context provides us with three things that we need in order to explore
whether clarity of responsibilitymakes incumbents pursue policy outcomes preferred
by the average voter. First, a policy outcome that is controlled by the municipal city
council and which is unpopular with the average voter: municipal income taxes. As
such, the municipal income tax rate is set by a simple majority in the city council,
and municipal voters show an electoral preference for lower municipal income tax
rates. Second, meaningful variation in clarity of responsibility for tax policy across
elections: single party majority status. Sometimes the largest party in the city council
controls a majority of the seats in the council, and sometimes the largest party only
controls a plurality of the seats. This means that sometimes the largest party can set
taxes on their own, leaving them clearly responsible for tax policy, and sometimes
they need to negotiate with other parties, leaving political responsibility for tax
policy less clear. Third, and perhaps most important, a way of identifying the causal
effect of gaining a single party majority on tax policy: a close elections regression
discontinuity design. As such, by comparing the tax rates in municipalities where
the largest party fell just short of getting a majority of the seats in the city council
with municipalities where the largest party narrowly won a majority, it should be
possible to unearth an unbiased estimate of the causal effect.
Below we discuss the nature of income taxes in Danish municipalities and the
difference between single partymajorities and pluralities, detailing how these aspects
of local government will help us explore our theoretical argument. Afterwards, we
derive some specific hypotheses about how single party majority status affects tax
policy.
3The tasks include primary education, child care and care for elderly people, libraries, local sports
facilities and other cultural activities, granting and payment of cash assistance, anticipatory pension
and certain other social benefits, job activation and employment projects for non-insured unemployed
persons, public utilities, environmental measures as well as emergency services.
4We exclude the municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg which in this period had a
different income tax structure that combined the regional and local income tax. The number of
municipalities vary a bit across time due to amalgamations.
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The Political Features of Local Income Taxes
Local governments in Denmark enjoy a large degree of income tax discretion. The
local income tax rate is determined by the city council in connection with the yearly
budget negotiations, which come to a vote in the fall of each year (Blom-Hansen,
2002).5 The local income tax rate is salient – all citizens are informed about the tax
rate via their early tax returns, and the media will also frequently report on tax rate
changes; it is broad based – the tax rate is the same for all levels of income and
cannot be bracketed; and it has a large impact on voters’ financial situation – tax rates
typically vary from ten to 20 percent.
Increasing the local income tax rate is unpopular with the electorate. As such,
unlike in the international literature, where there is mixed evidence regarding the
relationship between local income taxation and support for local incumbents (Besley,
2006; Boyne et al., 2009; Lowry, Alt and Ferree, 1998; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel,
1995; Peltzman, 1992), the Danish literature on this topic has consistently found that
increasing income taxes carry an electoral penalty (Bhatti, Hansen and Olsen, 2012;
Frandsen, 1998). In section S14 the supplementary materials, we replicate these
analyses. Using lagged dependent variable and difference-in-difference models,
we find, just like previous analyses have, that the largest party in the city council
is punished by the voters for raising taxes, showing that the average voter has an
electoral preference for lower taxes. We also find that this effect is pretty stable across
the period under study, with no statistically significant deviations from election to
election.
In sum, local income taxes are set by the city council, they are salient to voters,
and raising income tax rate carries an electoral penalty. These features make income
tax policy in the Danish municipalities interesting in the context of our theoretical
argument, because we can index the extent to which incumbents are responsive to
their electorates preferences for low(er) taxes, by examining whether they do, in fact,
keep income taxes low.
5In theory municipalities are allowed to set the tax rate at any level. Formally, tax discretion is
limited by national agreements between the central government and the association of local govern-
ments. They reach a common non-binding agreement about how much the average tax rate across all
municipalities is allowed to increase. However, in practice, these agreements have had little impact
on the tax level in each individual municipality (Pedersen and Jensen, 2004).
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Single Party Majorities
The city council is the primary form of local government in Denmark. Members are
elected at proportional single district elections, which are fixed to take place every
four years and do not usually coincide with elections at the national or EU level.
Turnout is high with an average of around 70 percent. The size of the city councils in
the primary municipalities goes from 9 to 31 seats.
After each election the mayor is appointed by a majority in the city council. This
means that after some elections the mayor will be appointed by just one party, a
single party majority, whereas sometimes several parties will have to agree on a
mayor. In these cases, the mayor will often end up being from the party, which has a
plurality of the seats. Just as important for present purposes, however, is that when a
party gets a single party majority they can set the income tax rate without coalescing
with other parties, increasing clarity of responsibility for tax policy. About one in
four elections result in a single party majority.
When a party wins a majority of the seats it will generally be the dominant
political force in the municipality (Olsen, 2013). Further, while there has been very
little research on the effect of single party majorities in a Danish context, Serritzlew
(2005) concludes that “if the mayor’s party has an absolute majority, the need for
compromise is limited, and implementation will not be challenged politically” (p.
422). This is consistent with our argument that gaining a single party majority
enhances clarity of political responsibility.
Taken together, we think single party majority status is a valid indicator of clarity
of responsibility. This is further corroborated by the fact that incumbents’ ability to
set fiscal policy without coalition partners or support from other parties is one of the
most commonly used indicators of clarity of responsibility (e.g., Hobolt, Tilley and
Banducci, 2013; Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002; Powell and Whitten, 1993).
Hypotheses
What are our expectations with regards to the relationship between single party
majority status and the tax policy pursued by the members of the city council? Above
we argued that if it is clear who is responsible for a certain policy outcome, then it
is more likely that incumbent politicians will try to deliver what the average voter
prefers with respect to this policy outcome. Since the largest party’s responsibility
for income taxes increases substantially if the largest party obtains a majority of
seats in the city council, and since the average voter has a well documented electoral
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preference for lower income taxes, we expect that single party majority status will
lead to lower income taxes. In particular, one can imagine two empirically distinct
ways that single party majority status affects tax policy.
One is that single partymajority status leads the city council to pursue lower taxes,
because if the largest party obtains a majority of the seats, they expect to be heldmore
electorally accountable for tax policy, and therefore they have a stronger electoral
incentive to lower taxes. Following the literature on electoral accountability (e.g.,
Ashworth, 2012), we can call this a sanctioning hypothesis (Besley, 2006; Ferejohn,
1986). It is important to note, that this sanctioning hypothesis is premised on the
idea that it takes effort for the largest party to lower or refrain from raising taxes. If
it took no effort, there would be no sense in not lowering taxes, even if the reelection
incentives were weak. However, it seems reasonable to assume that lowering taxes
require the largest party to exert some effort. In particular, if it were to cut taxes, the
largest party would need to find an alternative source of revenue or it would need to
cut spending.
Sanctioning hypothesis: If a party obtains a majority of seats in the city
council, then the city council will adopt lower income taxes before the next
election.
When the largest party obtains a single party majority, they can set tax policy
without interference from other parties, making the tax rate a better indicator of
this party’s willingness and ability to keep taxes low. To the extent that voters use
this improved indicator of the incumbents ‘type’ when allocating electoral support
in the next election, they will shift power away from parties that raise taxes and
towards parties that lower taxes, which should, all else equal, lead to a city council
that adopts lower taxes. This is the second way single party majority status might
affect tax policy. Following the literature on electoral accountability, we can call this
a selection hypothesis (Besley, 2006; Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fearon, 1999).6 It
is important to note, that the selection hypothesis does not predict that the change
in tax policy will kick in immediately, rather, it predicts that the effect will work
through changes to the composition of the city council, meaning that the effect will
not materialize until after the next election.
6This selection hypothesis is premised on the idea that some parties are low-tax types, who will
always work to lower taxes, whereas others are high-tax types, who will always work to raise taxes. If
parties did not differ in this respect, voters could not affect the tax rate by affecting the composition of
the city council.
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Selection hypothesis: If a party obtains a majority of seats in the city council,
then the city council will adopt lower income taxes after the next election.
The two selection and sanctioning hypotheses are notmutually exclusive. One can
easily imagine both selection and sanctioning mechanisms operating simultaneously
(for models that integrate sanctioning and selection effects, see Alt, De Mesquita
and Rose, 2011; Besley, 2006). If sanctioning and selection mechanisms are at work
at the same time, then incumbents’ motivation might change slightly, but the basic
predictions should remain the same.7
Figure 7.1 lays out how the two hypotheses relate single party majority status to
tax policy. Following the election of a single party majority at t = 0 the sanctioning
hypothesis predicts that the incumbent party will lower taxes before the next election
at t = 1, because the single party majority incumbent knows that the voters will hold
them more electorally accountable for the municipal tax rate at t = 1. Following the
election featuring a single party majority incumbent at t = 1, the selection hypothesis
predicts that the new city council will lower taxes before the next election at t = 2,
because voters were able to find out whether the single party majority up for election











(t=2)Sanctioning⇒ ∆tax ↓ Selection⇒ ∆tax ↓
Figure 7.1 A timeline of what the different hypotheses predict with respect to the
effect of single party majority status on tax policy.
7In particular, when selection and sanctioning are at work simultanously, incumbents who are
high-tax types will try to mimick low-tax types in order to get re-elected when clarity of responsibility
is high, leading to lower taxes before the next election. At the same time, however, the mimicking will
make it harder for voters to sort low-tax types from high-tax types, than in the case of pure selection.
Even so, it seems likely that sometimes the effort needed for high-tax types to mimick low-tax types
will be too high, and in these cases the high-tax types will end up setting the tax rate higher than the
low-tax types. In these cases it will thus be possible for voters to distinguish between the two types,
leading to lower taxes following the next election (these implications follow from the model laid out
in Besley and Case, 1995a).
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Identication Strategy: A Regression Discontinuity
In order to test our hypotheses we need to be able to identify the effect of single
party majority status on the tax policy pursued by the city council. However, like all
political institutions, assignment of single party majority status is endogenous to the
political and socioeconomic makeup of the municipality (Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi,
2004; Besley and Case, 2000). For instance, electing a single party majority will be
easier in smaller, rural municipalities where the electorate is more homogeneous.
In these rural municipalities, however, voters will also tend be more conservative,
and therefore have a stronger preference for lower taxes. This poses a challenge for
causal inference, as we might conflate the effect of single party majority status with
the effect of having a more conservative electorate. More generally, we can say that
the underlying factors which make single party majority status more likely might
also make adoption of specific tax rates more likely.
To sidestep these inferential issues and estimate an unbiased causal effect, we
use a close elections regression discontinuity (RD) design. That is, we compare tax
rates in municipalities where the largest party narrowly won a majority of the seats
in the city council with tax rates in municipalities where the largest party narrowly
lost a majority of the seats. This means focusing on municipal elections where only
a few votes were pivotal for giving the largest party a majority of the seats. When
focusing on these close elections, we can reasonably assume that it is as-if random
whether the largest party won a majority of the seats (for evidence of this, see Eggers
et al., 2015). This as-if random assignment of single party majority status makes it
possible to causally attribute differences in tax rates to the presence or absence of a
single party majority (Lee, 2008; Skovron and Titiunik, 2015).
Identifying Closeness of the Elections
We identify close elections in a two-step process. In the first step, we single out
municipal elections held between 1970 and 2001 where the largest party in the city-
council ended up having a one-seat majority or was one seat short of obtaining a
majority. This leaves us with 839 close elections out of a pool of 2,475 elections.8
Figure 7.2 illustrates this selection process. In the second step, we index the 839
8Municipalitieswith close elections tend to be smaller andmore rural than the averagemunicipality,
but they resemble the average municipality with respect to the ideological make-up of the electorate
and with respect to the tax rate. See section S1 of the supplementary materials for a table that presents
these differences.
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close elections according to how close they actually were. That is, we create a forcing
variable that can tell us how many additional votes the largest party would have














Number of seats needed to obtain single party majority
Figure 7.2Howmany additional seats did the largest party need to obtain a majority?
Only elections within the two dashed lines are used in our RD analyses.
Creating the forcing variable, however, is complicated by the fact that there is no
joint electoral cut-off at which the largest party is always assigned a majority of the
seats in the city council (e.g., 50 pct.). This is not to say that there is no exact cut-off
at which majority is assigned in each election; the cut-off simply moves around from
election to election. Sometimes it might be 42 pct. and sometimes it might be 45 or
48 pct.
The varying cut-off is a product of two features of the electoral system in the
Danish municipalities. The first feature is that assignment of seats is based on a
proportional divisor method. As a consequence, the number seats assigned to the
largest party depends on the exact configuration of votes cast for the other parties
up for election (Fiva, Folke and Sørensen, 2016; Folke, 2014; Freier and Odendahl,
2015). The second feature is that parties can form electoral coalitions (Cox, 1997). If
parties decide to form an electoral coalition, which they often do, then seats are first
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assigned to this coalition, and then to the individual parties. As a result, the number
of seats assigned to each party depends on the configuration of electoral coalitions,
the votes cast for the different electoral coalitions, and the votes cast for the different
parties within each coalition.
To develop a forcing variable which takes these particularities of the electoral
system into account, we first specified the exact distribution of votes across parties
and electoral coalitions for each of the 839 close elections using election reports
from Statistics Denmark. Next, we wrote a program that ran simulated elections
to determine the number of votes (+/- 10) the largest party would have needed to
either win/lose one seat (and thereby secure/lose their majority in the city council).9
Based on this, we measured the number of votes and the proportion of votes that the
largest party in the city council would have needed to either win a majority or lose
their majority. Figure 7.3 shows how these variables are distributed, that is, exactly
how close the 839 close elections were. As can be seen from this figure, there are a
large number of elections close to the cut-off (0) in our dataset. In the analyses below,
we use the proportional measure as our forcing variable.
Indicators
Our key dependent variable is the municipal income tax rate. Because there are
substantial temporal and cross-municipality differences in the tax rate (see section
S1 of the supplementary materials for details), we use the benchmarking procedure
suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010, 331). This proceduremakes it easier to compare
tax rates across municipalities and across different time periods (i.e., it increases
efficiency). Specifically, we adjust the income tax rate implemented in a given year by
a given municipality by subtracting (1) the average municipality-specific tax rate (i.e.,
average rate across all years for that municipality) and (2) the difference between the
average year-specific tax rate and the average tax rate across all years.10
9In particular, the program added or subtracted 10 votes from the actual vote total of the largest
party, while holding the electoral support for the other parties constant, and then calculated the
number of seats the largest party would have gotten given the electoral coalitions and the votes cast
for other parties. It performed this calculation until the number of seats assigned to the largest party
changed, and then reported how many times it had to add or subtract 10 votes before this change had
happened. To write this program we used the electools package in Stata (Jaime-Castillo, 2008).
10Note that the average municipality-specific tax rate and the average year-specific tax rate are going
to be balanced – in expectation – for the subset of close elections which we use to identify the effect of
single party majority status on income taxes. Accordingly, this transformation is not used to get an
unbiased estimate, instead, the transformation provides us with a more efficient comparison across
time and space. Here is an example of how the adjusted tax rate is calculated. Say a municipality
implements a 20 pct. income tax in 1980, that the average level of taxes this municipality has levied
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Figure 7.3 Density of forcing variable measured as number of votes and proportion
of votes. Only calculated for the 839 elections where single party majority status
would be reassigned if the largest party either won or lost a single seat.
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To bolster our analysis, we also look at spending. In particular, we look at per
capita public spending (both operating and capital expenses). We only have spending
data from 1978 and onwards. This spending variable is adjusted using the same
benchmarking procedure as the one used for the tax variable. We also use a number
of other supporting and control variables in the analysis. Section S1 of the supple-
mentary materials presents an overview of these variables as well as descriptive
statistics. All indicators used in the analysis are constructed from publicly available
data about the Danish municipalities published by either Statistics Denmark or the
Danish Election Database.11
Assessing the Validity of the Design
The key assumption underlying the RD design is that at the cut-off that determines
assignment to single party majority status, it was as-if random whether the largest
party was actually assigned amajority or not. We cannot test this assumption directly,
but we can look for indirect evidence. For one, we can examine whether there
are any systematic differences between the type of municipalities where parties
narrowly won majorities and the type of municipalities where parties narrowly
lost majorities. In section S2 of the supplementary materials, we show that there
are no such discontinuities at the assignment cut-off with respect to a number of
predetermined variables, which are either closely related to the dependent variable
or to the forcing variable.
Another way to probe the as-if randomness assumption is to examine the density
of the forcing variable. As such, if we find a large number of observations just below
or above the cut-off that assigns single party majority status, this could suggest that
local politicians or the electorate were able to decide whether the largest party ended
up with a single party majority. However, if one inspects figure 7.3, which plots the
density of the forcing variable, there does not seem to be any evidence of this type of
sorting. This is supported by the fact that a formal McCrary test of a discontinuity
in the density at the cut-off comes out insignificant (p > 0.8; see section S3 of the
supplementary materials for details). It is not surprising that we find no signs of
sorting. As mentioned above, the exact cut-off for assignment of single party majority
status is different from election to election, and depends on the exact vote totals of
from 1970 till 2005 is 18, and that in 1980 municipalities sat taxes two percent lower than the average
across all years. Then our benchmarked measure of tax rates equals 20− 18− (−2) = 4. As such, the
city council in this municipality has implemented a tax level which is 4 percentage points higher than
what we would expect from this municipality at this point in time.
11See http://www.statistikbanken.dk and http://valgdata.ps.au.dk.
128 | B: Incumbent Behavior
the other parties. Even if local politicians or municipal electorates could select into
exact vote shares for the largest party, they would be hard pressed to know exactly
how many votes this party would need in order to win or lose a majority of the seats
in the city council, because the exact number of votes needed would depend on
the complete distribution of votes across parties and electoral coalitions, which is,
naturally, not revealed before the election.
The Effect of Single Party Majority Status on Tax Policy
We begin our analysis of the relationship between tax rates and single party majority
status by plotting benchmarked tax rates against our forcing variable, and by showing
the over-all distribution of tax rates for parties who narrowly lost and for parties
who narrowly won a single party majority. We plot tax rates at two different points
in time. To test the sanctioning hypothesis, which suggested that if the largest party
won a majority of the seats in the city council, then the city council would lower taxes
before the next election, we plot the tax rate at the election following the one where a
party either narrowly won or narrowly lost a majority of the seats in the city council.
To test the selection hypothesis, which suggested that having a single party majority
incumbent up for election would lead to a city-council that lowered taxes, we plot
the tax rate at the election following the one that featured an incumbent party who
either narrowly won or narrowly lost a majority of the seats in the city council. In
effect, this means that for each close election, we plot the benchmarked election-year
tax rates at the time of the next two elections (t = 1 and t = 2, cf. figure 7.1).
Examining these graphs, we can see that there is no evidence of an immediate
effect of single party majority status on tax rates, however, there is evidence of a
long term effect. As such, whether or not a party wins a single party majority, does
not seem to have an effect on the tax rate set at the next election (t = 1), but there
does seem to be a negative effect of about half a percentage point if one looks at the
subsequent election (t = 2). In particular, if we look at the distributions of tax rates,
we can see that there are almost no municipalities with high benchmarked tax rates
(> 1) among single party majorities at this latter election.
We can interpret these findings as preliminary evidence against the sanctioning
hypothesis and for the selection hypothesis. Accordingly, when the largest party
in the city council gets a single party majority, increasing this party’s clarity of
responsibility for tax policy, there is no evidence that this leads the city council to
lower the (benchmarked) tax rate. This goes against the sanctioning hypothesis,
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which suggested that the prospect of being held more electorally accountable for
tax policy by the voters, would lead the largest party to lower taxes before the next
election. The evidence does suggest, however, that if the largest party has a majority
of the seats going into an election, then the type of city-council that gets elected will
be more prone to lower taxes. This is in line with the selection hypothesis, which
suggested that if the largest party holds a majority of the seats it is easier for voters
to identify and reduce the political influence of parties who are not interested in
lowering taxes, and, by extension, they are able to empower partieswho are interested
in lowering taxes.
Having examined the data graphically, we now try to estimate the effect of single
party majority status on tax rates in a statistical model. Specifically, we use the
rdrobust package developed by Calonico et al. (2014) to do local polynomial point
estimation of the effect.12 We do do this using both a first order (local-linear) and a
second order (local-quadratic) polynomial. The key estimates from these models are
presented in table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Does single party majority status affect tax rates?
Dependent variable Point estimate Robust p-value Bandwidth Polynomial n
Tax rates (sanctioning, t=1) -0.00 0.927 0.05 1 428
Tax rates (sanctioning, t=1) 0.02 0.846 0.08 2 618
Tax rates (selection, t=2) -0.39 0.016 0.04 1 317
Tax rates (selection, t=2) -0.42 0.035 0.06 2 478
Estimated using the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel.
As can be seen from table 7.1, the results line up nicely with what we found when
examining the data graphically. There is essentially no immediate effect of gaining
a single party majority on tax rates, but there is an effect of about −0.4 percentage
points on tax rates at the subsequent election. The effect at the subsequent election is
substantial: almost half a standard deviation.13
To examine the statistical significance of these effects, we can look at the robust
p-value associated with the point estimator, which is also reported in table 7.1 (for
description of the robust p-value, see Calonico et al., 2014). While the estimated
12This entails fitting weighted least squares (WLS) regressions of the forcing variable on tax rates
above and below the cut-off, using the difference in model expectations of the WLS regression
estimates at the cut-off as the estimator of the effect. To use this method, one needs to choose a
bandwidth around the cut-off within in which the WLS models can be fit and a weight structure.
Throughout our analysis we follow the advice of Skovron and Titiunik (2015) and use the CCT
MSE-optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel.
13In section S11 of the supplementary materials we examine the full time profile and heteregoneity
of these effects.
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effects on tax rates at t = 1 are statistically indistinguishable from zero, the effects
on tax levels at t = 2 are statistically significant for both the model with a first order
polynomial and the model with a second order polynomial (p < 0.05).
A potential critique of these significance tests are that they test the effect at t = 2
separately from the effect at t = 1. That is, there might be a multiple comparisons
problem (Gelman, Hill and Yajima, 2012). However, even if one takes the multiple
comparisons into account, the statistical evidence for an effect at t = 2 is still pretty
strong. If one, for instance, makes a simple Benjamini–Hochberg correction of the
critical p-values (using an FDR of 0.2), then the estimated effects remain statistically
significant.
Taken together, the evidence presented here is consistent with the selection hy-
pothesis, but not with the sanctioning hypothesis. That is, single party majority
status does affect tax rates, but it only does so after the single party majority has been
up for (re-)election.
Robustness Checks
How model dependent are our results? Following Skovron and Titiunik (2015), we
only used data within the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth of the forcing variable. All
decisions about the size of bandwidth, however, rely on a trade-off between bias and
efficiency, and therefore it is always interesting to see whether one’s results change
substantially depending onwhat trade-off is used. In section S4 of the supplementary
materials, we examine whether the results obtained in table 7.1 are sensitive to the
size of the bandwidth. We find that the point estimators of the effects are not sensitive
to the choice of bandwidth, however, the effect of single party majority status on
tax rates at t = 2 is statistically insignificant at the smallest bandwidths. This is not
surprising, as these include less than a hundred observations.
Another source of model dependence might lie in the local polynomial point esti-
mation. While this method is recommended by political methodologists (Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014; Skovron and Titiunik, 2015), it is still rather new. Ac-
cordingly, some might find it interesting to see whether more traditional estimation
methods identify similar effects. We look at this in section S5 of the supplementary
materials, where we estimate the effect of single party majority status on tax rates
using OLS regression. The effects estimated using this method are similar in mag-
nitude and in their statistical significance to the ones that are estimated using local
polynomial point estimation.
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As a final check of model dependence, we look at whether the local polynomial
point estimation only identifies an effect on tax levels at the cut-off where single party
majority status is assigned. We do this in section S6 of the supplementary materials
by examining placebo cut-offs along the forcing variable. There is no evidence of
tax levels changing at the alternative cut-offs we examine. We have also looked at
whether the results laid out in table 7.1 are sensitive to restricting the observations
used, so that all models are estimated using the same observations. This does not
affect the results (see section S7 of the supplementary materials for details).
No Evidence of ‘Strategic’ Tax Setting
In sections S8 and S9 of the supplementary materials we examine whether there is
any evidence of ‘strategic’ tax setting. That is, we examine whether the election-year
decreases in the tax rate identified above (cf. table 7.1) were offset by non-election-
year increases in the tax rate, and whether decreases in the income tax rate was offset
by increases in other taxes (i.e., property taxes). We find no evidence of this. These
analyses tells us that to the extent that changes in tax policy was a result of voters
selecting different types of local politicians (cf. the selection hypothesis), voters did
not simply select politicians who only seemingly lowered taxes through strategic
tax setting (i.e., taking advantage of the election cycle or tax mixing), they elected
politicians who, as far as we can tell, earnestly pursued lower taxes.
Alternative Explanations
In section S13 of the supplementary materials, we examine two alternative explana-
tions for why single party majority status might lead to lower taxes, namely, that the
effects are a result of increased partisan fragmentation or that they are related to the
ideology of the largest party. We find no evidence consistent with these alternative
explanations, which lends further credibility to our claim that it is changes in voters
mode of selection that is driving the identified changes in tax policy.
Additional Evidence for the Selection Hypothesis
The key mechanism underlying the selection hypotheses is that the way voters select
(i.e., vote for) local politicians changes when the largest party gets a single party
majority. In particular, the selection hypothesis suggests that electoral support for
the largest party becomes more dependent on tax policy when this party controls a
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majority of the seats in the city council. So far, we have simply assumed that single
party majority status leads to such changes in voter behavior, because that is what the
large and empirically powerful literature on clarity of responsibility would predict.
In this section, we explore whether this assumption about voters reaction to single
party majority status is empirically well-founded.14
To investigate whether voters hold the largest party more electorally accountable
for tax policy when this party controls a majority of the seats in the city council,
we estimate four linear regression models that set electoral support for the largest
party as a function of our benchmarked income tax measure, a dummy indicating
whether the largest party controls a majority of the seats in the city council and an
interaction between the two. In addition to this, all models include year fixed effects
to control for temporal trends in electoral support. The first two models are lagged
dependent variable (LDV) models, with and without a set of political controls meant
to index the ideological mood – using a set of dummies for mayoral ideology and the
proportion of right-wing voters - as well as the political engagement of the municipal
electorate – using proportion who turned out to vote. The second two models are
difference-in-difference (DiD) models (and thus include municipality and year fixed
effects), with and without the political controls. We use both LDV and DiD models
to explore the robustness of our results (as recommended by Angrist and Pischke,
2008, 245).
Figure 7.5 presents the marginal effect of tax rates on support for the largest
party for both single party majorities and pluralities derived from these four models.
Across all models, the estimated effect of tax rates on support for the largest party
is statistically significant and negative when the largest party controls a majority
of the seats. Conversely, the effect is close to zero and insignificant if the largest
party controls less than a majority of the seats. These differences in effect sizes are
statistically significant (cf. section S10 of the supplementary materials).
This tells us that voters are more likely to hold the largest party electorally ac-
countable for the tax rate if the party controls a majority of the seats in the city
council. What implications does this have? Imagine that the largest party in some
municipality narrowly wins a single party majority. If this party is able and willing
to lower local income taxes two percentage points, our estimates suggest that the
party will be rewarded by the voters with an extra 3-4 percentage points of electoral
support at the next election. All else equal, this electoral gain will ensure that the
14This section builds on our analysis of the electoral consequences of income tax rates described
above and detailed in section S14 of the supplementary materials.






























Figure 7.5 Did voters change their mode of selection? Effects of tax rates on electoral
support for the largest party in municipalities where the largest party has a plurality
or a majority of the seats in the city council. Spikes are 90 (wide) and 95 (thin)
pct. confidence intervals. Marginal effects are derived from lagged dependent
variable (LDV) and difference-in-difference (DiD) models with and without political
controls (turnout, percent right-wing voters and the mayor’s ideological orientation).
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Estimates from these models are
presented in section S10 of the supplementary materials.
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party can hold onto their majority. If the party is not able or willing to lower local
income taxes, but instead raises them, then the party will be punished by the voters,
and, all else equal, they will lose their majority. Accordingly, because voters change
their mode of selection, single party majority status ends up making the type of
parties who lower taxes more powerful and the type of parties who raise taxes less
powerful. Arguably, this shift in power will be reflected in the tax policy enacted
by the city council, which leaves us with the pattern identified in our main analysis,
namely, that single party majority status leads to lower taxes.
A reservation that one might raise with respect to this analysis is that voters
are not knowledgeable enough about patterns of political responsibility to act on
differences between single party majorities and pluralities (e.g., Achen and Bartels,
2016). There are two reasons why this is not necessarily an important concern in this
case. First, single party majority status does seem to have an impact on citizens’ basic
knowledge about the power structures in the city council. Looking at survey data of
a representative cross-section of voters, we find that having a single party majority
significantly improves voters ability to correctly name the political party of the mayor
and correctly name which party has the most seats in the city council (see section
S11 of the supplementary materials). Second, even if voters do not immediately
comprehend the changes in political responsibility that single party majority status
entails, political elites – such as unions, interest groups and the media – will surely
understand what single party majority status means for local politics, and try to
communicate this to the electorate.
Conclusion
Clarity of responsibility moderates retrospective voting. Incumbent politicians are
more likely to be held electorally accountable for policy outcomes if they are clearly
responsible for these outcomes. In this article, we explore whether this has any
implications for the type of policy outcomes incumbents pursue in office. Following
research on how retrospective voting constrains incumbent behavior, we asserted
that clarity of responsibility would increase the extent to which incumbent politicians
pursue the type of policy outcomes their electorate prefers.
To examine the viability of this assertion, we looked at tax policy in Danish mu-
nicipalities. In particular, we examined how an indicator of clarity of responsibility,
single party majority status in local city councils, affected the extent to which local
officials pursued a policy outcome that was shown to be electorally popular with the
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average voter in the Danish municipalities: lower income taxes. Using an RD design,
we were able to identify the causal effect of single party majority status on tax policy
by comparing municipalities where the largest party narrowly obtained an single
party majority with municipalities where the largest party fell just short of such a
majority.
We found that single party majority status did lead to lower taxes, however, the
effect was not immediate. When the largest party in the city council got a single
party majority, increasing its clarity of responsibility for tax policy, it did not lower or
refrain from raising taxes. Instead, our analyses identified an effect at the subsequent
election. That is, the type of city-council elected when a single party majority was
up for re-election tended to lower taxes.
We attributed this effect to voters changing theirmode of selecting local politicians
when a single party majority was part of their set of electoral choices. In particular,
we showed that if the largest party won a single party majority, they were held more
electorally accountable for the tax rate the city council enacted. Arguably, this change
in voters mode of selection meant that single party majority status was eventually
accompanied by a transfer of seats in the city council from the type of parties who
raise taxes and towards the type of parties who lower taxes, and this transfer of seats
lead some city councils to adopt lower taxes.
In summary, we found that clarity of political responsibility had a ‘selection’
rather than a ‘sanctioning’ effect on incumbent behavior. That is, while increases in
clarity of responsibility did mean that incumbents were sanctioned more harshly
for enacting unpopular tax policy, this change in re-election incentives did not make
the incumbent pursue different policies. Rather, clarity of responsibility affected
incumbent behavior by affecting who got to stay in power and who did not. As a
result, the local politicians elected when clarity of responsibility was high were more
likely to pursue the more popular policy of lowering taxes.
It is surprising that we do not find any evidence of a sanctioning effect. Much
previous literature on how elections discipline incumbents have found evidence of
sanctioning effects (e.g., Alt, De Mesquita and Rose, 2011; Besley and Case, 1995a).
Even so, we are not the first to find that selection dominates sanctioning when it
comes to the effects of clarity of responsibility (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008). In
any case, our findings highlight the important role electoral selection plays when it
comes to electoral control of the policies political leaders pursue.
How generalizable are our findings? Since we used an RD design, we can only
generalize directly to the types of municipalities where the largest party was close to
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either winning or losing a single party majority (Lee, 2008). Fortunately, this is not
just a small number of municipalities, because the exact cut-off for assignment of
single party majority status varies substantially across municipalities and elections.
In fact, 235 (out of 273) municipalities appear in our dataset of close elections at
least once. Therefore, we believe that the effects identified above can be generalized
to practically all Danish municipalities. The more interesting scope of inference,
however, is political systems in general. It is incredibly hard to say whether these
findings will generalize to other contexts, however, it is important to note that we
have found evidence of the importance of clarity of responsibility in a context with
a strong consensual culture and with a committee system which forces parties to
work together – even if a single party controls a majority of the seats (Serritzlew,
Skjæveland and Blom-Hansen, 2008). In other contexts, where differences in clarity
of responsibility are more dramatic, the effects might also be more dramatic.
Turning to implications, the most important one seems to be that incumbents will
do more to provide the policy outcomes that the average voter prefers when clarity of
responsibility is high. To the extent that democratic quality can be measured in terms
of responsiveness to the average voter (e.g., Lax and Phillips, 2012), this suggests
that a certain degree of clarity of responsibility is a desirable feature of a political
system. However, it is important to remember, that responsiveness to the average
voter is not only a force for good. The electorate may deviate from the population at
large, twisting the incentives of politicians away from the people they are meant to
serve (Sances, 2016), or the preferences of the electorate may be ill informed, leading
to bad decision-making if politicians are forced to follow them too closely (Bartels,
2005). Regardless of whether responsiveness is a force for good or not, our findings
suggests that in a representative democracy, clarity of political responsibility, and
the centralization of power which it entails, does carry an apparent benefit to an
electorate that wants to steer the action of its political leaders: it means that it will
be easier for the electorate to identify what type of political leaders they have at the
present, and easier to retain the political leaders which are actually willing and able
to act in their interest.
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Supplementary materials
S1: Descriptive Statistics
Tables S.7.1 and S.7.2 report descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis
for the close elections and for all elections. Table S.7.3 presents a description of the
same variables.
Table S.7.1 Descriptive statistics (close elections)
Mean SD Min Max n
Election year 1985.62 10.13 1970.00 2001.00 839
Size of city council 16.52 3.27 9.00 29.00 839
Single party majority 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 839
Population (log) 9.33 0.74 7.90 12.12 839
Area (log) 4.70 0.80 2.17 6.29 839
Right-wing voters 0.49 0.17 0.00 0.84 839
Turnout 0.75 0.06 0.55 0.95 839
How close was the election? (seats) -0.61 0.49 -1.00 0.00 839
How close was election? (votes/10) -6.65 61.65 -338.00 446.00 839
Forcing variable -0.02 0.07 -0.21 0.20 839
Tax level (unadjusted), t=0 18.00 2.64 9.40 23.20 741
Per capita spending (unadjusted) 30.19 10.33 11.76 65.34 595
Support for the largest party, t=0 0.45 0.06 0.27 0.91 839
Election cycle 5.07 2.63 1.00 9.00 839
Forcing variable, absolute values 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.21 839
Tax level, t=0 -0.02 0.85 -3.76 3.53 741
Tax level, t=1 -0.04 0.83 -3.76 2.37 834
Tax level, t=2 -0.00 0.75 -2.32 2.35 731
Tax level, t=3 0.05 0.70 -2.00 2.84 632
Tax level, t=4 0.08 0.67 -1.97 2.84 535
Property tax, t=1 0.05 2.62 -14.00 22.53 642
Property tax, t=2 -0.12 2.49 -14.00 15.02 636
Per capita spending, t=1 0.14 4.57 -8.70 23.72 593
Per capita spending, t=2 0.28 4.65 -8.38 23.64 492
Average tax level, t=1 -0.04 0.79 -3.38 2.86 834
Average tax level, t=2 0.00 0.71 -1.97 2.88 731
Right-wing mayor 0.64 0.61 0.00 2.00 839
Retain SPM 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 839
Support for the largest party, t=1 0.43 0.08 0.21 0.89 739
Figure S.7.1 shows the development of the tax rates for all municipalities in the
time period under investigation. Interestingly, we can see that taxes were rising
sharply in the 1970s and 1980s. In this period the average tax rate rose from around
14 percent to about 20 percent. The primary explanation for this uniform increase
in taxes in this period is the expansion of the Danish welfare state, which left the
municipalities with a lot of new tasks that needed to be financed. This might also
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Table S.7.2 Descriptive statistics (all elections)
Mean SD Min Max n
Election year 1987.38 11.06 1970.00 2005.00 2841
Size of city council 17.16 4.13 9.00 55.00 2475
Single party majority 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 2475
Population (log) 9.37 0.79 7.73 13.35 2475
Area (log) 4.81 0.77 2.17 6.33 2475
Right-wing voters 0.48 0.17 0.00 0.84 2475
Turnout 0.75 0.06 0.47 0.95 2475
How close was the election? (seats) -1.61 1.67 -12.00 4.00 2475
How close was election? (votes/10) -6.65 61.65 -338.00 446.00 839
Forcing variable -0.02 0.07 -0.21 0.20 839
Tax level (unadjusted), t=0 18.38 2.67 9.40 23.20 2452
Per capita spending (unadjusted) 29.64 10.52 11.03 79.40 1813
Support for the largest party, t=0 0.42 0.11 0.21 1.00 2473
Election cycle 5.04 2.57 1.00 9.00 2559
Forcing variable, absolute values 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.21 839
Tax level, t=0 -0.00 0.84 -3.94 3.53 2452
Tax level, t=1 -0.00 0.84 -3.94 3.53 2452
Tax level, t=2 0.00 0.77 -3.63 3.28 2179
Tax level, t=3 0.00 0.72 -3.34 2.84 1906
Tax level, t=4 0.00 0.69 -2.54 2.91 1633
Property tax, t=1 0.00 2.50 -14.00 22.53 1911
Property tax, t=2 0.00 2.42 -14.00 22.53 1911
Per capita spending, t=1 -0.00 4.59 -9.54 37.35 1813
Per capita spending, t=2 -0.00 4.80 -9.54 37.35 1554
Average tax level, t=1 0.00 0.80 -3.73 2.88 2452
Average tax level, t=2 0.00 0.74 -3.73 2.88 2179
Right-wing mayor 0.92 0.73 0.00 2.00 2841
Retain SPM 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 2841
Support for the largest party, t=1 0.41 0.10 0.21 0.92 2197
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Table S.7.3 Variable description
Variable name Description
Election Year Year before election period started.
Election Cycle Election Cycle examined (1=1971-1974, 2=1975-1978 and so on).
Size of city council Number of seats.
Single party majority Dummy indicating whether the largest party controls a majority of the
seats in the city council.
Population (log) Logged number of inhabitants in the beginning of the election year.
Area (log) Logged number square kilometers the municipality covers.
Right-wing voters Proportion of voters for the Conservative or the Liberal party (Venstre).
Turnout Proportion who turned out in the election.
How close was the election?
(seats)
Number of seats largest party would have needed to obtain/lose a
single party majority.
How close was the election?
(votes/10)
Number votes largest party would have needed to win/lose a single
party majority divided by 10. Only coded for close elections.
Forcing variable Proportion of votes largest party would have needed to win/lose a
single party majority. Only coded for close elections.
Tax level (unadjusted) The municipalities income tax rate.
Tax level The municipalities benchmarked income tax rate. Measured in the
election year where single party majority is assigned (t=0) and at the
next four elections (t=1,2,3,4).
Average tax level The average benchmarked income tax rate across the entire election
period. Measured in the election period where single party majority is
assigned (t=1) and in the next election period (t=2).
Per capita spending (unad-
justed)/1000 DKK
The municipalities public spending per capita in 1000 DKK. Includes
all operating and capital expenditures.
Per capita spending/1000
DKK
The municipalities benchmarked public spending per capita in 1000
DKK. Includes all operating and capital expenditures. Measured in
the election year after single party majority is assigned (t=0) and in the
subsequent election (t=2).
Property tax level The municipalities benchmarked property tax rate in 10th of a percent.
Measured in the election year after single party majority is assigned
(t=0) and in the subsequent election (t=2).
Support for the largest party Proportion who votes for the the largest party in the municipality.
Measured in the election where single party majority was assigned and
in the next election (t=0,1).
Retain SPM Dummy variable indicating whether single party majority is retained.
Right-wing mayor Categorical variable indicating whether mayor is left wing (0, the Social
Democratic or Socialist Peoples party), right-wing (1, the Conservative
party or the Liberal party) or non-ideological (3, other parties) .
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explain why the average voter preferred lower taxes, as the differences in tax rates did
not simply translate into different levels of public goods provision, but also indicated



















Figure S.7.1 Local income tax levels from the Danish national statistics bureau (Statis-
tics Denmark) on the 273 Danish municipalities between 1972 and 2006. The black
line indicates the average for all municipalities. The grey lines show tax rates for
individual municipalities.
Figure S.7.2 plots the share of single party majorities across all municipalities
for all elections. 24 percent of all elections result in a single party majority. Across
time this share varies from 15 percent in the 1985 election to 35 percent in the 2001
election.
































Figure S.7.2 The share of municipalities with a single party majority across all elec-
tions (1970 to 2001). The black line indicates the mean across all municipalities. The
grey lines are the shares for each of the 14 Danish regions.
S2: Discontinuity in predetermined variables
In table S.7.4 we use local polynomial point estimation to estimate whether there
is an identifiable discontinuity around assignment to single party majority status
on a set of pre-treatment variables (i.e. variables determined before single party
majority status was assigned). The variables we look at are either lagged versions
of the dependent variables we look at (i.e., tax levels and spending), related to the
forcing variable (support for the largest party, council size) or related to the political
make-up of the municipality (ideology og voters/mayor and turnout.)
We use the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth, a triangular kernel and a local-linear
specification. If we can identify an discontinuity for these pre-treatment variables
this means that it is possible for certain parties to select into single party majority
status at the cut-off, threatening the identifying assumption of no sorting. To take
into account, that we are examning discontinuities for multiple variables, we also
display Benjamini-Hochberg critical values.
As can be seen from table S.7.4, there are no signs of a statistically significant
discontinuity around the cut-off for any of the pre-treatment variables we examine
(i.e., no p-value falls below the B-H critical value).
Supplementary materials | 143
Table S.7.4 Is there a discontinuity in predetermined variables?
Variable Point Estimator p-value B-H critical value Bandwidth n
Per capita spending (unadjusted) 3.31 0.28 0.14 0.04 269
Tax level (unadjusted), t=0 0.66 0.24 0.11 0.04 336
Support for the largest party, t=0 0.00 0.83 0.25 0.06 499
Size of city council 0.08 0.75 0.21 0.04 349
Right-wing voters -0.02 0.65 0.18 0.05 471
Turnout -0.02 0.15 0.07 0.04 357
Right-wing mayor -0.23 0.06 0.04 0.05 432
Estimated using the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth, a triangular kernel, and a local-linear specification.
Benjamini–Hochberg critical values calculated using 0.25 FDR.
S3: McCrary Test
There was no evidence of sorting, cf. the McCrary test reported in figure S.7.3.
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Figure S.7.3 Is there a discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable around the
cut-off? McCrary test. Plot produced using package rdd in R. There is no evidence
of sorting around the cut-off (p ≈ 0.8).
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S4: Sensitivity to Bandwidth Choice
In figure S.7.4 we look at whether the effect-estimates vary depending on what
bandwidth is chosen. The figure reveals little variation in the effect sizes, suggesting
that the results are not sensitive to choice of bandwidth.
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Figure S.7.4 How sensitive are the results to changes in bandwidth? Dots signify
estimated effects of single partymajority status on tax rateswith different bandwidths
along with 90 pct. (thick) and 95 pct. (thin) confidence intervals. The effects and their
variance were estimated using local polynomial point estimation with a triangular
kernel. The numbers next to the dots are the number of observations within the
particular bandwidth.
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S5: Alternative Estimation Methods
Below we estimate the effect of single party majority status on tax rates using an OLS
regression. We estimate six linear models predicting tax rates at t = 1 and at t = 2 (cf.
figure 7.1). We use a standard OLS regressionwith robust andmunicipality-clustered
standard errors to estimate the models. In the first model we include a single party
majority dummy and our forcing variable, in the second model we also include a
quadratic version of our forcing variable, and in the third model we substitute the
quadratic term for an interaction between the forcing variable and the single party
majority dummy. In the fourth, fifth and sixth models we include a small battery of
controls and otherwise run the same specifications as in models one through three.
The controls used are: population size (log), size of municipality (log), size of the city
council (seats), support for right wing parties in the close election (pct.), turnout in
the close election (pct.) and the ideology of the mayor’s party (right-wing, left-wing
or non-ideological). The key estimates from these models are presented in tables
S.7.5 and S.7.6.
As can be seen from tables S.7.5 and S.7.6 the estimated effects are very close to
the ones arrived at when using the local polynomial point estimation (cf. table 7.1).
Table S.7.5 Effect of single party majority status on on tax rates at t=1 (sanctioning)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Single party majority -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Forcing variable 1.05 0.93 1.47 1.88 1.74 2.29
(2.83) (2.85) (3.93) (2.77) (2.77) (3.90)
Forcing variable × Forcing variable -16.01 -18.42
(52.31) (52.65)
Single party majority × Forcing variable -0.98 -0.97
(5.63) (5.63)
Controls X X X
Observations 436 436 436 436 436 436
R squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04
RMSE 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.81
Standard errors in parentheses
Estimated using a 5 pct. bandwidth.
Controls: Population, area, turnout, percent right-wing voters, mayoral party.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table S.7.6 Effect of single party majority status on on tax rates at t=2 (selection)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Single party majority -0.40∗ -0.41∗ -0.41∗ -0.44∗ -0.45∗ -0.44∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Forcing variable 5.75∗ 6.08∗ 3.79 6.24∗ 6.48∗ 4.75
(2.43) (2.45) (3.27) (2.46) (2.49) (3.34)
Forcing variable × Forcing variable 48.93 38.28
(48.81) (50.40)
Single party majority × Forcing variable 4.55 3.42
(4.89) (5.09)
Controls X X X
Observations 379 379 379 379 379 379
R squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04
RMSE 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Standard errors in parentheses
Estimated using a 5 pct. bandwidth.
Controls: Population, area, turnout, percent right-wing voters, mayoral party.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05
S6: Placebo Test
In figure S.7.5 we use local polynomial point estimation to estimate the effect of being
above or below a number of so-called placebo cut-offs. That is, the effect of being
above or below a cut-off at which nothing happens. We estimate the effect at these
cut-off for taxes at t = 1 and t = 2. In our estimation we use the CCT MSE-optimal
bandwidth, a triangular kernel and a local-linear specification.
We do not identify a statistically significant effect at any of the placebo cut-offs.
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Figure S.7.5 Effects at placebo cut-offs and the actual cut-off (0) which assigned single
party majority status. Effects estimated using local polynomial point estimation.
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S7: Balanced Panel
In table S.7.8 we replicate table 7.1 excluding the year 2001, which was not included
for the original analyses of taxes at t = 2, because we do not have tax levels for
the election in 2009 (see the section ‘Income Taxes in Danish Municipalities’ for an
explanation of why we do not have tax rates in 2009). This does not change the
results.
Table S.7.7 Does single party majority status affect property tax rates? (excluding
2001)
Variable Point Estimate p-value Bandwidth Polynomial n
Tax rates (sanctioning, t=1) -0.06 0.841 0.05 1 388
Tax rates (sanctioning, t=1) 0.00 0.870 0.07 2 508
Tax rates (selection, t=2) -0.39 0.016 0.04 1 317
Tax rates (selection, t=2) -0.42 0.035 0.06 2 478
Estimated using the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel.
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S8: Examining the Election Period Average Tax Rate
Above we only examined the tax rate in the election year, however, if single party
majority status actually affected the city councils’ propensity to pursue lower taxes,
then we should be able to find this effect in the entire election period, not just in the
election year. In particular, we want to make sure that local politicians do not offset
lower taxes in an election year by raising taxes in the beginning of the election period.
In table S.7.8 we replicate table 7.1 using the average tax rate across the entire election
period. The results are pretty much the same as what we found in table 7.1. One
difference is that the effects estimated at t = 2 seems to be slightly smaller. As such,
there seems to be a larger negative effect in election years, however, this tendency is
not very strong. In particular, the absolute difference between the estimates for the
election year tax rate and the average tax rate is less than 0.1.
Table S.7.8 Does single party majority status affect average tax rates?
Variable Point estimate p-value Bandwidth Polynomial n
Tax rates (sanctioning, t=1) -0.06 0.701 0.05 1 474
Tax rates (sanctioning, t=1) -0.06 0.817 0.08 2 627
Tax rates (selection, t=2) -0.32 0.038 0.05 1 356
Tax rates (selection, t=2) -0.34 0.102 0.07 2 504
Estimated using the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel.
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S9: Examining Property Taxes
Municipalities in Denmark can also levy a property tax. There are several reasons
why we did not use the property tax in the main analysis: they are not as salient,
they constitute a much smaller fraction of the municipalities’ income, they are only
directly paid by those who own their own home, and it is not clear that there is an
electoral incentive to lower them (Blom-Hansen, Monkerud and Sørensen, 2006).
However, in spite of this, it is interesting to briefly examine the property tax. As
such, by examining property tax rates it becomes possible to find out whether single
party majority status does in fact lead to a lower over-all tax level, or whether the tax
mix simply changes from income to property taxes.
In table S.7.9 we replicate table 7.1 using property taxes as the dependent variable.
The property taxes are measured in tenths of a percent. As can be seen from this
table, we find no evidence of tax-mixing, if anything, property taxes seem to drop
as well in t = 2, however, the estimated effects of single party majority status on
property taxes are not statistically significant.
Table S.7.9 Does single party majority status affect property tax rates?
Dependent Variable Point Estimate Robust p-value Bandwidth Polynomial n
Tax rates (sanctioning, t=1) -0.04 0.942 0.06 1 384
Tax rates (sanctioning, t=1) 0.40 0.528 0.06 2 414
Tax rates (selection, t=2) -0.55 0.336 0.06 1 400
Tax rates (selection, t=2) -0.29 0.807 0.06 2 400
Estimated using the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel.
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S10: Full Model
Table S.7.10 presents the key estimates from the regression models underlying figure
7.5.
Table S.7.10 OLS regression of largest party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single party majority 0.017∗ 0.023∗ 0.026∗ 0.028∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tax level, t=1 × Single party majority -0.014∗ -0.015∗ -0.015∗ -0.015∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Support for the largest party, t=0 0.562∗ 0.496∗
(0.037) (0.035)
Political Controls X X
Year FE X X X X
Municipal FE X X
Observations 2180 2180 2182 2182
Municipality Clustered Standard errors in parenthesis.
Political controls: Turnout, percent right-wing voters, mayoral party ideology.
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S11: Citizen Survey on Local Politics (1978)
In this section, we examine responses from a survey conducted in 1978 on a repre-
sentative sample of citizens from 70 municipalities (n = 1, 856).15 The survey was
conducted in the month following the 1978 municipal election. Respondents were
asked about the political party of the mayor and the largest political party in the
council. 88 pct. could (correctly) name the political party of the mayor while 71 pct.
could name the largest political party in the council. In table S.7.11 we test whether
the share of correct responses differ among municipalities with and without a single
party majority. On both dimensions, we see that citizens in municipalities with
a single party majority are significantly more likely to provide a correct response.
This is particular true for naming the largest political party, which improves by 10
percentage points when there is a single party majority.
Table S.7.11OLS regressions of citizens’ knowledge about local politics (1978 survey)
Can the respondent corretly name...
...The party of the mayor? ...The largest party in the council?





Adjusted R2 0.002 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<.05
15Data from this survey was acquired through the Danish Data Archive, see http://dda.dk/
catalogue/199?lang=da for details.
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S12: Heterogeneity in the Effects
Our selection and sanctioning hypotheses only made predictions about tax levels at
t = 1 and t = 2, but what is the complete temporal profile of the single party majority
effect? We explore this in figure S.7.6, estimating the effect of single party majority
on election-year tax rates at the four elections following assignment of single party
majority. Here we can see that the effect does not kick in until t = 2, as we found in
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Figure S.7.6 Effect of obtaining a single party majority on benchmarked tax levels at
t=1, 2, 3, and 4. Spikes are 90 pct. (thick) and 95 pct. (thin) confidence intervals. Ef-
fects estimated using local polynomial point estimation with a first order polynomial,
a triangular kernel and the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth.
In addition to this temporal profile of the effect, we can look atwhether the effect is
larger in some municipalities than it is in others. In table S.7.12 we examine whether
the effect of single party majority status on property tax rates at t = 2 depends on
whether the tax rate before the close election was above or below the median tax rate
(18.5), whether right wing parties received support from more or less than 50 pct. of
voters in the close election, and whether the election took place before or after 1984.
These analyses show that the effect is stable across the time period investigated.
More importantly, the effect does not seem to depend on the ideological make-up of
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Table S.7.12 Does single party majority status affect property tax rates at t=2?
Analysed group Point Estimate Robust p-value Bandwidth Polynomial n
Below median tax rate -0.25 0.374 0.04 1 162
Above median tax rate -0.59 0.006 0.04 1 156
Support for right-wing parties < 50 pct -0.40 0.064 0.04 1 168
Support for right-wing parties > 50 pct -0.39 0.094 0.05 1 154
Before 1984 -0.34 0.115 0.05 1 188
After 1984 -0.43 0.070 0.04 1 140
Estimated using the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel.
the electorate. The effects on tax rates in t = 2 are the same in municipalities where
a majority of the voters support right-wing parties. This suggests, that our results
do not hinge upon the ideological make-up of the Danish electorate. We do find,
however, that the effect depends on the over-all tax rate in the municipality. If the
municipality starts out with a tax rate that was above the median, then the effect of
single party majority status on tax rates at t = 2 tends to be higher.
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S13: Alternative Explanations
Gaining single party majority status might have effects on other things than just the
mode of selection adopted by the voters, and these things could potentially affect tax
setting as well. For one, single party majority status reduces partisan fragmentation
in the city council and reduces the number of parties who have a say in municipal
policy-making. If one conceptualizes public spending as a common pool resource,
then political economy models tells us that as fragmentation decreases so does
public spending (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Martin and Vanberg, 2013; Velasco,
2000; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981). To the extent that this lower spending
translates into lower taxes as well, this might explain our findings. However, existing
studies on the relationship between party fragmentation and spending in Danish
municipalities have gottenmixed results (Blom-Hansen, 2010; Hansen, 2014). Further,
if the decrease in party fragmentation and need for inter-party cooperation is what is
driving down taxes, it is not clear why this effect does not appear immediately after
the election of a single party majority (i.e., why is there no effect at t = 1?).
Even so, it is still interesting to explore whether single party majority status
affects the level of municipal public spending. We estimate the effect of single
party majority status on per capita spending using the same local polynomial point
estimation method we used for examining effects on income taxes. We estimate
effects at both t = 1 and t = 2with both a local-linear and a local-quadratic fit. The
key estimates from these models are presented in table S.7.13. As can be seen from
this table, there is a positive point estimate of the effect on spending across both time
periods, but the effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Note that this goes
against the notion that single party majority status should affect tax rates through
decreased spending. As such, it does not seem to be the case that municipalities
lower taxes because they lower public spending. Instead, municipalities must be
identifying other ways of getting additional revenue, while maintaining the same
level of spending (e.g., increase their debt or increase other sources of revenue).
Table S.7.13 Does single party majority status affect per capita spending?
Dependent variable Point estimate Robust p-value Bandwidth Polynomial n
Spending (sanctioning, t=1) 0.79 0.462 0.05 1 280
Spending (sanctioning, t=1) 1.19 0.412 0.07 2 402
Spending (selection, t=1) 0.34 0.751 0.05 1 238
Spending (selection, t=1) 0.61 0.682 0.06 2 325
Estimated using the CCT MSE-optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel.
Spending is benchmarked and measured in 1,000 DKK per capita (≈ 150 USD).
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Another alternative explanation is that the effects identified above are related
to the ideology of the largest party. In particular, if right-wing parties are more
interested in lowering taxes than left-wing parties, and if the largest party is more
often right-wing than left-wing, then this might explain why taxes go down when
the largest party wins a majority of the seats in the city council (Lowry, Alt and
Ferree, 1998).
In fact, the largest party in the Danish municipalities is more often right-wing
than left-wing. 45 pct. of the largest parties are right-wing, 35 pct. are left-wing
and the last 20 pct. are parties who do not lean strongly left or right. However, if
this ideological imbalance is what is driving down tax levels, it is not clear why
single party majority status has no immediate effect on tax rates (i.e., no effect at
t = 1). Further, if we analyze our data separately for cases where the largest party is
right-wing and for cases where the largest party is left-wing, we find no substantial
differences in the results, cf. figure S.7.7. That is, the tax policy pursued by the city
council when the largest party wins a majority of the seats, does not depend on the
largest party’s ideological orientation.
In sum, there is no evidence that the effect of single party majority status on
tax policy is based on changes in party fragmentation, coalition structure or the
ideological composition of the largest parties. This, combined with the evidence for
the key mechanism underlying the selection hypothesis, lends credibility to the fact
that it is changes in voters mode of selection that is driving the changes in tax policy
we identified in our main analysis.




























Figure S.7.7 Effects of single party majority status on tax rates for left- and right-
wing parties. Spikes are 90 (wide) and 95 (thin) pct. confidence intervals. Effects are
estimated using local-linear point estimation using the CCTMSE-optimal bandwidth,
restricting the sample to cases where the largest party is either left- or rightwing.
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S14: The Electoral Cost of Raising Local Income Tax Rates
Table S.7.14 presents four different models predicting support for the largest party
using the election-year income tax rate, set by the incumbent city council, as the
independent variable. All models include year fixed effects to control for trends in
electoral support and income tax rates. The first two models are lagged dependent
variable models with and without a set of political controls meant to index the
ideological mood – using a set of dummies for mayoral ideology and the proportion
of right-wing voters - as well as the political engagement of the municipal electorate
– using proportion who turned out to vote. The second two models are difference-in-
difference models (and thus include municipality and year fixed effects), with and
without the political controls. We use both type of models to explore the robustness
of our results (as recommended by Angrist and Pischke, 2008, 245).
Across all models we find the same basic result. Namely, that there is a negative
and statistically significant effect of election year income tax rates on support for the
largest party. The size of the effect varies slightly from specification to specification,
with the largest effects being in the more restrictive difference-in-difference models.
Table S.7.14 OLS regression of largest party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax level, (t=1) -0.004∗ -0.005∗ -0.007∗ -0.008∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Support for the largest party, t=0 0.587∗ 0.543∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Political Controls X X
Year FE X X X X
Municipal FE X X
Observations 2180 2180 2182 2182
Municipality Clustered Standard errors in parenthesis.
Political controls: Turnout, percent right-wing voters, mayoral party ideology.
How variable is the electoral cost of raising income taxes across elections? To
explore this, we estimated a version of model four from table S.7.14, where we
interacted the income-tax variable with the year fixed effects. Figure S.7.8 presents
marginal effects from this model across all election years included in our study (1970
is omitted since we do not have a lag of the dependent variable from before this
period).
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While there is some modest variation in the effect size, which drops closer to zero
between ’78 and ’85 and is above the average from ’93 to 2001, a joint significance test
of the year by tax rate interactions reveal that this variation might be due to chance
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Figure S.7.8Did voters consistently punish the largest party for raising income taxes?
Marginal effects of tax rates on largest party vote share across the different elections
included in our study. Spikes are 90 (wide) and 95 (thin) pct. confidence intervals.
Marginal effects are derived from a difference-in-difference model including the
political controls (cf. table S.7.14) as well as an interaction between the year dummies
and the income tax variable. The dark gray line represents the average marginal





Crowds Out Economic Voting
We know that economic circumstances often shape the electoral fortunes of political
leaders. However, we do not know whether the importance of these economic
circumstances change during political leaders’ time in office. If one asserts that
politicians become more responsible for the economic situation as their time in office
increase, then the literature on clarity of responsibility would suggest, that there
might be a positive relationship between incumbent tenure and economic voting.
Conversely, if one asserts that voters continually accumulate information about
politicians as their time in office increases, then models of Bayesian learning would
suggest that this growing stock of information could crowd out the importance
of recent economic conditions. Using three independent datasets, we empirically
adjudicate between these different theoretical expectations. We find that as an
executive party’s tenure increases, its electoral support becomes more independent
of the economic situation.
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Economic circumstances often shape the electoral fortunes of political leaders (Healy
and Malhotra, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013). A recession, a spike in unem-
ployment, or an increase in prices, will, all other things being equal, lead voters to
unseat incumbent politicians and elect political opponents. However, other things
are often not equal. Studies on the economic antecedents of electoral behaviour have
identified extensive variation, in the relationship between the economic situation
and electoral support for incumbents (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck, 1990;
Paldam, 1991; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007). So why is economic
voting more prevalent in some elections than it is in others? Previous studies of why
the economic vote varies have typically explained this in terms of variations in the
political and economic institutional context (e.g. Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Powell
and Whitten, 1993). In particular, these studies have found that institutions that
regulate the extent to which incumbents have unified control over economic policy
condition the extent to which incumbents are held electorally accountable for the
economic situation. For instance, works in this ‘clarity of responsibility’ literature
have found that economic openness (Hellwig and Samuels, 2007; Hellwig, 2001) and
government composition (Anderson, 2006; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013) mod-
erate the economic vote. Yet, despite this comprehensive literature on the sources of
variation in economic voting, a surprisingly understudied question is whether the
duration of a governments time in office conditions the economic vote.
Only a small number of studies have dealt with the relationship between time
in office and economic voting. These studies have generally conceptualised tenure
as a component of clarity of responsibility (Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002),
asserting that incumbents’ influence on economic outcomes increases with their
time in office, and because of this one should expect economic voting to be more
prevalent in elections which feature more experienced incumbents and less prevalent
in elections which feature less experienced incumbents. Empirically, these studies
have primarily, though not exclusively, been interested in the short term relationship
between economic voting and tenure, studying how the economic vote develops
during an incumbent’s first term (Carey and Lebo, 2006; Lebo and Box-Steffensmeier,
2008; Singer andCarlin, 2013). Generally, they find that retrospective economic voting
tends to increase during the incumbent’s first two years in office. In this article, we
add to this small, growing literature by employing an alternative theoretical approach
to the relationship between tenure and the economic vote, Bayesian learning, and by
examining the long term relationship between economic voting and time in office
using a number of different data sources.
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Models of Bayesian learning tells us that beliefs which are based on more infor-
mation are generally less likely to be moved by a single new piece of evidence than
beliefs which are based on less information (Breen, 1999; Gerber and Green, 1999).
In the context of economic voting, one can conceptualise this “information” as all
relevant cues about the quality of the incumbent obtained before one takes recent
economic conditions (i.e., the new piece of evidence) into account. Information
naturally accumulates with time in office. That is, voters will always have more
information about their incumbent at t = x+1 than they have at t = x, because all of
the information accumulated by t = x is also available at t = x+ 1. Accordingly, as
an incumbent’s time in office increases, voters stock of relevant information increases,
strengthening voters beliefs about the incumbent, leaving the beliefs less malleable,
and thus potentially attenuating the effect recent economic conditions have on these
beliefs.
If one considers Bayesian learning in conjunction with the clarity of responsibility
hypothesis that has been advanced in previous research, it becomes clear that there
could be countervailing forces at work when it comes to the relationship between
economic voting and time in office. As such, the clarity of responsibility hypothesis
suggests that experienced incumbents have more influence over the economy than
inexperienced incumbents, driving economic voting up as time in office increases,
whereas Bayesian learning suggests that voters’ beliefs about inexperienced incum-
bents are more malleable than their beliefs about experienced incumbents, driving
economic voting down as time in office increases.
In order to determine which of these countervailing forces dominate, this article
sets out to conduct a thorough, empirical re-examination of the long term relation-
ship between economic voting and time in office. We begin this re-examination by
studying country-level election returns from 409 elections in 41 different countries.
Measuring economic voting as the correlation between economic conditions (i.e. eco-
nomic growth) and support for the executive party, we find that as incumbent tenure
increases, economic voting decreases. Next, we conduct a conceptual replication,
where we once again identify a negative relationship between time in office and
economic voting. The conceptual replication utilizes a pooled cross-section of 60
representative national surveys from 10 Western European countries, measuring
the economic vote by correlating voters’ retrospective perceptions of the national
economy and their intention to vote for the executive party. Our third and final study
uses subnational data to zero in on the proposed theoretical mechanism driving the
negative relationship between time in office and economic voting: that is, Bayesian
166 | C: Incumbent Tenure
learning. In particular, we look at a dataset of some local elections in Denmark that
were held in the wake of a large municipal redistricting reform. We take advantage of
the fact that, as a consequence of the reform, a number of municipalities were amal-
gamated, which created within-municipality differences in the amount of experience
the electorate had with the same incumbent mayoral party. We find that voters who
had less experience with their incumbent mayor were more likely to hold the mayor
electorally accountable for recent changes in local levels of unemployment. In effect,
we find that as voters become more acquainted with an incumbent, they become
less inclined to hold this incumbent electorally accountable for recent economic
conditions
These results are surprising for a couple of reasons. First, because some previous
studies have found that economic voting increases with tenure. A divergence which
might be explained by the fact that previous researchers have primarily examined
how economic voting changes in the first year or two of the incumbent’s time in
office, whereas our study examines the more long term effects of tenure. Second,
because the clarity of responsibility hypothesis has such a dominant position in the
comparative economic voting literature, one might have suspected that it also had
extensive explanatory power when it came to explaining the effects of incumbent
tenure. This does not seem to be the case. It is important to note that this of course
does not mean that clarity of responsibility is irrelevant for explaining why the
economic vote varies from one election to another. The clarity of responsibility
hypotheses have been shown, time and again, to be quite apt for predicting variation
in economic voting. Even so, these results highlight the importance of considering
other factors than just clarity of responsibility when trying to understand how and
why the economic vote varies.
This article extends the literature on comparative economic voting — a literature
which has, broadly speaking, focused on either political institutions (e.g., Duch
and Stevenson, 2008; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Powell and Whitten, 1993;
Whitten and Palmer, 1999) or voter characteristics (e.g., Kayser and Wlezien, 2011;
Malhotra and Kuo, 2008; Vries and Giger, 2014). In particular, the article helps
analysts and researchers interested in understanding why economic voting is more
prevalent in some elections than in others, by giving them an additional factor to
take into account when making predictions about how important the economy will
be in a particular election: the tenure of the executive up for reelection. Further, by
highlighting Bayesian learning as a key to understanding why incumbent tenure
crowds out economic voting, this article also demonstrates that in spite of voter
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myopia (Healy and Lenz, 2014; Healy and Malhotra, 2009), incumbents’ history have
an important role to play if one wants to understand the temporal dynamics of
electoral accountability (see Krause and Melusky 2014 for a similar point).
Time in Office and the Economic Vote
Research on how the economy shapes the electoral support for incumbents has
generally been sensitive to the role that the timing of economic outcomes might
play for both voters and politicians. For instance, several studies have investigated
the extent to which voters are myopic, caring exclusively about present (and recent)
economic conditions (Achen, 2012; Healy and Lenz, 2014; Healy and Malhotra, 2009;
Hellwig and Marinova, 2014), and the degree to which incumbent politicians can
use this myopia strategically by creating political business cycles and when timing
elections (Kayser, 2005; Nordhaus, 1975; Samuels and Hellwig, 2010; Smith, 2003).
Other studies have tried to discern whether voters focus on past or (their expectations
of) the future economy (Lanoue, 1994; Soroka, Stecula and Wlezien, 2015). Yet
the existing research on economic voting has rarely examined the potential role
politicians’ time in office might have in moderating the economic vote. Instead, those
interested in tenure have examined whether and why there is a general cost of ruling
(Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Paldam and Skott, 1995; Stevenson, 2002), and other
types of generalisable temporal trends in the incumbent’s popularity (Mueller, 1970).
There are at present only a few studies which examine time in office in con-
junction with the economic vote. One of these studies is by Nadeau, Niemi and
Yoshinaka (2002). They include time in office in a larger index of ‘dynamic clarity of
responsibility’ (i.e., ideological cohesion of the government, the number of parties in
parliament), and then look at whether this index correlates with the economic vote
in eight different European countries. They find a positive relationship between eco-
nomic voting and their index, but they do not examine time in office separately from
the other factors. Studies by Carey and Lebo (2006) and Lebo and Box-Steffensmeier
(2008) examine how the nature of economic voting changes across the election cycle.
Focusing on the US and the UK respectively, they tend to find more prospective eco-
nomic voting at the beginning of an election cycle and more retrospective economic
voting at the end of an election cycle, however, their analyses are primarily graphical,
and they conduct no formal statistical tests of the differences they identify.
The most thorough examination of the relationship between time in office and
the economic vote can be found in a recent study by Singer and Carlin (2013). Here,
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they link time in office with different types of economic voting in a wide cross-
section of Latin American countries. They find that “voters’ reliance on prospective
expectations indeed diminishes over the election cycle as the honeymoon ends and
they retrospectively evaluate the incumbent’s mounting record” (Singer and Carlin,
2013, 731). Even though this study iswell executed and convincing, the inferences one
canmake about the long term relationship between tenure and economic voting based
on this study are limited by two factors. First, the study measures economic voting
by looking at economic perceptions, not objective economic conditions. Second, and
more importantly, their focus is on the short term relationship between time in office
and the economic vote. This is in part because the study focuses on a region of the
world which is relatively politically volatile: most of the incumbents examined have
only been in office a short time. Roughly 90 percent of the incumbents they examine
have held office for less than five years, and the median time in office is 2.5 years.1
The authors are aware of this limitation, and their theoretical predictions, as well as
their key findings, tend to be concerned with the first few years of the incumbent’s
time in office (Singer and Carlin, 2013, figure 1, 738).
Taken together, this small set of studies have made important headway in explor-
ing the relationship between time in office and the economic vote, but they leave
some important empirical questions unanswered. First, what is the long term relation-
ship between tenure and the economic vote? In many countries the same incumbent
has been in power for many years – sometimes more than a decade. While existing
studies tell us something about how economic voting evolves through the first elec-
tion cycle, we know little about what happens beyond that. Is there, for instance, a
difference between an incumbent who has been in office for four years and one who
has been in office for 10? At present we do not know. Second, is there a relationship
between the extent to which objective economic conditions affect support for the
incumbent and time in office? Existing studies have exclusively focused on how the
effects of prospective versus retrospective economic perceptions change as time in
office increases; however, we do not know whether the effect of objective economic
conditions changes with time in office.
Theoretical Expectations
On a theoretical level, existing studies have explained why tenure moderates the
economic vote in terms of the clarity of responsibility hypothesis. First developed
1See section S2 of the supplementary materials for the distribution of time in office in the Singer
and Carlin (2013) study.
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by Powell and Whitten (1993), the clarity of responsibility hypothesis suggests that
the extent of economic voting depends on the the extent to which governments are,
or seem to be, responsible for economic outcomes (see also Duch and Stevenson,
2008; Fisher and Hobolt, 2010; Hellwig, 2001; Lobo and Lewis-Beck, 2012). Based
on this hypothesis, previous research has concluded that it seems reasonable to
expect, that as an incumbent’s time in office increases, so does the economic vote.
The underlying logic is that incumbents with more tenure will have had more time to
enact policies that affect economic conditions (Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002).
Voters recognise this, and punish and reward incumbents more for the state of the
economy as time in office increases.
As mentioned in the introduction, this intuition becomes more complicated if one
takes the concept of Bayesian learning account. Bayesian learning asserts that when
people make inferences, these are based upon a set of prior beliefs, which are then
updated when people encounter a new piece of evidence (Gerber and Green, 1999;
Granato et al., 2015). In the context of economic voting, this would mean that when
voters evaluate the incumbent, they base their evaluation on some prior beliefs about
the incumbent’s quality, which they then update when they observe the economic
situation (the new piece of evidence). A key prediction from models of Bayesian
learning is that the extent to which people rely on new evidence when forming their
beliefs depends on how strong their prior beliefs are. If their prior beliefs are weak
(i.e., rely on little relevant information) then new evidence will have more of an
impact than if their prior beliefs are strong (i.e., rely on a lot of relevant information).
What implications does this have for the relationship between economic voting
and tenure? Imagine that a new incumbent has just come into office, and after four
years they then run for re-election. Because the incumbent is relatively new, voters’
prior beliefs about the incumbent’s competence are not based on a lot of solid infor-
mation. The economic situation around election time is good, and since voters have
no information to the contrary, they infer that the incumbent is probably a competent
economic manager. The incumbent is re-elected for a second term, and runs for
re-election once again. Now the economic situation is bad. If voters were to put the
same weight on the economic situation as they did before the previous election, they
would conclude that the incumbent is probably an incompetent economic manager.
However, going into second term they believe, because of the incumbent’s economic
record in the first term, that the incumbent is probably competent. Their prior beliefs
have strengthened
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This ends up moderating the voters judgement, as they conclude that given
the incumbent’s history of producing both good and bad economic outcomes, the
incumbent is probably a mediocre economic manager. Put differently, because voters
take prior information about the incumbent into account, the economic situation has
less of an impact on voters beliefs about the incumbent when the incumbent runs for
re-election a second time (in section S1 of the supplementary materials, we formalise
this argument, showing that this belief formation process is rational). Because voters’
stock of information about the incumbent will always increase with time in office,
voters’ beliefs will continually strengthen. As such, we can can say that if voters are
Bayesian learners, time in office will tend to crowd out the electoral importance of
recent economic conditions.
Bayesian learning is not incompatible with the clarity of responsibility hypothe-
sis. Voters might think the incumbent becomes more responsible for the economic
situation as their time in office increases, while at the same time interpreting the
present economic situation in light of their prior experiences with the incumbent. In
section S1 of the supplementary materials we present a formal model in which both
Bayesian learning and clarity of responsibility are at work simultaneously. The key
take-away from this model is that it is not possible to arrive at a uniform theoretical
prediction about whether economic voting will increase or decrease as time in office
increases. Instead, the model shows that what force comes to dominate will depend
on exactly how much voters believe clarity of responsibility increases with time in
office, and how much voters believe they can generally infer about the incumbent’s
competence from economic conditions.
This theoretical ambiguity, combinedwith the empirical limitations of the existing
literature, motivate the empirical examination of the relationship between time in
office and economic voting which takes up the remainder of the article.
Country-level Evidence
We begin our exploration of the relationship between tenure and the economic vote
by examining a country-level dataset of national elections. This type of data has been
used to study variation in the economic vote in numerous other studies (cf. Hellwig
and Samuels, 2007; Kayser and Peress, 2012; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Whitten and
Palmer, 1999). The underlying assumption in these studies is that one canmeasure the
level of economic voting by looking at the correlation between economic indicators
and electoral support for incumbents, and, in turn, use variations in this correlation
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to infer whether specific factors, such as tenure, affect the degree to which voters
hold politicians accountable for economic outcomes.
The chief advantage of this approach is that it sidesteps problems of endogeneity
related to using voters’ perception of the economy by using objective economic indica-
tors instead (Kramer 1983, Van der Brug, Van der Eijk and Franklin 2007, 26). The
chief disadvantage is that the economic indicators used are country-level aggregates.
These aggregates are noisy estimates of the economy as experienced by the individual
voter (Duch and Stevenson, 2008, 26), and they are restricted to n = 1 per election,
limiting the statistical power of the analysis. To overcome these problems, we use a
relatively large sample of elections and, later in the article, we replicate our findings
using an individual-level data set which includes a subjective measure of economic
conditions.
Data and Model
We use a dataset of 409 elections across 41 different countries (see section S2 of the
supplementary materials for a list of the countries and elections). To get such a wide
cross section of elections, we use and amend datasets already developed by Kayser
and Peress (2012) and Hellwig and Samuels (2007). The key dependent variable is the
percentage point change in electoral support for the executive party at legislative and
executive elections (∆y).2 The executive party is the party which had primary control
of the executive branch at the time of the election (i.e., the party of the prime minister
or the president). Using the executive party rather than the parties in government
is common in the literature (see, for instance, Duch and Stevenson 2008). Further,
several studies have shown that the executive party is much more prone to electoral
judgement than other governing parties (Debus, Stegmaier and Tosun, 2014; Fisher
and Hobolt, 2010; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007).
The key independent variables are economic growth (gr) and tenure (ten). Eco-
nomic growth is a proxy for the economic conditions in the country and is measured
as election-year GDP per capita growth (as a percentage, pct.). This indicator is used
because it is available for a large cross section of elections and because it has been
widely used in the previous literature. For elections occurring in the first six months
of the year, we use economic growth in the year prior to the election year, for elections
2In presidential systems, where the president is directly elected by the voters, we use both support
for the president at presidential elections, as well as support for the president’s party in the legislature.
Since our data is primarily from parliamentary systems, we end upwith 57 executive elections and 352
legislative elections. The legislative election results used are from the lower house if the legislature is
bicameral.
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occurring in the final six months of the year we use economic growth in the election
year. Data on economic growth was taken from the World Bank’s database. Time
in office is measured as the number of years since the current executive party came
into power. We focus on the tenure of parties, since the main dependent variable is
support for the executive party. Data on tenure is taken from the database of political
institutions (Beck et al., 2001), and has been extended by the author to create better
coverage for the electoral variables. The average level of tenure for the incumbent
parties is six years, and the median is five years. See section S3 of the supplementary
materials for descriptive statistics on all of the variables.
Turning to modeling, we set changes in electoral support as a linear function of
tenure, economic growth and an interaction between the two. We also include a
dummy variable indicating whether the election is executive or legislative (exec) to
take into account that economic voting works differently in executive and legislative
elections (Hellwig and Samuels, 2008; Samuels, 2004). As such, the baseline model
we estimate can be described as
∆yit = β0 + β1grit + β2tenit + γgrit × tenit + β3execit + ϵit. (8.1)
The coefficient of interest is γ, which signifies the change in the effect of economic
growth as tenure increases. If the coefficient is negative, it means economic voting de-
creases with time in office. If the coefficient is positive, it means that economic voting
increases with time in office. In the analysis below, we add various statistical controls
to this baseline model, in order to try and sieve out any potential confounding.
Results
Table 1 presents key estimates from the model described in equation 8.1 in column
one, using a maximum likelihood estimator to obtain country-clustered standard
errors. The baseline growth and tenure effects should be interpreted as the effect of
the variable when the other variable is held at zero. The baseline effect of economic
growth is thus estimated to be 0.68, and can be understood as the (theoretical) effect of
economic growth on change in electoral support if an incumbent runs for re-election
without any tenure.
The variable of interest is the interaction between economic growth and tenure.
The interaction is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that the positive
effect of economic growth at the beginning of an executive party’s tenure diminishes
over time. Specifically, the estimate suggests that each year, the effect of economic
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growth on electoral support drops by 0.06 from the starting point of 0.68. Accordingly,
this model suggests that after 12 years in office, the effect of economic growth is
essentially zero.
Table 8.1 Linear regression of changes in executive party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic growth 0.68∗ 0.78∗ 0.61∗ 0.90∗
(0.25) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30)
Tenure -0.05 -0.03 -0.28+ -0.25
(0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17)
Economic growth × Tenure -0.06∗ -0.07∗ -0.05 -0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Executive election -2.80+ -1.81 -0.90 -4.12∗
(1.52) (1.51) (1.97) (1.17)
Year FE X X
Country FE X X
Leader FE X
Observations 409 409 409 409
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
How sensitive is this finding to different model specifications? To investigate this,
the baseline model is extended in three ways. In column two, we show estimates
from a model including year fixed effects. These take any global trends in growth,
tenure and incumbent support into account. This leaves the interaction practically
unchanged.
The second extension is the addition of country fixed effects. These control for
potentially confounding differences in tenure and economic growth across different
countries. In column three we show estimates from a model including country fixed
effects, and while these do not change the interaction effect markedly, it does drop
0.01 from the baseline specification, leaving the estimate statistically insignificant.
The third extension is the inclusion of leader fixed effects: that is, a dummy for
each of the 158 different incumbents in the dataset.3 Including the leader fixed effects
means that any factors which are constant within the same incumbent are omitted
when estimating the interaction. As such, the model estimates the interaction by
comparing the degree to which the same executive party is punished (or rewarded)
for the economic situation across elections, rather than comparing how harshly
different executive parties with different levels of tenure are punished. The leader
3The leader fixed effects count an executive party which returns to power after being defeated as a
new incumbent. For instance, the United Kingdom has five different incumbents in the dataset across
11 elections, in spite of the fact that only two different parties were in power across these elections.
























Figure 8.1Marginal effects of economic growth on the change in electoral support for
the executive party across levels of tenure with 90 pct. confidence intervals. We only
plot tenure from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Derived from the model presented
in column four of table 8.1. The bar plot shows the density of the variable years in
office.
fixed effects make the year fixed effects less relevant, as we are now comparing levels
of economic voting across a relatively short span of time (i.e., from the beginning to
the end of an incumbent’s tenure). Further, if they are included along with the leader
fixed effects the degrees of freedom drop dramatically, and they are therefore omitted
from the model with the leader fixed effects. The leader fixed effects are included
in the model estimated in the fourth column of table 8.1. In this specification, the
interaction estimate is virtually unchanged and statistically significant at the five
percent level. Figure 8.1 plots the marginal effects of economic growth across time in
office using this specification.
In the supplementary materials, four additional robustness checks are laid out.
First, we look at whether the results are sensitive to using the average growth rate
across the previous two years rather than simply the election-year growth rate.
This does not substantially affect the results (see section S4 of the supplementary
materials). Second, we look at whether adding additional controls for parliamentary
and government composition affects the results. This means omitting a large number
of elections for which this information is not available, increasing the standard errors
attached to the estimates. Even so, the interaction estimates are not affected by adding
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the controls (see section S5 in the supplementary materials for details). Third, we
look at whether a single country is driving the results. We find that the interaction
estimates in columns one and two are not sensitive to excluding a single country.
For the models in columns three and four, the exclusion of Luxembourg draws the
interaction closer to zero, however, the interaction remains negative even when
excluding this country (see section S6 of the supplementary materials for details).
Fourth, we examine the interaction between economic growth and tenure in light of
the different diagnostics suggested by Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2016). This
is done in section S7 of the supplementary materials. Overall, we find monotonicity
in the average marginal effects and approximate linearity. However, we also find
that the interaction variable is kurtotic, which hurts the reliability of the interaction
estimate.
In conclusion, our analyses of the country-level data suggests that economic voting
decreases with time in office. The long term relationship between economic voting
and tenure is negative. Even so, the estimated interaction effect was not consistently
statistically significant. This can, in part, be explained in terms of the low statistical
power of country-level analyses. Asmentioned above, the chief disadvantage of using
country-level data is that it is quite noisy. To address this, we conduct a conceptual
replication with individual-level data in the next section.
Before moving on to the replication, however, a few alternative explanations
for the findings deserve to be discussed. For one, the negative correlation between
tenure and economic voting might be due to strategic election-timing (Kayser, 2005;
Samuels and Hellwig, 2010). That is, what we see above might simply be a reflection
of the fact that certain types of leaders call early elections, and are therefore more
likely to have less tenure when they run. In the supplementary material, we examine
this alternative explanation by trying to control away election-timing in two different
ways: (1) by including a control for how often incumbents call elections and (2) by
restricting the sample of elections to countries with fixed terms, where strategic
election timing is not possible. In both cases, the most demanding specification,
which includes leader fixed effects, produces an interaction estimate which is nega-
tive and statistically significant (see section S8 of the supplementary materials for
details). Another possible alternative explanation for our findings might be that the
negative interaction can be explained by the fact that voters start out by holding the
executive party electorally accountable, but then, as time goes by, voters start to hold
government coalition partners accountable as well. To test whether this is the case,
we estimate themodels from table 8.1 separately for coalition governments and single
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party governments in section S9 of the supplementary materials. We identify no
systematic differences across the two groups, suggesting that the negative interaction
term cannot be explained by voters holding coalition partners more accountable
as time in office increases. Finally, we look at whether our results can be ascribed
to the fact that we study incumbent parties (e.g. Labour), rather than executive
officers (e.g., Tony Blair). To do this, we add a control to the model for whether the
incumbent party and the executive officer have different levels of tenure. The results,
reported in section S10 of the supplementary materials, show that this does not shift
the interaction estimates substantially, however, the level of statistical significance
does drop from 0.05 to 0.1.
Individual-level Evidence
Having established a relationship between economic voting and the tenure of the
executive party at the country-level, we now explore the same relationship at the
individual-level. In essence, we try to replicate our results by investigating whether
voters rely less (more) on their perceptions of how the national economy has devel-
oped when deciding whether to vote for a more (less) experienced incumbent.
To do this, we closely follow a recent study by Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger
(2013), who investigated the relationship between national economic perceptions
and the vote for executive parties in 10 Western European countries over the past 20
years. This gives us a well-established model of the economic vote, and allows us to
simply extend this model to include an interaction between tenure and economic
perceptions.
It is important to explain, what we hope to gain from this replication. Because
results in the comparative economic voting literature are known to be quite unstable
(Paldam, 1991), it makes sense to replicate our findings using a new dataset. As such,
if we get similar results using a new dataset, it makes it more likely that what we
found above is a generalisable pattern. A replication of our country-level results
using individual-level economic perceptions is particularly relevant in light of the
studies described above (i.e., Carey and Lebo, 2006; Singer and Carlin, 2013), which
have found a positive relationship between the effect of economic perceptions and
tenure (at least in the short term). Finally, by using a set of surveys which run
outside national election cycles, it is possible to sidestep any additional concerns one
might have about the extent to which the identified relationship between tenure and
economic voting is driven by election-timing.
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Data and Model
We use the European Election Studies (ESS). The EES is a survey of all EU coun-
tries which has been conducted every fifth year since 1979. They are fielded in the
year of European Parliamentary elections, and their timing is therefore somewhat
independent of national elections. We use the six Europe-wide studies which have
been conducted since 1989 (i.e., ’89, ’94, ’99, ’04, ’09, and ’14), as these are the only
surveys which include questions about national economic perceptions as well as vote
intention in national elections. Moreover, we focus on the ten countries which have
participated in all six survey-rounds: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom (see section S2 of
the supplementary materials for details about the samples used). This gives us 60
cross-sectional national surveys, which can be pooled to test whether the effect of
economic perceptions on voter intentions depend on the tenure of the executive
party.
Turning to indicators, the key dependent variable is whether respondents report
that they would vote for the executive party if a national legislative election was held
tomorrow (reelect).
The key independent variables are national economic perceptions and tenure.
National economic perceptions (NEP ) are measured using a question that asked
respondents whether the economic situation in their own country had gotten better
or worse in the past 12 months. Responses were recorded on a five-point scale (except
for the 1994 election study, which used a four-point scale). Tenure (ten) is measured
as the number of years the executive party had been in power at the time of the survey.
Once again, this variable is taken from Beck et al. (2001) and extended to provide
complete coverage for the 60 surveys. The mean time in office of the incumbent
parties is five years and the median is four years.
We use the same control variables as Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger (2013)
use for their standard economic voting models: respondents’ ideology, self-perceived
class, church attendance and a dummy indicating whether the respondent voted for
the executive party at the last election.4 All variables were rescaled to go from zero
to one, and recoded so that higher values were likely to mean a higher probability of
4We exclude a control used by Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger (2013) measuring the time since
the last election, since this variable is very closely related to tenure.
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voting for the executive party.5 See section S3 of the supplementary materials for the
exact question wording and descriptive statistics.
We model the probability that voters will report an intention to vote for the
executive party as a logistic function of national economic perceptions, tenure, an
interaction between the two and the individual level controls. As such, the model
we estimate can be described as
Pr(reelect) = logit(α0 + α1NEPijt + α2tenit + γtenit ×NEPijt +Xijtβ + ϵijt, (8.2)
where i indicates country, t year and j the respondent. X is a row vector of the
control variables ideology, class, religion and reelectlag and β is a column vector of
coefficients attached to these controls. The coefficient of interest is once again γ,
which signifies the change in the effect of national economic perceptions as tenure
increases. Following our country-level analysis, we expect γ to be negative.
Results
In the first column of table 8.2, we estimate the parameters of the model presented
in equation 8.2 using a multi-level logistic regression. We cluster the standard errors
at the country-level and estimate random effects at the survey-level.
Ideology, class, religiosity and lagged executive party vote all have the expected
signs, and, apart from religiosity, are statistically significant. The baseline economy
and tenure effects should (once again) be interpreted as the effect of the variable
when the other variable is held at zero. The baseline effect of national economic
perceptions is estimated to be 1.85, and can thus be understood as the (theoretical)
effect of going from one end of the national economic perceptions scale to the other
on the logit probability of voting for an executive party without any tenure.
The key estimate of interest is the one attached to the interaction between national
economic perceptions and tenure, which signifies how the effect of national economic
percepts change as tenure increases. The interaction-coefficient is statistically signifi-
cant and negative, suggesting that the positive effect of the respondents’ perception
of the national economy at the beginning of an executive party’s tenure diminishes
as their time in office increases – an interaction effect which is qualitatively similar to
the one found in the country-level data.
5In particular, religion, class, and ideology were coded differently across the different surveys to
take differences in the ideological position of the executive into account.
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Table 8.2Multi-level logit model of voting for executive party
(1) (2) (3)




National Economic Perceptions × Tenure -0.05∗ -0.06∗ -0.06∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged executive party vote 4.36∗ 4.37∗ 4.37∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Ideology 2.31∗ 2.30∗ 2.32∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Religiosity 0.13 0.14 0.14
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Class 0.30∗ 0.30+ 0.30+
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Survey RE X X X
Leader FE X X
Survey FE X
Observations 39,556 39,556 39,556
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
Tenure omitted in model (3) due to collinearity with Survey FE.

















Figure 8.2 Average marginal effects of national economic perceptions on the proba-
bility of voting for the executive party across levels of tenure with 90 pct. confidence
intervals. We only plot tenure from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Derived from the
model presented in column 3 of table 8.2. The bar plot shows the density of the years
in office variable.
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We also investigate whether these individual-level findings are sensitive to dif-
ferent model specifications. In column 2, we include leader fixed effects (cf. the
country-level data). Estimating this more demanding model does not substantially
change the results. The interaction remains negative and statistically significant. In
column 3, we introduce survey fixed effects; a dummy for each of the sixty surveys.
The interaction between national economic perceptions and tenure remains negative
and statistically significant in this model as well.
In order to investigate the consequences this negative logistic interaction has
for the relationship between voters’ economic perceptions and their propensity to
vote for the executive party, we derive average marginal effects of these perceptions
across different levels of tenure based on the model with survey fixed effects. These
average marginal effects are plotted in figure 8.2. This figure reveals that the average
marginal effect of national economic perceptions is reduced as tenure increases. For
an executive party with one year of tenure, the effect of a voter going from one end of
the economic perception scale to the other is an increase in the probability of voting
for the executive party of about 14 percentage points. For an executive party with 15
years of tenure the same change leads to an increase of eight percentage points. A
comparison of the average marginal effect at one years of tenure and fifteen year of
tenure reveals that this decline is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
In the supplementary materials, we conduct a number of additional robustness
checks for this finding. We show that the main results are robust to a two-step
estimation procedure, cf. section S11. We show that the results are not sensitive to
outliers, cf. section S6. We also examine the robustness of the interaction in light of
Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2016), cf. section S7.
In the model above, we use a standard retrospective question, which asks voters
how their country’s economy has developed in the past year. However, some studies
of American elections have suggested that when an executive party has been in office
for a while, retrospective concerns give way to prospective concerns (Nadeau and
Lewis-Beck, 2001). That is, voters beliefs about how the economy is going to develop
becomes more important than their beliefs about how the economy has developed
in the past (although see Carey and Lebo, 2006; Singer and Carlin, 2013, for the
opposite argument). Based on this, one might suspect that the reason we see a drop
in the effect of retrospective economic perceptions is that the type of perceptions
which matter at the beginning of the term are different from those that matter at the
end of term. To test whether this is the case, we examine the relationship between
prospective national economic perceptions and time in office in section S12 of the
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supplementarymaterials. We find that the effect of prospective economic perceptions
are not moderated by time in office. As such, there are no signs that some other type
of economic percepts become more important as the effect of retrospective national
economic percepts subside.
Overall, the results seem to line up nicely with what we found in the country-
level data, however, there is one important inconsistency. While both datasets show
the importance of the economic vote decreasing with time in office, the decline
seems to be less dramatic in the individual-level data. In the country-level data, the
estimated effect of the economy is essentially zero after 15 years (cf. figure 8.1). In
the individual-level data, there is still a substantial amount of economic voting left
after 15 years (cf. figure 8.2). One potential explanation for this inconsistency is that
the individual-level data overestimates the amount of economic voting across all
levels of tenure.
There are some studies that suggests thatwe do, in general, overestimate economic
voting, when using voters’ perceptions of the economy rather than objective economic
conditions (Evans and Pickup, 2010; Evans and Andersen, 2006; although see Lewis-
Beck, Nadeau and Elias, 2008). In particular, these studies argue that partisan voters
will adjust their perceptions of the economy to make their preferred party look good,
which leads to inflated estimates of the economic vote (Gerber andHuber, 2010; Tilley
and Hobolt, 2011). Put more succinctly, economic perceptions are endogenous and
this might explain the discrepancy between the individual-level and country-level
results.
In section S13 of the supplementary materials, we try to correct for this type of
endogeneity in twoways. First, we re-analyze the survey data excluding potential pro-
executive partisans. Second, we use objective economic conditions as instruments of
national economic perceptions. In both cases, we find that correcting for endogeneity
tends to align the results from the individual-level with the results from the country-
level data, suggesting that the immediate divergence between the country-level and
the individual-level results can be explained by the methodological idiosyncrasies of
how the economic vote is measured in the two different datasets.
Taken together, the individual-level findings reaffirm the country-level findings:
as an incumbent party’s time in office increases, the economy becomes a less impor-
tant determinant of their electoral fortune.
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Subnational Evidence
So far, our empirical analyses suggest that for a large cross section of countries and
elections, there is a negative long term relationship between economic voting and
time in office. Why is this the case? In our discussion of theoretical expectations, we
advanced one reasonwhy incumbent tenuremight be driving down economic voting:
voters’ stock of information about the incumbent naturally increases with time in
office. Following models of Bayesian learning, we surmised that this accumulation
of information would strengthen voters’ beliefs about the incumbent, making them
less malleable to the economic situation. That is, the economic situation will play
less of a role in shaping voters beliefs about an incumbent as time in office increases,
because the economic situation becomes an increasingly small part of the total stock
of relevant information voters have about the incumbent. In this third and final study,
we try to examine this potential explanation of the country-level and individual-level
findings in more detail.
To do this, we focus on a set of municipal elections following a 2005 jurisdictional
reform of local government in Denmark, in which a large number of municipali-
ties merged (for details on the reform, see Bhatti and Hansen, 2011; Blom-Hansen,
Houlberg and Serritzlew, 2014; Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011). This reform allows
us to isolate variation in voters stock of information about the incumbent – the key
factor we believe is driving down economic voting as time in office increases – while
holding attributes of the political system, the election, and the incumbent constant.
In particular, this reform allows us to separate the amount of experience voters have
with an incumbent from the amount of experience an incumbent has with being in
office.
To see how we can use the reform in this way, consider the following stylized
example. Municipality 1 and municipality 2 merge as a result of the jurisdictional
reform. Before the merger, party A was the mayoral party in municipality 1, whereas
party B was the mayoral party in municipality 2. In 2005, these municipalities
merge and have to elect one, common mayoral party. They elect party A. In the
following election (i.e., 2009), the voters in the newly merged municipality have
to decide whether to re-elect the incumbent party A. The voters who originally
lived in municipality 1 have accumulated information about this mayoral party both
before and after the merger. The voters who originally lived in municipality 2 have
only accumulated information about this mayoral party after the merger. Figure 8.3
visualizes this example.
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What are our expectations if voters’ stock of information drives down the eco-
nomic vote? In terms of the stylized example, we should expect economic voting
to be less prevalent among voters who originally lived in municipality 1, and more
prevalent among those who originally lived in municipality 2. Conversely, if voters’
stock of information is not important, we should expect no difference across those
who originally lived in municipality 1 and those who originally lived in municipality
2. Importantly, if we find a difference between the voters who originally lived in
municipalities 1 and 2, we know that this difference cannot be attributable to the
incumbent (who is the same) or the type of political system (which is also the same).
As such, by analysing the electoral consequences of the jurisdictional reform process,
we will be able to conduct a very “clean” test of whether voters growing stock of
information affects for economic voting, and, in turn, find out whether it is plausible







Figure 8.3 A stylized example of the consequences of the jurisdictional reform pro-
cess. The shading denotes the electorate’s stock of information about the incumbent
mayoral party before the 2009 election.
Data and Model
To study the consequences of the jurisdictional reform, we examine election returns
from the 2009 Danish municipal elections. In particular, we construct a dataset based
on returns from 1,465 different precincts (i.e., polling places). Each precinct lies
within one of 239 original municipalities (pre-reform) and 66 merged municipalities
(post-reform).6 We do not use data from precincts which lie in municipalities that
did not merge as a result of the reform, because these do not exhibit the type of
within-municipality variation we are interested in, cf. figure 8.3.
InDanishmunicipalitiesmayors are not directly elected, but are instead appointed
by a majority of the members in the city council. Often, this means a coalition of
two or three ideologically similar parties decide to appoint a mayor from the largest
6 We collected this data from the Danish Election database. For details, see
http://valgdata.ps.au.dk/en/.
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party. Accordingly, the key dependent variable is change in electoral support for the
incumbent mayoral party between the 2009 and 2005 city council elections (∆y).
The key independent variables are changes in the municipal unemployment
rate from 2007 to 2009 (∆unem), and a dummy indicating whether the voters in the
precinct had a different incumbent before and after the reform (newinc).7 Note that
because all of the municipalities studied here merged with other municipalities in
2005, the variable newinc varies within the merged municipalities. Section S3 of the
supplementary materials includes descriptive statistics on all variables.
Turning to modeling, we set the change in support for the mayoral party in each
precinct as a linear function of whether voters had a new incumbent, changes in
municipal unemployment levels, and an interaction between the two. We also include
post-reform municipality fixed effects (θ), as well as a control for the level of support
for the mayor at the last election (lagy). This leaves us with the following baseline
model
∆yij = β0 + β1newincij + β2unemj + γnewincij × unemj + β4lagyij + θj + ϵij, (8.3)
where i indicates precinct and j indicates the post-reform municipality. The key
estimate of interest is once again γ, which denotes the difference in the effect of the
unemployment rate between those voters who have gotten a new incumbent and
those who have not. We expect γ to be negative, so that increases in the unemploy-
ment rate has a larger negative effect if the voters in the precinct have gotten a new
incumbent, and thus have less (prior) information about the incumbent. We include
the municipality fixed effects, θ, to make sure that we are only comparing electorates
which have the same incumbent (i.e., election returns from the same post-reform
municipality). We also include support for the mayoral party in the last election (’05),
because we want to take the mayoral party’s baseline level of support in the different
precincts into account.
Results
In the first column of table 8.3, we estimate the model presented in equation 8.3,
using a maximum likelihood estimator to obtain municipality-clustered standard
errors. Note that the baseline effect of increases in the municipal unemployment
7Because of the large redistricting reform, there is no comparable data on the level of unemployment
in ’05 or ’06 at the municipal level, which is why we look at changes from ’07 to ’09.
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rate is not estimated, because the baseline is perfectly collinear with the post-reform
municipality fixed effect.
The key estimate of interest is the one attached to the interaction between increases
in the unemployment rate and whether the incumbent is new to the electorate.
Consistent with our expectations, the interaction estimate is negative and statistically
significant. This suggests that increases in the unemployment rate have a larger
impact on support for the incumbent mayoral party in precincts where voters have
less experience with the incumbent mayor.
Table 8.3 Linear regression of change in support for the incumbent mayoral party
(1) (2) (3)
New incumbent 1.92 1.91 1.44
(2.69) (2.70) (2.65)
Increase in unemployment rate × New incumbent -2.13∗ -2.14∗ -2.08∗
(1.07) (1.08) (1.02)
Support for mayoral party 05 -0.63∗ -0.63∗ -0.63∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Right wing mayor -10.63∗
(0.95)




Log of eligible voters -0.31 0.12
(0.36) (0.30)
Municipality FE X X X
Observations 1,465 1,465 1,465
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by municipality.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
In figure 8.4, we illustrate this interaction effect by plotting the difference in sup-
port for the mayoral party between precincts where the voters have a lot of experience
with the mayor (both pre- and post-reform) and precincts where the voters have little
experience with the mayor (only post-reform) across increases in the unemployment
rate.8 The figure shows that in municipalities where the unemployment rate did not
increase, the mayoral party was just as popular in precincts where voters had little
experience with the incumbent as in precincts where the voters had a lot of experi-
ence with the incumbent. However, in municipalities which saw the unemployment
rate increase a lot, the mayoral party was way less popular among those who did not
8The 2009 elections were held just as the effects of the financial crisis were starting to kick in, and
therefore the unemployment rate increased for all municipalities in this period.















































Figure 8.4Differences in electoral support for themayoral party between the precincts
that had the same incumbent before and after the reform, and the precincts which
did not, across changes in the municipal unemployment rate with 90 pct. confidence
intervals. Derived from the model presented in column one of table 8.3. The bar plot
shows the density of the variable increases in the unemployment rate.
know the mayoral party well. Put differently, those without a lot of prior information
about the mayoral party seemed to be much more affected by recent increases in
local levels of unemployment than those with a lot of prior information.
As for the country-level and the individual-level results, we examine whether
these subnational results are sensitive to alternative specifications. In particular, we
are interested in seeing whether some other characteristics of the precincts might
explain the differences in economic voting between those who have experience with
the incumbent mayor and those who do not. To control for the demographic charac-
teristics of the precincts, we add controls for turnout and the size of the electorate
in the second column of table 8.3. To control for the ideological make-up of the
precincts, we add controls for whether the mayoral party is right-wing and for the
proportion of voters who voted for a right-wing party in the third column. The
inclusion of these controls does not affect the interaction estimate. It remains statisti-
cally significant, negative and of the same approximate size. In the supplementary
materials, we also investigate the robustness of the results. In particular, we examine
whether the interaction estimate is sensitivity to outliers in section S6, and whether
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the interaction is robust to the checks suggested by Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu
(2016) in section S7.
These results tell us that voters’ stock of information about the incumbent affect
whether they ‘vote economically’. As such, voters who have more time to get to know
an incumbent, like those voters who had the samemayoral party both before and after
the reform, are less likely to shift their support to or away from the incumbent based
on how the economy is doing around election time. While this does not definitively
show that voters growing stock of information is the only force driving down the
economic vote as time in office increases, these findings make it more plausible that
it is one such force.
Conclusion and Discussion
The British parliamentary elections of 1997 and 2001 featured two very different
incumbents. One was the Conservative Party, in power for 18 years and headed by
John Major, the prime Minister for seven years and cabinet member for the last 10.
The other was the Labour party, in power for four years and headed by Tony Blair,
prime minister with a new cabinet. As British voters searched for clues in 1997 and
2001 about the quality of the incumbent, some probably took a look at the economic
situation. When these voters decided to what extent the economic situation should
be leveraged in their eventual electoral decision, did the fact that these incumbents
were so different matter? Did the fact that the incumbent up for election in 1997 had
been in power for almost two decades make voters consider the economy differently
than in 2001, when the incumbent had only been in power for four years? Answers
to these questions are not easy to find in the existing literature on economic voting,
which has generally paid little attention to how differences in incumbent tenure
might moderate the economic vote.
In this article, we have tried to amend this by providing a thorough empirical
investigation of the long term relationship between economic voting and time in
office. Specifically, we have shown that the electoral support for executive parties
becomes more independent of the economic situation as the parties time in office
increase. This finding was arrived at using two markedly different datasets; one at
the country-level and one at the individual-level; one using objective measures of
economic conditions and one using a subjective measure.
To explain why the relationship between economic voting decreases as incum-
bents’ time in office increases, we advanced a theoretical argument predicated on
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Bayesian learning. It follows from Bayesian learning, that if voters have a lot of
information about an incumbent, then their evaluation of this incumbent is less likely
to be swayed by the economic situation around election time. Conversely, if voters
have less information, they are willing to let the economic situation around election
time count for more. Since voters naturally accumulate more information about
the incumbent as time in office increases, the economic situation should matter less
for voters’ evaluation of the incumbent, effectively driving down economic voting.
Returning to the British case, our study thus suggests that voters relied more on re-
cent economic conditions when evaluating the relatively new Labour administration
than when evaluating the relatively old Conservative administration, because British
voters’ had come to know the Conservative party quite well, whereas voters had less
to go on, apart from the economic situation, when evaluating the Labour incumbent.
In order to examine the empirical implications of this argument in more detail,
we conducted an additional study of Danish municipal elections. In particular, we
studied the level of economic voting following a large redistricting reform, which
created within-municipality differences in the amount of experience the electorate
had with the same incumbent mayoral party. In line with our theoretical argument,
we found that voters who had less experience with an incumbent were more likely
to hold the incumbent accountable for local levels of unemployment.
Our findings are noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, incumbents are likely
to be more responsible for the quality of economic conditions as their time in office
increases, and accordingly, following the large literature on clarity of responsibil-
ity, we should expect incumbents to be held more accountable for their economic
performance as their time in office increases, not less. However, our results suggest
that other factors, like Bayesian learning, are more important than any potential
changes in clarity of responsibility which occur as time in office increases. Second,
previous studies have found that incumbent support becomes more dependent on
recent economic conditions in the first few years of an incumbent’s time in office.
Our study does not find any signs of this – instead, we consistently find that the
importance of recent economic conditions decreases with time in office.
This article has examined a large subset of countries and elections, increasing
the generalisability of the results. Even so, the results have mainly focused on
advanced democracies, delimiting the scope of inference to this type of countries.
A consequence of primarily studying advanced democracies is that one tends to
examine more stable political systems. In the present context, this translates into
studying incumbents who have, relatively speaking, served for a long time. This
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might, in part, explain why our findings diverge from those in previous research. As
mentioned earlier in the article, the most extensive exploration of the link between
tenure and economic voting in the existing literature focused exclusively on Latin
America (Singer andCarlin, 2013); amore politically volatile region. Here, researchers
found that retrospective economic voting increased markedly in the first two years
of the incumbent’s time in office. They were able to detect this short term shift in the
economic vote because half of the incumbents they examined had been in office for
less than 2.5 years. In comparison, only one fifth of incumbents in our country-level
dataset had been office for less than three years (one in three for the individual-level
dataset). Based on the difference in coverage for the time in office variable, one can
imagine that the Latin America study was at least half right – economic voting might
shoot up in the first two years of the incumbents term, but then depreciate in the long
term (cf. our findings). Our data, however, is not detailed enough to test whether the
relationship between the economic vote and time in office follows such a curvilinear
pattern. Instead, we simply conclude that in the long run, incumbent tenure crowds
out economic voting.
Future studies should also try to come closer to a definitive understanding of why
incumbent tenure tends to crowd out economic voting. Bayesian learning seems to
be part of the explanation, however there might be other factors at work as well, such
as changing priorities among voters or changing patterns of partisanship. Future
research might be able to uncover these mechanisms using controlled survey or lab
experiments (for work along these lines, see Mitchell, 2012). Future research could
also delve into which factors becomemore important as the explanatory power of the
economy declines. Do voters, for instance, become more interested in the ideological
position of the executive party and/or their specific policies as tenure increases, or
will electorates simply become less malleable, in general, as their incumbent’s time
in office increase.
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Supplementary materials
S1: A Formalisation of the Bayesian Learning Model
In this model we examine a set of voters who have to decide whether to re-elect an
incumbent. We assume that the voters are more likely to re-elect the incumbent if
voters believe the incumbent is more competent. Given this assumption, the voters’
goal is to construct a set of rational beliefs about the incumbent’s competence given
the available evidence. Specifically, imagine an incumbent I which was elected
at t = 0, and who is now up for re-election at t = 1. We denote the incumbent’s
competence as CI . Based on the voters’ prior experiences with other incumbents,
they start off with a normally distributed prior belief about CI , which we standardise
to have a mean of zero with a variance of 1.
Since voters are interested in the incumbent’s competence, CI , the voters try to
infer how competent the politician is based on the economic situation, y, which is
affected by CI . However, the economy is also affected by a non-competence related
shock ϵ, which is independently and identically drawn in each period from a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance σ2ϵ . Accordingly, the economic situation at
t = 1 can be defined as:
y1 = CI + ϵ1 (8.4)
In this equation, voters only observe y1; however, voters know the distribution the
non-competence related shock is drawn from. As such, voters face a signal extraction
problem, which can be solved by using the Bayes rule to update their prior beliefs
about CI using y1. This leaves voters with the following posterior beliefs about CI :






Equation 8.5 tells us that voters’ beliefs about the incumbent’s expected compe-
tence are improving in y1. That is, a better economic situation leads the voter to infer
that the incumbent is likely to be more competent. Specifically, the effect of a one
unit increase in y1 on expected competence is 11+σ2ϵ .
From this, we can also see that effect of the economic situation on beliefs about
competence becomes smaller as σ2ϵ becomes larger. That is, as the variation in non-
competence related shocks to the economy increases, it becomes more likely that
any variation in the economic situation is due to non-competence related shocks,
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and accordingly the economy becomes a less efficient estimator of the incumbent’s
competence. In effect, σ2ϵ can be thought of as being an inverse measure of clarity of
responsibility. If σ2ϵ is large, the incumbent is probably not responsible for changes in
economic conditions, if σ2ϵ is small the incumbent is probably responsible for changes
in ecnomic conditions.9
Imagine the incumbent is re-elected in t = 1. In period t = 2, the voters have to
decide once again whether to vote for the incumbent. However, now the voters’ prior
beliefs about the incumbent incorporate the information obtained about CI at t = 1.
That is, voters’ prior beliefs now have a mean of 1
1+σ2ϵ









for all possible values of σ2ϵ (i.e., voters know more about the incumbent than they
did before).
Voters update their prior beliefs using Bayes rule, based on the economic situation
in t = 2, y2, which is equal to:
y2 = CI + ϵ2 (8.6)
This leaves the voter with the following posterior beliefs about the incumbent’s
competence.









Just as in period 1, a better economic situation in period 2, y2, is used to infer that
incumbent competence is higher, and just like in period 1, σ2ϵ attenuates the degree to
which voters can use the economic situation to make inferences about CI . However,
there is one key difference from period 1: the effect of the economic situation on
voters’ expectations about the incumbent’s competence have decreased.
In period 1 the effect of a one unit increase in y1 was 11+σ2ϵ . In period 2 the effect of a
one unit increase in y2 is 12+σ2ϵ . Since
1
1+σ2ϵ
is larger than 1
2+σ2ϵ
, variation in the economic
situation has less bearing on how competent voters expect the incumbent to be when
the incumbent is up for re-election the second time. Economic voting decreases with
time in office. This is a key result from the model, which underlines the assertion
made in the theoretical discussion of the main article: as voters’ information about
the incumbent accumulate, the recent economic situation comes to play a smaller
role in shaping voters’ beliefs about the incumbent.
9This conclusion closelymirrors the one found byDuch and Stevenson (2008). Using a slightlymore
complicated set-up, they show that as control of economic conditions becomes more independent
of elected officials (i.e. the size of non-competence related shocks increase), voters beliefs about the
incumbent’s competence depend less on economic conditions.
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Increasing Clarity of Responsibility Versus Bayesian Learning
In the model presented above, we assumed that the economic situation in period 1
and the economic situation in period 2 was a result of the same mix of competence
and non-competence related shocks. Some previous literature on the relationship
between economic voting and time in office makes a different assumption (e.g.,
Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 2002). In particular, these researchers assume that
the incumbent becomesmore responsible for the economic conditions as their time in
office increases. In the terminology of our model, they think incumbent competence
becomes more important relative to non-competence related shocks at t = 2. What
happens if we incorporate this alternative assumption into our model?
We introduce the assumption by letting our inverse measure of clarity of respon-
sibility, σ2ϵ , decrease with time in office. In particular, we assume that the variance
decreases from σ2ϵ at t = 1 to σ˜2ϵ at t = 2, where σ˜2ϵ < σ2ϵ . We denote the rate at which
the variance decreases as α, where α = σ˜2ϵ/σ2ϵ . If α is close to 1, there is only a small
decrease in the variation of the error term, signifying that incumbents become only
slightly more responsible as their time in office increase; if α is close to 0 there is a
marked decrease in the variation of the error term, signifying that incumbents be-
come a lot more responsible as their time in office increases. Effectively, α is therefore
negatively related to the increase in the clarity of responsibility over time.
How does introducing this assumption affect voters’ beliefs about incumbent
competence? In the first period, nothing changes, because the assumption only
alters the variance of the non-competence related shocks in period 2. However, i
period 2, voters take into account that the variance in ϵ has decreased to σ˜2ϵ , and
consequently rely more on the competence signal relayed by the economic situation
y2. In particular, after updating their priors using Bayes rule, voters’ posterior beliefs
about incumbent competence can be described as follows:
CI |y2, y1 ∼ N( 11
α
+ σ2ϵ + 1
y1 +
1













Note that in equation 8.8, the extent to which voters rely on y2 depends negatively
on α, which we defined as the rate at which the variance in the non-competence
related shocks decreases from t = 1 to t = 2. This makes intuitive sense, because a
large decrease in variance corresponds to a large increase in the clarity of political
responsibility over time. As such, if clarity of responsibility increases a lot with time
in office, α is low, and voters tend to rely more on y2.
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Just as we did above, we can compare the extent of economic voting across time in
office by comparing the effect of a one unit increase in y2 on CI at t = 2 (cf. equation
8.8) with the effect of a comparable increase in y1 on CI at t = 1 (cf. equation 8.5)




). If the effect of y1 is larger than the effect of y2, then
economic voting decreases over time; if the effect of y2 is larger than the effect of y1,
















− 1) < 1 (8.10)
If the inequality in equation 8.10 is satisfied, economic voting decreases with time
in office. When will this inequality be satisfied? All other things being equal, it is
more likely to be satisfied if the increase in the clarity of responsibility is low (i.e.
α close to 1), and, other things being equal, is also more likely to be satisfied if the
overall role placed by non-competence related shocks is low (σ2ϵ is small). Note that
if α is 1, signifying no increase in the clarity of responsibility over time, the condition
in equation 8.10 will always be satisfied, and incumbent tenure will always crowd
out economic voting.
In sum, it is not possible to form unambiguous theoretical expectations for how
incumbent tenure and economic voting are related based on this augmented model.
As such, whether or not incumbent tenure does in fact crowd out economic voting,
will depend on the exact beliefs voters hold about α and σ2ϵ . What it does tell us,
however, is that there are countervailing forces at work as incumbent tenure increases.
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S2: Description of the Samples
The samples used in the country-level and individual-level data are described in
tables S.8.1 and S.8.2. In table S.8.3, we show the full distribution of the tenure
variables in both the country-level and individual-level data. For comparison, we
also include the tenure variable from the Latinobarométro data, which is what Singer
and Carlin (2013) use for their study.
Supplementary materials | 195
Table S.8.1 Elections included in the country-level analysis
Minimum Maximum Number of Elections
Argentina 1985 2001 12
Australia 1961 2007 19
Austria 1971 2008 12
Belgium 1961 2007 15
Bolivia 1989 2002 8
Brazil 1990 2002 7
Bulgaria 1991 2001 6
Canada 1962 2008 16
Chile 1993 2001 5
Colombia 1982 2002 12
Costa Rica 1982 2002 12
Denmark 1964 2007 18
Dominican Republic 1990 2002 6
Ecuador 1984 1998 11
El Salvador 1985 2000 9
Finland 1962 2007 17
France 1968 2007 14
Germany 1972 2009 11
Greece 1981 2009 9
Honduras 1989 2001 8
Iceland 1963 2007 13
India 1980 1998 6
Ireland 1973 2007 10
Israel 1969 2006 12
Italy 1972 2008 10
Luxembourg 1979 2009 7
Madagascar 1996 2001 2
Netherlands 1963 2006 14
New Zealand 1978 2008 11
Norway 1969 2009 11
Papua New Guinea 1987 2002 4
Peru 1990 2001 6
Poland 1993 2001 3
Portugal 1980 2009 10
Spain 1979 2008 9
Sweden 1976 2006 10
Switzerland 1983 1999 5
Trinidad and Tobago 1991 2000 3
Turkey 1987 2002 5
United Kingdom 1964 2010 12
United States 1978 2002 19
Total 1961 2010 409
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Table S.8.2 Observations included in the individual-level analysis
1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Total
Denmark 832 1642 759 999 867 1063 6162
France 749 1321 363 1034 513 1055 5035
Germany 875 1333 777 381 691 1610 5667
Greece 525 1236 320 373 689 1080 4223
Ireland 752 1351 370 892 762 1074 5201
Italy 673 960 2446 1151 561 1068 6859
Netherlands 871 1610 804 1260 802 1087 6434
Portugal 521 1154 259 605 623 1020 4182
Spain 618 1216 581 887 680 1097 5079
United Kingdom 856 1603 711 1104 690 1378 6342
Total 7272 13426 7390 8686 6878 11532 55184
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Table S.8.3 Distribution of Time in Office (years)
Country-level Individual-level Singer & Carlin (2013)
Less than six months 11.8
(25)
1 5.4 13.3 18.9
(22) (8) (40)
2 9.5 16.7 18.9
(39) (10) (40)
3 8.8 15.0 17.0
(36) (9) (36)
4 25.2 10.0 16.5
(103) (6) (35)
5 12.2 5.0 7.5
(50) (3) (16)
6 6.6 6.7 3.3
(27) (4) (7)
7 3.9 11.7 2.8
(16) (7) (6)
8 9.3 3.3 1.4
(38) (2) (3)
9 2.9 3.3 0.5
(12) (2) (1)
10 3.2 1.7 0.9
(13) (1) (2)
























Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
(409) (60) (212)
Number of country-level observations in parentheses.
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S3: Variable Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the country-level data are presented in table S.8.4.
Table S.8.4 Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max n
Electoral support for incumbent party 33.63 12.26 0.00 59.20 433
Effective number of parties 3.87 1.63 1.18 10.49 415
Election year 1988.82 11.82 1961.00 2010.00 433
Electoral support for incumbent party (initial election) 37.99 12.61 0.00 67.30 433
Executive election 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 433
Economic growth - 2 years 3.08 2.65 -8.78 14.90 428
Coalition partners 1.53 1.28 0.00 3.00 433
Government has majority in legislature 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 348
Number of elections 12.57 4.06 5.00 19.00 431
Years pr. term 2.34 1.03 0.00 4.67 433
Fixed term 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 433
Election year economic growth 2.91 3.14 -11.70 13.85 433
Change in electoral support -4.36 8.03 -42.80 20.70 433
Tenure 6.02 4.25 1.00 30.00 409
Trichotomised tenure 0.70 0.77 0.00 2.00 409
Mismatch tenure (person v. party) 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 433
The questionwording for the different questions used in this individual-level analysis
are as follows.
• Executive party vote: “If there were a general election tomorrow, which party
would you vote for?” Executive parties are coded 1, others are coded 0.
• Executive party vote (last election): “Which party did you vote for at the General
Election of [Year]?” Same coding as for the vote variable.
• Ideology: “In political matters people talk about ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ What
is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-point
scale. On this scale, where 1 means ‘left’ and 10 means ‘right’, which number
best describes your position?”
• Class: “If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class,
which would you say you belong to — the working class, the lower middle
class, the middle class, the upper middle class, or the upper class?”
• Religiosity: “How often do you attend religious services: several times a week,
once a week, a few times a year, once a year or less, or never?”
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• National economic perceptions (NEP): In 1989, 1994, 2004, 2009 and 2014:
“What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you
think that the general economic situation in this country is: a lot better, a little
better, stayed the same, a little worse, or a lot worse?” In 1999: “How about the
state of the [country’s] economy? Very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat
dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?”
Descriptive statistics for the individual-level data are presented in table S.8.5.
Table S.8.5 Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max n
Ideology 0.50 0.26 0.00 1.00 51030
Year 2001.63 8.70 1989.00 2014.00 55184
National Economic Perceptions 0.43 0.28 0.00 1.00 55184
Class 0.45 0.31 -0.33 1.33 52700
Religiosity 0.51 0.32 0.00 1.17 49165
Prospective NEP 0.53 0.40 0.00 3.50 39571
Country Code 5.53 2.90 1.00 10.00 55184
Economic growth 1.85 2.96 -5.64 10.76 48842
Inflation 2.24 2.82 -4.48 13.70 47967
Unemployment rate 10.16 5.24 3.40 26.30 48842
Coalition government 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 55184
Lagged executive party vote 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 49266
Executive party vote 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 55184
Tenure 5.46 4.24 1.00 17.00 55184
Trichotomised time 0.78 0.82 0.00 2.00 55184
Descriptive statistics for the subnational data are presented in table S.8.6.
Table S.8.6 Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max n
Total number of eligible voters 2349.64 2563.93 6.30 31458.61 1823
Support for mayoral party 05 35.11 18.34 0.00 87.74 1823
Proportion of votes cast for mayoral party 09 32.26 14.52 0.00 82.61 1823
Municipality amalgamated 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 1823
New incumbent 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 1823
Change in support for mayoral party -2.85 15.67 -45.20 78.15 1823
Unemployment 07 2.31 0.86 1.00 8.70 1823
Unemployment 09 4.51 0.81 2.30 8.30 1823
Right wing mayor 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 1823
Turnout 0.69 0.06 0.37 0.89 1823
Proportion of votes for right wing parties 0.48 0.14 0.10 0.88 1823
Increase in unemployment rate 2.20 0.67 -0.40 4.10 1823
Log of eligible voters 7.24 1.10 1.84 10.36 1823
Trichotimized unemployment 1.11 0.80 0.00 2.00 1465
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S4: Alternative Measure of Growth
In table S.8.7, we re-estimate the models from table 8.1 using an alternative measure
of economic growth: economic growth across the past two years, rather than just
the past year. The interaction effect becomes slightly larger, remains negative and
statistically significant.
Table S.8.7 Linear regression of changes in executive party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic growth - 2 years 0.93∗ 1.09∗ 1.05∗ 1.31∗
(0.29) (0.35) (0.39) (0.38)
Tenure -0.01 0.02 -0.22 -0.19
(0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18)
Economic growth - 2 years × Tenure -0.08∗ -0.10∗ -0.08∗ -0.08∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Executive election -2.98∗ -2.04 -1.08 -1.99∗
(1.52) (1.51) (1.94) (0.55)
Year FE X X
Country FE X X
Leader FE X
Observations 406 406 406 406
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
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S5: Using Controls in the Country-level Data
Below, we add some controls to the models estimated on the country-level dataset of
elections. This means dropping a number of the observations, about 80, for which
we do not have data coverage for the control variables. In order to make the estimates
with and without controls more comparable, we start by estimating the same models
as in table 8.1 on the smaller sample of elections, for which we have controls. This is
done in the four furthest left columns of table S.8.8. As we can see, the results are
fairly similar to those found using the full sample. The main difference is that the
interaction effects become slightly smaller, and the standard errors become slightly
larger, leaving the interaction terms insignificant.
Next, we introduce the controls. The controls we use are number of government
coalition partners, including a dummy for one, two and three or more partners;
majority government, including a dummy forwhether the government hasmore than
fifty percent of the seats in parliament; and effective number of parties in parliament,
a linear index measuring the size-adjusted number of parties in parliament. All
these variables have been taken from the database of political institutions (Beck et al.,
2001). They have been chosen with the following considerations in mind: we know
that government composition affects economic voting (cf. Powell and Whitten, 1993),
depressing the clarity of responsibiliy for economic policy, and it seems plausible
that the effective number of parties can work in a similar way – the more parties, the
more political actors there are to blame for any economic misfortune. It also seems
likely that government and parliamentary composition can influence the tenure of
the executive party, making it a good candidate for a confounding factor. Finally,
unlike most other institutional factors, government and parliamentary composition
are not already controlled for using the year, country and leader fixed effects. In the
last four columns of table S.8.8 the controls are introduced. This leaves the interaction
effects practically unchanged.
In sum, while the interaction estimates remain substantially unchanged, the statis-
tical significance of the interaction coefficients drops when introducing the controls;
however, this is only a result of the fact that another, smaller sample of elections are
being analysed. As such, there is no evidence that the controls introduced in any
way confound the negative relationship between economic voting and time in office.
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Table S.8.8 Linear regression of changes in executive party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Executive election -3.00+ -1.88 -1.20 -4.52∗ -2.21 -1.00 -0.20 -3.38∗
(1.57) (1.54) (1.99) (1.35) (1.61) (1.54) (1.93) (1.29)
Economic growth 0.68∗ 0.71∗ 0.60+ 1.08∗ 0.75∗ 0.79∗ 0.67∗ 1.15∗
(0.28) (0.30) (0.32) (0.34) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31)
Tenure -0.08 -0.04 -0.38+ -0.27 -0.05 -0.01 -0.36+ -0.24
(0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.21) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.21)
Economic growth × Tenure -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Government has majority in legislature -2.28∗ -2.69∗ -2.62+ -4.51∗
(1.12) (1.30) (1.40) (1.82)
One coalition partner 2.59∗ 2.62+ 1.02 0.41
(1.30) (1.44) (1.57) (2.58)
Two coalition partners -0.41 -0.19 -0.58 -0.73
(1.83) (1.71) (1.62) (2.18)
More than two coalition partners 1.44 1.10 -0.31 2.68
(1.43) (1.67) (1.76) (2.08)
Effective number of parties 0.52 0.54 1.09 0.48
(0.41) (0.49) (0.68) (0.58)
Time FE X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Leader FE X X
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
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S6: Sensitivity to Outliers
Are the interaction effects presented above based on broad patterns in voting behavior
or idiosyncrasies related to just one country? This is always an important question
when dealing with time-series cross-sectional data. In order to investigate whether
this was the case for the present analyses, we re-estimated the key models in the
country-level, individual-level and subnational datasets, looking for evidence of
instability in the effect-sizes which stem from the exclusion of one important set of
cases.
For the country-level data, we re-estimate the models from table 8.1 excluding one
country, for all countries in the sample. The resulting 41× 4 regression coefficients,
attached to the interaction between economic conditions and incumbent tenure, are
plotted for each model in the top left panel of figure S.8.1. As can be seen from this
figure, the interaction coefficients in models 1 and 2 seem rather stable; however, in
models 3 and 4 one of the estimated coefficients deviates substantially from the rest.
An inspection of the underlying data, reveals that the omitted country in this context
is Luxembourg. There are two reasons why this is not that disconcerting. First, the
problem is less severe in model 4, which is the more demanding model of the two.
Second, Luxembourg is not one of the countries included in the individual-level
dataset, and therefore the negative relationship between economic voting and tenure
cannot be attributable to Luxembourg alone.
For the individual-level data, we re-estimate the models from table 8.2 excluding
one survey, for all surveys in the sample (i.e. country-year). The resulting 60 × 3
logistic regression coefficients, attached to the interaction between economic per-
ceptions and incumbent tenure, are plotted for each model in the top right panel of
figure S.8.1. As can be seen from this figure, the interaction coefficients are relatively
stable across all models.
For the subnational data, we re-estimate the models from table 8.3 excluding one
municipality, for all muncipalities in the sample. The resulting 66 × 3 regression
coefficients, attached to the interaction between unem and newinc, are plotted for
each model in the bottom panel of figure S.8.1. As can be seen from this figure, the
interaction coefficients are relatively stable across all models.
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Figure S.8.1 Lines represent the interaction coefficients from linear and logit models
in tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. Each dot in the top left panel represents an interaction
coefficient from one of the four country-level linear models, estimated with one of
the 41 countries omitted. Each dot in the top right panel represents an interaction
coefficient from one of the three individual-level logit models, estimated with one
of the 60 surveys omitted. Each dot in the bottom panel represents an interaction
coefficient from the three subnational linear models, estimated with one of the 66
municipalities omitted.
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S7: Further Checks of the Interaction Terms
In a recent paper, Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2016) suggests three diagnostics
to run when encountering a multiplicative interaction term. Below, we look at each
of these in turn for the interactions estimated in the country-level, individual-level
and subnational data.
The first diagnostic is examiningwhether the L-kurtosis of the interaction variable
is below 0.16. If the L-kurtosis is above 0.16, then much of the variation in the
interaction variable is based on just a few observations. The L-kurtosis for the time
in office variable in the country-level dataset is 0.2. This means that the interaction
effect in the country-level data potentially relies on just a few observations, making
the interaction term less reliable. The L-kurtosis for the time in office variable in
the individual-level dataset is 0.075. In the subnational data, the L-kurtosis for
the unemployment variable is 0.14. This is below the cut-off, and accordingly, we
probably do not need to be concerned with the reliability of the interaction variable
in the individual-level or the subnational data.
The second diagnostic looks for monotonicity in the average marginal effects.
That is, we should expect average marginal effects to move monotonically with the
interaction variable. To test this we trichotomised our interaction variables for all
three datasets based on the variables’ terciles. For the linear interaction models
we then estimate the average marginal effect at the median of each tercile using a
binning estimator (cf. equation (4) in Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu, 2016). For
the non-linear model which analyze the individual-level data we cannot use the
binning estimator. Instead, we estimate a model using the trichotomised interaction
variable as a set of dummy-interactions instead of the linear interaction, deriving the
average marginal effects for the bottom, middle and top tercile. For the country-level,
individual-level, and subnational data, we find that the average marginal effects
monotonically decrease across the three terciles.
The final diagnostic is examining the linearity of the interaction. To do this, we
plot the average marginal effects from the trichotomised interaction terms, along
with the average marginal effects derived from simple linear interaction terms, in
figure S.8.2. The trichotomised interaction terms are plotted at the median within
each tercile. While the average marginal effects from the trichotomised interaction
terms do not match the average marginal effect from the linear interaction terms
exactly, they do not deviate substantially from each other.
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Figure S.8.2 The lines represent the average marginal effects of economic growth,
national economic perceptions and newinc across the interaction variable. Derived
from column one of table 8.1, column three of table 8.2 and column one of table 8.3.
Dots represent the average marginal effects from binning estimators, which include
a trichotomised interaction. All the average marginal effects are plotted with 90 pct.
confidence intervals.
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S8: Strategic Election Timing
To probe the plausibility of the strategic election timing explanation, we augment
our country-level analysis in two different ways.
First, we introduce a control variable which measures how often an incumbent
calls for an election (i.e. years served divided by elections called). By introducing
this variable we hold constant the incumbents’ inclination to call early elections. We
add this variable as a control to the set of models already estimated in table 8.1, and
report estimates of these extended models in the first four columns of table S.8.9. As
can be seen from table S.8.9, the interaction remains negative, it has the same size,
and in three of the four specifications, it is statistically significant (p < 0.1).
Table S.8.9 Linear regression of changes in executive party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic growth 0.68∗ 0.79∗ 0.63∗ 0.90∗ 0.86+ 0.47∗ -0.19 0.71
(0.25) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.45) (0.15) (0.41) (0.54)
Tenure -0.08 -0.06 -0.31+ -0.25 0.23∗ -0.02 -0.40∗ 0.04
(0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.03) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08)
Economic growth × Tenure -0.06+ -0.08∗ -0.05 -0.06∗ -0.09∗ 0.01 -0.02 -0.10∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Executive election -3.01+ -2.06 -1.31 13.80∗ -3.03 -1.76 -0.61
(1.55) (1.53) (1.94) (1.73) (3.86) (2.48) (3.29)
Time FE X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Leader FE X X
Observations 409 409 409 409 60 60 60 60
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
Executive election dummy omitted in column (8) due to perfect collinearity with Leader FE.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Second, we disentangle election-timing and tenure by restricting the sample of
elections to the five countries in our dataset where terms are fixed. This leaves 60 of
the original 409 elections. In these countries, the executive cannot time the election,
and accordingly, any relationship found between time in office and the importance
of the economy cannot be attributed to election timing. Using this restricted sample,
we re-estimate the models from table 8.1. The key estimates from these models are
reported in the four rightmost columns of table S.8.9. As can be seen from table
S.8.9, the interaction effect remains negative and statistically significant in the most
demanding model, which includes the leader fixed effects.
Taken together, the fact that, across both types of control for election timing, the
interaction remains negative and substantially unchanged in the most demanding
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specification (cf. columns 4 and 8), suggests that the results laid out in table 8.1 were
not the result of strategic election-timing.
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S9: Coalition and Single-party Governments
In table S.8.10, we re-estimate the models from table 8.1 only for single-party gov-
ernments (columns one through four) and only for coalition governments (columns
five through eight). Across all specifications the estimated interaction coefficient
is negative, however, there are some differences across the two sets of models. In
the models with no controls and the model with leader fixed effects, the negative
interaction seems to be smaller for single-party governments. In the models with
year and country fixed effects, the interaction seem to be smaller for multi-party
governments. As such, there are no consistent differences across the two groups.
This suggests that the negative interaction term identified in the country-level
data cannot be explained in terms of differences in how voters judge coalition and
single-party governments over time. If this was the case, we would expect to see
no interaction between time in office and economic voting for the single-party gov-
ernments, and a very strong and statistically significant interaction among coalition
governments. This is not what we find in table S.8.10.
Table S.8.10 Linear regression of changes in executive party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic growth 0.70+ 1.04+ 0.75 0.98 0.45+ 0.61∗ 0.62∗ 0.21
(0.36) (0.53) (0.67) (0.71) (0.25) (0.26) (0.21) (0.28)
Tenure -0.37∗ -0.05 -0.28 -0.64+ 0.01 -0.06 -0.25 -0.23
(0.19) (0.30) (0.31) (0.35) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Economic growth × Tenure -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.07∗ -0.07+ -0.06∗ -0.04
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Time FE X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Leader FE X X
Observations 113 113 113 113 239 239 239 239
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
In table S.8.11, we re-estimate the models from table 8.2 only for single-party
governments (columns one through three) and only for multi-party governments
(columns three through six). There are no substantial differences across the two sets
of models, which once again suggest that any differences in economic voting across
tenure cannot be explained away by differences in how voters hold single-party and
coalition governments electorally accountable for the economy.
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Table S.8.11Multi-level logit model of voting for executive party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National Economic Perceptions 2.44∗ 2.48∗ 2.44∗ 1.56∗ 1.60∗ 1.59∗
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
Tenure 0.03 -0.02 0.06+ -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
National Economic Perceptions × Tenure -0.06+ -0.07+ -0.06+ -0.07∗ -0.08∗ -0.07∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Individual lvl. controls X X X X X X
Survey RE X X X X X X
Leader FE X X X X
Survey FE X X
Observations 14,444 14,444 14,444 25,112 25,112 25,112
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
Tenure omitted in models (3) and (6) due to collinearity with Survey FE.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
S10: Mismatch in Tenure
In table S.8.12, we re-estimate the models from table 8.1, including a control for
whether the tenure of the executive officer (i.e. president or prime minister) is
different from that of the executive party. We include this control by itself and
interact it with time in office. This control is, obviously, highly co-linear with time in
office. As such, the longer a party is in office, the more likely it is that it switches out
the executive officer. Adding these controls shift the estimates and standard errors
slightly, making the interaction estimate significant at the .1 level rather than at the
0.05 level in columns one and four.
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Table S.8.12 Linear regression of changes in executive party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mismatch tenure (person v. party) -3.13+ -3.17+ -2.78 -3.45
(1.85) (1.88) (2.15) (2.29)
Economic growth 0.68∗ 0.76∗ 0.59∗ 0.88∗
(0.24) (0.27) (0.28) (0.30)
Tenure -0.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.31
(0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.28)
Mismatch tenure (person v. party) × Tenure 0.22 0.21 0.02 0.27
(0.25) (0.25) (0.29) (0.29)
Economic growth × Tenure -0.05+ -0.07∗ -0.04 -0.05+
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Executive election -2.80+ -1.82 -1.01 -3.90∗
(1.49) (1.50) (1.95) (1.50)
Year FE X X
Country FE X X
Leader FE X
Observations 409 409 409 409
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
S11: Two-step Models of Individual-level Data
Another way to examine whether there is an interaction between time in office and
national economic perceptions is to estimate a multilevel model which allows for
a random slope with respect to national economic perceptions across the different
surveys, and then examine whether the size of the survey-specific slopes are related
to the tenure of the incumbent party at the time of the survey.
To do this, we estimate a set of multi-level logit models of the probability of voting
for the executive party with the full set of individual-level controls, omitting time in
office, allowing the effect of national economic perceptions to vary across the surveys
(i.e., estimate a random slope model). We estimate three of these models: one with
survey random effects, one with leader fixed effects and one with survey fixed effects.
For each of these models, we obtain sixty different logit coefficients, which represent
the effect of national economic perception in the individual surveys. We plot these
logit coefficients against incumbent tenure at the time of the survey for each of the
three models in figure S.8.3.
As can be seen from these figures, there is a negative relationship between time
in office and the size of the logit coefficients. OLS regressions of time in office on
the logit coefficients reveal that the negative relationship is statistically significant
(p < 0.05, using country-clustered standard errors). As such, this alternative way
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Figure S.8.3 Random slope of NEP plotted with 95 pct. confidence intervals. From
left to right the models used for plotting include random effects, leader fixed effects
and survey fixed effects. Uniformly distributed random noise added to the horizontal
placement of the dots. The figure shows a linear fit with 95 pct. confidence intervals.
of estimating the effect of time in office on the economic vote gives the same basic
result as that identified in table 8.2.
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S12: The Role of Prospective Economic Conditions
In table S.8.13, we re-estimate the models presented in table 8.2, adding a measure
of prospective national economic perceptions and an interaction between these
perceptions and tenure.
To measure prospective national economic perceptions, we use the following
question from the EES: “Over the next 12 months, how do you think the general
economic situation in this country will be: a lot better, a little better, stay the same, a
little worse, or a lot worse?”. We rescale this variable to go from zero (a lot worse)
to one (a lot better). This question was not asked in the ’89 and the ’99 EES, and we
therefore omit these years when estimating the models with prospective economic
perceptions.
As can be seen from table S.8.13, there is no statistically significant interaction
between prospective economic perceptions and time in office. Further, the negative
interaction between time in office and (retrospective) national economic perceptions
remains statisically significant, and is three times the absolute size of the interaction
for prospective economic condtions. In sum, there is no evidence that incumbents
time in office lead voters to shift their focus from one type of economic percepts
to another. They simply become less reliant on retrospective national economic
conditions when deciding whether to vote for the incumbent.
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Table S.8.13Multi-level logit model of voting for executive party
(1) (2) (3)
Prospective NEP 0.27 0.28 0.27
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)




Prospective NEP × Tenure 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
National Economic Perceptions × Tenure -0.06∗ -0.06∗ -0.07∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lagged executive party vote 4.28∗ 4.29∗ 4.29∗
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Ideology 2.43∗ 2.44∗ 2.44∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34)
Religiosity 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Class 0.29∗ 0.30∗ 0.28+
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Survey RE X X X
Leader FE X X
Survey FE X
Observations 28,894 28,894 28,894
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
Tenure omitted in model (3) due to collinearity with Survey FE.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
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S13: Endogeneity in National Economic Perceptions
In the individual-level data, we generally found higher levels of economic voting
across all levels of tenure than we did in the country-level data. As mentioned
above, this might be because the endogeneity of national economic perceptions is
leading us to overestimate the level of economic voting in the individual-level data.
To investigate whether this is the case, we re-analyze the individual-level data in two
different ways, both of which might allow us to sieve out some of this endogeneity.
First, we examine a smaller, restricted sample. Specifically, we exclude those
who voted for the incumbent at the last election, because these are more likely to be
incumbent partisans and thus engaged in the type of “wishful thinking” described
above.10 In the first three columns of table S.8.14, we present the results of this
analysis for the same model specifications that were used in the main analysis.
Figure S.8.4 plots the average marginal effects of national economic percepts across
tenure for the censored sample, based on the model presented in column three of
table S.8.14. As can be seen from this figure, the pattern identified in this censored
sample matches up more closely with that found for the country-level data. As such,
when we leave out incumbent “partisans”, incumbent tenure tends to completely
crowd out economic voting.
Second, we use aggregate objective economic conditions to instrument national
economic conditions. This approach sidesteps problems with endogeneity by only
examining the differences in national economic perceptions which are caused by
changes in objective economic conditions (see Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger,
2013, for the details of this method). This means sieving out variation in national
economic perceptions which are caused by other factors, such as partisanship.
In measuring objective economic conditions we include election year inflation,
unemployment and economic growth at the country-level. All these variables were
taken from the World Banks database. The reason we do not simply use economic
growth, as we did in the analysis of the country-level data, is that it is possible to
get estimates for unemployment and inflation for the time period covered by the
EES. The same was not possible for the country-level data. Turning to estimation, we
instrument national economic perceptions and the interaction between these percepts
and tenure using growth, unemployment and inflation as well as an interaction
between these three variables and time in office. We omit the individual-level controls,
since these are potentially endogenous as well, and we do not use survey or leader
10A more standard measure of party identification would be preferable, however, no such measure
is included in the EES.

















Figure S.8.4 The average marginal effects of national economic perceptions on the
probability of voting for the executive party across levels of tenure with 90 pct.
confidence intervals. Estimated based on the model presented in column three of
table S.8.14. Derived from the model using respondents who did not vote for the
executive party at the last election with survey fixed effects. The bar plot shows the
density of the variable years in office.
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Table S.8.14 Adressing Endogeneity Problems
(1) (2) (3) (4)
National Economic Perceptions 2.41∗ 2.53∗ 2.51∗ 0.39∗
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.04)
Tenure 0.05 0.00 0.01∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.00)
National Economic Perceptions × Tenure -0.13∗ -0.18∗ -0.14∗ -0.02∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)
Ideology 2.98∗ 3.01∗ 2.99∗
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Religiosity -0.13 -0.15 -0.12
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Class 0.27 0.30+ 0.29
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Survey RE X X X




Observations 25,220 25,220 25,220 47,967
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country.
Tenure omitted in model (3) due to collinearity with Survey FE.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
fixed effects as these would be perfect or near-perfectly collinear with the aggregate
level economic indicators. Finally, we link the instrumented economic perceptions
and incumbent support using a linear probability model rather than a logit model to
make the estimation less computationally complex.
The estimates produced using this instrumental variables approach are presented
in the fourth column of table S.8.14. As can be seen from this model, we still see a sta-
tistically significant negative interaction between tenure and the now-instrumented
national economic perceptions. In figure S.8.5, we plot the average marginal effects
based on the instrumental variables regression. Here, we see that after taking poten-
tial problems with endogeneity into account, the level of economic voting becomes
statistically indistinguishable from zero after roughly 15 years in office. This trajec-
tory is roughly similar to what we find in the country-level data, where the effect
of economic voting also becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero as time in
office increases (although this already happens after eight years, cf. figure 8.1).
Taken together, these analyses lend credibility to the conclusion that both the
individual-level and country-level dataset paints a similar picture of the relationship
between time in office and economic voting.
















Figure S.8.5 The average marginal effects of national economic perceptions on the
probability of voting for the executive party across levels of tenure with 90 pct.
confidence intervals. Derived from the instrumental variables estimation, cf. column
four of table S.8.14. The bar plot shows the density of the variable years in office.
Chapter 9
A Self-serving Bias in
Attribution of Political Responsibility
Individuals’ desire to protect and enhance their own self-image often lead them
to take personal responsibility for good outcomes yet externalize responsibility for
adverse outcomes. In this article, I show that this self-serving bias in attribution
has important implications for how voters assign political responsibility in settings
where it is unclear whether outcomes are a result of government intervention or an
individual’s own behavior. In these settings, voters assign political responsibility
in a self-serving way, downplaying the government’s role in producing desirable
outcomes, and highlighting the government’s role in producing undesirable out-
comes. I demonstrate that voters attribute responsibility in this way using election
studies from three different continents, a survey asking detailed questions about
attributions, and a set of survey experiments.
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The protection and enhancement of one’s self-image is an important motivation
underlying human behavior (Baumeister, 1999; Beauregard and Dunning, 1998;
Sedikides and Strube, 1995). This is reflected in a ubiquitous self-serving bias in
attribution, which motivates people to draw causal inferences that make themselves
look good (Heider, 2013; Kunda, 1999; Stephan, Rosenfield and Stephan, 1976). In
particular, because of this bias, people tend to take personal responsibility for desir-
able outcomes and externalize responsibility for undesirable outcomes. Arguably,
this self-serving bias is also present when people make attributions about the out-
comes of political decisions, and it might therefore, in some cases, affect how voters
attribute political responsibility. In spite of this, no study has examined whether or
under what conditions the self-serving bias affect voters’ political attributions.
While the previous literature has not examined whether voters’ desire to make
themselves look good affects how they attribute responsibility for policy outcomes, a
large number of studies have found that voters’ desire to make their preferred party
look good does make a difference. As such, voters who identify with, or feel close
to, a particular party will hold this party responsible for desirable policy outcomes
yet exculpate the party for undesirable outcomes (Bisgaard, 2015; Healy, Kuo and
Malhotra, 2014;Malhotra andKuo, 2008;Marsh andTilley, 2010; Rudolph, 2003b, 2006;
Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). This fits nicely with the larger literature on how attachment
to a party fundamentally alters voters’ political cognition (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960).
A partisan bias in attribution is also consistent with a self-enhancement motive, as
partisans might selectively attribute in order to protect the image of themselves as
someone who supports a successful party (for an argument along these lines, see
Tilley and Hobolt, 2011, 319). However, the effects of voters’ self-serving motives on
their political attributions might extend beyond any role these play in driving the
partisan bias.
This article argues that self-serving motives shape how voters assign political
responsibility in settings where it is unclear whether outcomes are the result of
government intervention or an individual’s own behavior. This includes a number
of important policy outcomes such as voters’ employment situations, their mortgage
payments, their children’s test scores, and the quality of their health insurance. When
it comes to this type of policy outcome, concerns about self-image should motivate
voters to shift responsibility for undesirable outcomes away from themselves and
towards governing politicians, and similarlymotivate voters to shift the responsibility
for desirable outcomes away from politicians and towards themselves. For instance,
wewould expect voters to bemore likely to attribute responsibility to the government
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for losing a job as opposed to getting a job, because individual voters can influence
their own employment prospects, and therefore should want to downplay (overstate)
their own responsibility for adverse (good) employment outcomes. Conversely,
when it is clear that outcomes are not the result of an individual’s own behavior,
the self-serving bias should not play any direct role in shaping voters’ attribution of
responsibility for these outcomes. For instance, voters should not be more likely to
attribute responsibility to the government for increases as opposed to decreases in
the national unemployment rate, because individual voters cannot affect the national
unemployment rate, leaving them with no self-serving motive to attribute political
responsibility asymmetrically.
In order to empirically substantiate this argument, I undertake three separate
studies. The first study examines voters’ propensity to support the incumbent across
their beliefs about the national and their personal economic situation. Using data
from the Danish National Election Studies, the American National Election Studies
and the Latinobarómetro, I find that voters electorally punish incumbents when
they think their personal economic situation is deteriorating, yet do not reward the
government when they think their personal economic situation is improving. I find
no similar asymmetry across evaluations of the national economic situation. This
is consistent with the self-serving bias in attribution, because voters can influence
how their personal economic situation develops, and therefore have a self-serving
motive to attribute less (more) responsibility to the government when their economic
situation is improving (deteriorating). They have no similar motive when it comes to
the national economic situation.
In the second study, I move a step closer to the proposedmechanism, investigating
whether voters adjust their beliefs about the extent to which the government is
implicated in producing economic outcomes in a self-serving way. To that end, I
use a population-based survey of Danish voters, asking respondents about whether
they believe the government can affect their personal economic situation, and look at
how these beliefs correlate with voters’ evaluation of their personal and the national
economic situation. In line with what I would expect if there is a self-serving bias
in political attribution, I find that voters who believe their own economic situation
is doing better are less likely to believe that the government can affect their own
economic situation.
In the third study, I address issues related to causal inference: issues which are
hard to get at with the observational data used in studies 1 and 2. To do this, I
conduct a survey experiment on a population-based sample of Danish voters, as
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well as a survey experiment on a convenience sample. In the experiments, I ask
respondents to evaluate the extent to which the government would be responsible for
a set of hypothetical outcomes, randomly assigning outcomes to respondents. Across
different types of outcomes, I find that when it comes to policy outcomes voters’
might have had a hand in shaping, they hold the government more responsible for
undesirable outcomes than for desirable outcomes.
The article extends the literature on how voters assign political responsibility for
policy outcomes, as it tells us that not only partisanship but also self-servingness
can bias voters’ attributions. Further, the article uses both observational and experi-
mental data from outside the US and the UK in a literature which has been primarily
experimental and based on these two countries (Healy, Kuo and Malhotra, 2014;
Malhotra and Krosnick, 2007; Marsh and Tilley, 2010; Rudolph, 2006; Tilley and
Hobolt, 2011). The findings may also help explain why previous literature has gener-
ally found the effects of personal economic conditions to be small and inconsistent
(Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013; Singer and Carlin,
2013; Stubager et al., 2014). As such, if the self-serving bias drives down the effect
of personal economic conditions when these conditions are improving, then the
estimated effect of these conditions will be sensitive to the distribution of personal
economic conditions in the electorate (i.e., be smaller when more people’s personal
economic situation is improving).
To the extent that the way voters interpret and act on policy outcomes can shape
the actions of reelection-minded politicians (Alt, De Mesquita and Rose, 2011; Besley,
2007; Ferejohn, 1986; Tilley, Neundorf and Hobolt, 2017), the self-serving bias also
has interesting implications for democratic accountability. In particular, politicians
might shy away from otherwise efficient policies, if these policies leave room for
interpretation as to whether their outcomes are due to the policy or due to the actions
of the individual voter, because voters will seize upon this ambiguity, and assign
responsibility for any gains to themselves and responsibility for any losses to the
politicians.
The Political Relevance of the Self-serving Bias
Social psychological research has long identified a self-serving bias in attribution
(Fiske and Taylor, 2013; Greenwald, 1980; Heider, 2013; Stephan, Rosenfield and
Stephan, 1976, 272). This bias is reflected in a “tendency for people to take personal
responsibility for their desirable outcomes yet externalize responsibility for their
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undesirable outcomes” (Shepperd, Malone and Sweeny, 2008, 895). If someone, for
instance, gets a good grade on an exam, they will infer that this must be based on
their own effort and skill, however; if they get a bad grade, they infer that it was due
to the teacher’s tough grading or the loud neighbors who made studying impossible
(McAllister, 1996).
The self-serving bias is a type of “directional” motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990),
meaning that the bias leads people to reach conclusions based on some other motive
than accuracy. In particular, the self-serving bias has been shown to be driven by a
number of different cognitive heuristics and psychological needs (Shepperd, Malone
and Sweeny, 2008; Snyder, Stephan and Rosenfield, 1976). Themost prominent driver
of the bias, however, is the need to sustain a positive self-image (i.e., self-enhancement
or self-protection) (Miller, 1976; Sedikides, Gaertner and Toguchi, 2003).
While previous studies have found that the self-serving bias shapes people’s
attributions in a number of different areas (e.g., Campbell et al., 2000), it has not
been shown to affect how voters attribute responsibility for policy outcomes. This
might be because the self-serving bias has no obvious universal relevance for this
type of outcome. To see this, imagine that a voter thinks the national economy is
doing worse than it was 12 months ago. It is not obvious how the self-serving bias
should influence the attribution of responsibility for this economic development.
However, even if the the self-serving bias does not have an impact on how voters
attribute responsibility for all types of policy outcomes, it might still have an impact
in some cases. In particular, the self-serving bias might play a role when the policy
outcome voters attribute responsibility for satisfies the following plausibility criteria.
Voters need to believe that they can plausibly influence the outcome themselves.
Since the self-serving bias is premised on voters wanting to adjust how personally
responsible they are for an outcome based on how desirable this outcome is, the bias
is obviously not relevant if voters know, on the face of it, that they had no personal
responsibility for said outcome. Imagine, for instance, that a voter want to assign
responsibility for rising inflation. Since the voter knows that she had nothing to do
with increasing prices, adjusting the extent to which she is responsible vis-a-vis the
government does not make sense. Imagine instead that a voter’s mortgage payments
go up. The voter knows that he is partly responsible for the size of his mortgage
payments, as he could (plausibly) have negotiated a better deal with the bank or
increased his savings earlier in life. Accordingly, the voter can meaningfully adjust
the extent towhich he is responsible vis-a-vis the government, making the self-serving
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bias relevant. The first criteria, therefore, is that voters need to be plausibly personally
responsible for the outcome.
In addition to this, voters need to believe that political control over the outcome
is ambiguous. As such, if voters believe the economic outcome is either completely
under political control or completely out of political control, voters will not be able
to rationalize adjusting the extent to which the government is responsible. The
second criteria, therefore, is that it is plausible for voters to adjust how responsible
the government is for the outcome.
These plausibility criteria matter because even when people are attributing selec-
tively they “do not seem to be at liberty to conclude whatever they want [...] [t]hey
draw the desired conclusion only if they can muster of the evidence nessecary to
support it.” (Kunda, 1990, 482-283). Put differently, if voters are to shift responsibility
for an outcome self-servingly between themselves and the government, they need
to able to to think up a set of reasons why they themselves (criteria one) and the
government (criteria two) had some part to play in producing this outcome. If the
plausibility criteria are not met, this is impossible.
If both plausibility criteria are met, however, the self-serving bias should shape
voters’ attributions of political responsibility. In an attempt to minimize their own
involvement, voters should over-emphasize the role played by the government in
producing desirable outcomes, and, in an attempt tomaximize their own involvement,
voters should under-emphasize the role played by the government in producing
undesirable outcomes. That is, if the plausibility criteria are met, there will be
a valence asymmetry in the extent to which voters attribute responsibility to the
government. This is the article’s central hypothesis:
The Self-serving Bias Hypothesis: If voters can reasonably assign re-
sponsibility to themselves and to governing politicians for a given out-
come, then voters will hold governing politicians more responsible for
this outcome if it is undesirable as opposed to desirable.
The Hypothesis and the Existing Literature
The hypothesis is most closely related to a small and recent set of studies which
explain policy attitudes in terms of the self-serving bias (e.g., Cassar and Klein, 2017;
Deffains, Espinosa and Thöni, 2016; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2017). However,
unlike these studies, this hypothesis is not concerned with voters’ preferences for par-
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ticular policies, but in how voters attribute political responsibility to the government
for policy outcomes.
As mentioned in the introduction, the hypothesis is also related to the large
literature on partisan bias in political attributions (e.g., Bisgaard, 2015; Healy, Kuo
and Malhotra, 2014; Malhotra and Kuo, 2008). In fact, the partisan bias in attribution
is often conceptualized as the “group-serving” counterpart to the self-serving bias
(Rudolph, 2003b, 701), and might be driven by similar psychological impulses (Lodge
and Taber, 2013; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). Even so, the self-serving bias hypothesis
stands apart from the partisan attribution bias hypothesis in that it is interested
in whether voters exculpate themselves, rather than their preferred party, when
assigning blame for undesirable outcomes.
As the self-seving bias hypothesis predicts a valence asymmetry in attribution
of responsibility for policy outcomes, it is also related to studies which identify a
negativity bias (or grievance asymmetry) in retrospective voting (cf. Bloom and Price,
1975; Soroka, 2006). However, the self-serving bias hypothesis suggests that the
valence asymmetry is conditional upon the type of outcome (e.g., conditional on
whether voters can influence the outcome themselves), contrary to the negativity
bias literature, where the asymmetry is typically thought to be unconditional (cf.
Nannestad and Paldam, 1997). Even so, the hypothesis is not necessarily at odds with
the notion of a more unconditional negativity bias, as the present hypothesis focuses
exclusively on attribution and not on how voters form beliefs about the quality of
policy outcomes. Accordingly, a conditional attributional valence asymmetry could
be compatible with an unconditional perceptual valence asymmetry. In particular,
the self-serving bias hypothesis is consistent with a world in which voters are always
more (less) likely to notice, remember and retrieve negative (positive) information,
when assessing the quality of policy outcomes. The self-serving bias hypothesis
simply suggests that once the voter has assessed the quality of a given policy outcome,
then the valence of this assessment will only affect the extent to which the voter
attributes responsibility to the government if this outcome meets the two plausibility
criteria laid out above.
The self-serving bias hypothesis is also indirectly linked to the literature on the
relative importance of personal contra national economic conditions (Kinder and
Kiewiet, 1979, 1981; Singer and Carlin, 2013; Stubager et al., 2014; Tilley, Neundorf
and Hobolt, 2017). This becomes clear if one thinks systematically about the kinds of
outcomes which voters can, and the kind of outcomes voters cannot, hold themselves
responsible for. As such, voters can attribute responsibility to themselves for the
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quality of their personal economic situation, but they cannot attribute responsibility
to themselves for national economic conditions. When it comes to testing the hypoth-
esis below I use this fact repeatedly. Even so, these empirical explorations will differ
from previous research in this area because the focus will not be on the absolute
or relative weight that voters put on national and personal economic conditions.
Instead, the goal will be to get at whether there is a valence asymmetry in attribution
of political responsibility, and whether this valence asymmetry is only present for
personal economic conditions.
Testing the Hypothesis
As mentioned in the introduction, the article employs a series of surveys and ex-
periments to test the self-serving bias hypothesis. I have organized these different
empirical explorations into three separate studies. All three studies, directly or in-
directly, look at how voters attribute responsibility for outcomes which meet and
outcomes which do not meet the plausibility criteria. The three studies have differ-
ent inferential strengths (i.e., some have stronger external and some have stronger
internal validity), and thus serve as a type of methedological triangulation. Table 9.1
presents an overview of the different studies.
Table 9.1 Overview of the studies
Motivation Data sources N
1. Identify signs of a self-serving bias in
voter behavior.
Danish National Election Survey
(1990-2015)
13,292






2. Explorewhether differences in behavior
reflect differences in attributions.
Survey of Danish voters
(2014)
933
3. Explore whether differences in attribu-
tions are caused by the valence of policy
outcomes.
Survey experiment with Danish voters
(2015)
1,002




Study 1: Election surveys | 227
Study 1: Election surveys
Following the self-serving bias hypothesis developed above, voters should hold
governing politiciansmore electorally responsible forworsening economic conditions
than for improving economic conditions when it comes to their own economy. I
expect there to be such a valence asymmetry because voters will be motivated to
hold themselves less responsible when their economic conditions are deteriorating,
leaving the door open for blaming the government instead. However, there should be
no such valence asymmetry when it comes to national economic outcomes, as a bad
(good) national economic situation does not reflect poorly (well) on the individual
voter. The article begins to test the self-serving bias hypothesis by looking at whether
voters attribute responsibility in this way in a large set of election surveys.
Election surveys generally do not include explicit questions about attribution.
To measure how responsible voters hold their government for economic outcomes
in these election surveys, I therefore assume that attribution of responsibility can
be inferred from the correlation between voters’ perceptions of the economy and
support for the incumbent government. This is a relatively standard assumption
in retrospective voting research (e.g., Carlin and Singh, 2015; Duch and Stevenson,
2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013).
I use three different sets of election surveys: the American National Election Stud-
ies (ANES), the Latinobarómetro and the Danish National Election Studies (DNES).
The ANES was chosen because much groundbreaking research on retrospective
voting has used this dataset (e.g. Fiorina, 1981). The Latinobarómetro was chosen
based on two considerations; (1) it covers a diverse set of countries that are quite
different from the US, enhancing external validity; (2) it includes a large number of
respondents (n > 140.000), increasing statistical power. Finally, studies 2 and 3 are
based on surveys of Danish voters, so to increase consistency and continuity across
the different studies, the DNES is included as well.
Data and Empirical Strategy
From the ANES, I use the time series cumulative data file, analyzing data from the
presidential election years 1984 to 2012. From the Latinobarométro, I use 141 annual
surveys from 18 countries covering the years from 1995 to 2010 (our starting point is
the dataset used in Carlin and Singh, 2015). The DNES data is from the Danish Data
Archive, and covers all parliamentary elections from 1990 to 2015 (except 1998 due
to a missing question concerning personal economic conditions). For an overview
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of which surveys were included in study 1, see section S2 of the supplementary
materials.
The dependent variable is support for the incumbent executive. In the ANES, this
is operationalized as a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent reported
voting for the incumbent presidential party at the presidential election. Denmark
has a parliamentary system, and accordingly the dependent variable in the DNES is
a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent reported voting for one of the
parliamentary parties which were in government at the time of the election, and zero
otherwise. Since the Latinobarómetro data does not follow election cycles, I cannot
use reported voting behavior at elections as the dependent variable. Instead, I use
a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent approved of the incumbent
president’s performance.1
The independent variables are voters’ evaluations of their own and the national
economy. Specifically, I use two questions which were included in all the election
surveys, which asks respondents how (1) your own and your family’s economy and
(2) the national economy has developed over a period of time. The time period differs
across the different election surveys covering anything from the last 12 months to the
last three years. Responses given to these questions were sorted into three categories:
responses indicating the economy had stayed the same, responses indicating the
economy had gotten worse, and responses indicating the economy had gotten better.2
I also use a small set of control variables in some parts of the analysis. These
are gender, age in years, education, ideology and strength of party identification.
Education is measured using a dummy indicating whether the respondent reported
having attended college/university. Ideology is measured on an eleven-point scale
going from left to right in the Latinobarómetro and the DNES. In the ANES, ideology
is measured on a seven-point scale going from “extremely liberal” to “extremely
conservative”. Strength of party identification is measured on a three point scale in
the DNES (none, weak, strong) and on a four point scale in the ANES (independent,
leaning, weak and strong). The Latinobarómetro only asks for party identification in a
small number of surveys. Instead, I use a dummy indicating whether the respondent
had strong feelings about (not) trusting the president.
1This is the standard dependent variable used when estimating retrospective voting models on
the Latinobarómetro data (Carlin and Singh, 2015).
2For some of the election surveys, the respondent had more than three options available when
characterizing the economic situation; however, tomake comparisons across all of the surveys possible,
these were collapsed into these three categories. Section S3 of the supplementary materials discusses
whether this might affect the results.
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To analyze the data, I model the probability of supporting the incumbent as a
linear function of voters’ evaluations of the national and their personal economic
conditions. I also include survey fixed-effects to control for any election-specific or
country-level confounders. For both national and personal economic evaluations, I
include the variables as dummy variables, using those who thought their own/the
country’s economy had stayed the same as the reference category. I estimate the
parameters of this linear probability model (LPM) using an OLS regression with
robust standard errors, and estimate separate models for each of the three sets of
election studies.
Results
Three of the four graphs in figure 9.1 present the key estimates from the OLS regres-
sions run on the DNES, the ANES and the Latinobarometro data.3 In particular, it
presents the estimated effect of evaluating the economy as doing better rather than
having stayed the same, the estimated effect of evaluating the economy as doing
worse rather than having stayed the same, and the estimated asymmetry in these
effects: the valence asymmetry.4 The valence asymmetry represents the extent to
which voters react more strongly when the economic situation changes for the worse
rather than for the better. A positive valence asymmetry thus means that voters are
more sensitive to things getting worse. I present estimates of the valence asymmetry
for both the national economic situation and for voters’ personal economic situation.
The key take-away from figure 9.1 is that in all of the DNES, the ANES and in
the Latinobarómetro results, there is a statistically significant valence asymmetry
for personal economic conditions (p < 0.05), yet no discernible valence asymmetry
for national economic conditions. Further, if one compares the estimated valence
asymmetry for personal and national economic conditions, one finds that the former
is significantly larger than the latter in each of the three sets of election surveys
(p < 0.05). This is in line with the self-serving bias hypothesis, which predicted a
valence asymmetry in attribution of responsibility for personal economic conditions,
where voters can plausibly adjust how responsible they view the government vis-a-vis
themselves, but no asymmetry for national economic conditions, where it makes no
sense for voters to make any such adjustments.
3Section S4 of the supplementary materials present the tables underlying these and subsequent
figures in the article. See section S6 for descriptive statics on all variables used in the analysis.
4See section S1 of the supplementary materials for details on how the valence asymmetry was
estimated.
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Figure 9.1 Estimated effects of believing your own or the national economy has
gotten "Worse" or "Better" rather than "Stayed the same" on voting for/supporting
the incumbent government. Estimated using OLS-regression of incumbent support
for the DNES (n = 13, 293), the ANES (n = 13, 306) and the Latinobarometro (n =
143, 191). The valence asymmetry was calculated as the difference between the
absolute values of the “Worse” and “Better” effects. Horizontal lines are 95 pct.
(thin) and 90 pct. (thick) confidence intervals. Diamond shaped dots are from
models which include controls (i.e., gender, age, education, ideology and strength of
partisanship).
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Figure 9.1 also shows, unsurprisingly, that across all three election surveys, the
state of the national economy seems to bemore closely related to government support
than the state of the respondent’s own economy (cf. Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981).
There are also some differences across the election surveys. As such, for both the
Latinobarómetro and the ANES, there is a statistically significant estimated effect of
perceiving one’s own economy as improving rather than staying the same. There
is no such effect in the DNES. Even so, the valence asymmetry in the effect size is
present in all three sets of election studies.
How does this pattern hold up to statistical control? To test this I re-estimate the
models used to produce figure 1, including age, gender, education, ideology and
strength of partisanship as controls. These variables are not meant to be exhaustive,
as they do not control for all possible confounders. Nor are they necessarily great
controls, as some of them, like ideology, might be post-treatment (King, 2010). How-
ever, in re-estimating the models using these controls, I can conduct a simple test of
whether the patterns found above can be explained away by using a “standard set of
controls”.
In the graph presented in the bottom right corner of figure 9.1, I plot the valence
asymmetry estimated from the LPMs with controls. For comparison, I also include
similar estimates from the models without controls. The main difference is that the
valence asymmetry for the respondent’s own economy in the DNES becomes roughly
two percentage points smaller and also statistically insignificant (p = 0.26). However,
in the ANES and the Latinobarómetro, the valence asymmetry for the respondent’s
own economy is still significantly different from zero (p < 0.05) and significantly
different from the valence asymmetry for the national economy (p < 0.05).
Just as important as the statistical significance, however, is that once controls are
introduced, the approximate size of the valence asymmetry is remarkably similar
across all three election studies (ca. two to four percentage points). This resonates
with the idea that the self-serving bias in attribution is a relatively universal psycho-
logical mechanism.
In sum, voters in the ANES, the DNES and the Latinobarómetro behave in a way
that is consistent with a self-serving bias in political attribution. Across the US, Latin
America and in Denmark, voters are unlikely to hold incumbents responsible for
their personal economy if it is improving, yet likely to hold incumbents responsible
for their personal economy if it is getting worse. This is an asymmetry which is
not present for the state of the national economy. These findings are especially
noteworthy, because of the diverse set of contexts which have been analyzed. As
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such, signs of a self-serving bias in political attribution do not seem confined to one
particular type of election or country.
While the consistency of the results does speak in favor of the self-serving bias hy-
pothesis, there are still some important inferential issues, which this data cannot deal
with effectively. First, I assume that differences in the effect of economic conditions
on incumbent support correspond to differences in attribution of responsibility. As
mentioned above, this is a standard assumption in much research on retrospective
voting, however, this does not necessarily make it a valid assumption. Second, I
assume that the correlation between voters beliefs about the economy and incumbent
support reflects a causal effect of the former on the latter. This is not necessarily the
case, as the factors which determine voters’ beliefs about their own and the national
economy might have an independent effect on incumbent support (i.e., there might
be omitted variable bias). In studies 2 and 3, I devise new tests of the self-serving bias
hypothesis, which try to address these shortcomings. In particular, study 2 utilizes
a survey of voters’ beliefs about the role government plays in producing economic
outcomes. This should alleviate concerns related to the measurement of attribution
of responsibility. Study 3 randomly assigns hypothetical outcomes to voters in the
context of a survey experiment, which should help to alleviate concerns related to
causal inference.
Study 2: A Survey of Voters’ Attributional Beliefs
In study 2, I test the self-serving bias hypothesis by once again examining the re-
lationship between voters’ beliefs about the economic situation and the extent to
which they attribute responsibility for this situation to the government. However,
instead of gauging attribution of responsibility indirectly, I measure it directly by
asking voters to what extent they believe the government can affect different aspects
of the economy.
The expectations are similar to those in study 1. As such, I expect that voters who
believe their own economic situation is improving will be less likely than those who
think their own economic situation is deteriorating to think that the government can
affect their personal economy. Conversely, I do not expect voters’ evaluations of the
national economy to have any bearing on voters’ beliefs about the government’s role
in shaping national economic conditions.
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Data and Empirical Strategy
The survey I use in study 2 was part of the “DK-OPT” project.5 The survey was
collected by the polling company Epinion using a population-based sample frame.
The survey ran from May 28 to June 28 2014, included 1,028 respondents, and was
conducted over the phone. The sample was diverse though not completely represen-
tative of the Danish voting age population.6
The survey focused mainly on EU attitudes, but also included some items related
to the national government’s ability to affect the state of the economy. In particular,
the survey included the following two items:
• “To what extent can the Danish government affect your personal economic
situation?"
• “To what extent can the Danish government affect the national economic situa-
tion?"
Answers were recorded on five-point scales going from “Not at all” to “A lot”.
These items are used as the dependent variable in the analyses. The independent
variables are the same as in study 1; voters’ evaluations of how their own economic
situation and the national economy have developed over the last 12 months. For
simplicity, responses are once again sorted into three categories; better, worse and
the same.
I also use a small set of controls in this study; however, since strength of partisan-
ship was not included in the survey, I only use ideology, education, age in years and
gender. Once again, education is coded as a dummy indicating whether the respon-
dent reported having attended university. Ideology is measured as agreement with
the statement “People with high incomes should be more severely taxed”, measured
on a five point scale from “Disagree Completely” to “Agree Completely”.
To analyze the data, I estimate two linear regressions with the two items on the
government’s role in shaping economic outcomes as the dependent variables. I
include the independent economic variables as a set of dummy variables, using those
who thought the economy had stayed the same as the reference category. I estimate
both models with the small battery of controls and with robust standard errors.
5Data obtained from PI in the “DK-OPT” project, Derek Beach, Professor, Aarhus University,
Denmark.
6The sample was more educated and slightly older than the Danish voting age population, cf.
section S6 of the supplementary materials.
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Results
Figure 9.2 presents the predicted values from these linear regressions. In the top
panel, I look at how personal economic conditions are related to attributional beliefs.
Here I find that voters are less likely to think the government can affect their personal
economic situation if their own economic situation is improving. In particular, there
is a statistically significant difference between thosewho think their economy is doing
better than a year ago and those who think their economy is doing worse (p < 0.05).
This is in line with a self-serving bias in attribution of political responsibility, since
those who are doing better should be motivated to credit themselves rather than the
government. Conversely, there is no similar relationship between voters’ personal
economic conditions and their tendency to believe the government is responsible for
national economic conditions. This is important, because it tells us that the types of
people who are doing well are not less likely to hold the government responsible for
all types of economic outcomes. They are only less likely to hold the government
responsible for their own good fortune, not the fortune of the nation as a whole.
In the bottom panel of figure 9.2, I look at how national economic conditions are
related to attributional beliefs. In general, I find no systematic relationship between
how voters believe the national economy is doing and their beliefs about the extent
to which the government can affect their personal or national economic conditions.
If I compare those who believe the country is doing better than a year ago with those
who think the economy is doing worse, I find no differences in their attributional
beliefs (p > 0.2 for both dependent variables).7
In sum, I find a relationship between the valence of personal economic condi-
tions and the extent to which voters think the government can affect their personal
economy, but no relationship between the valence of national economic conditions
and the extent to which voters think the government can affect the national economy.
This is exactly what the self-serving bias hypothesis would predict.
Study 3: Survey Experiments
In study 3, I test the self-serving bias hypothesis using a set of survey-experiments. In
particular, I randomly assign voters to descriptions of different hypothetical outcomes,
ask them the extent to which they believe the government would be responsible
7Interestingly, those who think the national economy has remained the same are significantly
more likely to think that the government cannot influence their personal and the national economy.














































































































Figure 9.2 Top: Beliefs about the extent to which the government can affect your
personal (left) and the national (right) personal economy across beliefs about personal
economic conditions. Bottom: Beliefs about the extent to which the government can
affect your personal (left) and the national (right) personal economy across beliefs
about national economic conditions. Dots calculated by adding average marginal
effects of economic variables, derived from the OLS-regressions (n = 933 for all
models), to the sample mean. All models include both evaluations of your own and
the national economy as well as controls for ideology, education, gender and age.
Vertical lines are 95 pct. (thin) and 90 pct. (thick) confidence intervals.
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for these outcomes, and then examine whether their answers follow the same self-
serving pattern identified in studies 1 and 2.
By randomly assigning economic outcomes to voters, I address a key problem
with the analyses I have engaged in so far, namely, that observed economic outcomes
are endogenous to assignment of responsibility. So far I have estimated the effect of
economic outcomes on the assignment of political responsibility by comparing voters
who believe an outcome is getting better with voters who believe the same outcome is
getting worse. This is potentially problematic, as voters with specific propensities to
attribute responsibility to the government may, inadvertently or intentionally, select
into specific types of beliefs.8 By assigning outcomes at random, we can be sure that
voters’ propensities to hold the government responsible is balanced, in expectation,
across those assigned to desirable and undesirable outcomes.
In the first experiment, I vary two of the characteristics of the hypothetical out-
comes that voters are assigned to. One is the valence of the outcome (i.e., whether it
is positive, negative or neutral). The other is whether voters can reasonably assign
responsibility to themselves (i.e., the first plausibility criteria). Following the obser-
vational studies, I manipulate this by presenting voters with outcomes at a personal
or at a national level.
Data and Empirical Strategy
The survey experiment was conducted by the polling company Norstat using a
population-based internet panel to recruit respondents. The survey ran from June 2
till June 4 2015. It sampled 1,002 respondents. The sample was diverse, though not
completely representative of the Danish voting age population.9
The survey presented voters with two experimentally manipulated outcomes.
One outcome was related to housing and one outcome was related to employment.
For each of the two outcomes, respondents’were given one of three valence conditions
(negative, neutral, positive) and one of two relevance conditions (personal/national).
Respondents were then asked: “To what extent would the government be responsible
for this outcome?” Answers were given on a eleven point point scale from "Not at
all" to "A great deal". The variable was rescaled to go from zero to one.
8For instance, conservative voters may be more skeptical of the government’s ability to affect the
economy, refraining from attributing political responsibility for economic conditions, and at the same
time, they may be more likely to observe good economic conditions, because conservatives tend to be
more well off (Rudolph, 2003b, 2006).
9In particular, the sample was slightly older and had a higher proportion of men, cf. section S6 of
the supplementary materials.
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The first outcome voters were presented with concerned housing prices. Specif-
ically, respondents were presented with one of the following six hypothetical out-
comes:
1,2,3 Imagine that the price of your or your family’s house [increased/ decreased/
increased or decreased].
4,5,6 Imagine that the price of houses in the country as a whole [increased/ de-
creased/ increased or decreased].
The positive economic outcome in this case is increasing house prices, which will
enable voters to sell their house, or draw up a larger mortgage, at a possible gain to
themselves (Ansell, 2014). Conversely, decreasing house prices is the negative out-
come. Note that the neutral condition simply asks voters to evaluate how responsible
the government would be for house prices either increasing or decreasing.
The second outcome concerned employment. Respondents were presented with
one of the following six versions of the outcome:
1,2,3 Imagine that you or someone in your family [lost their job/got a better job/lost
their job or got a better job].
4,5,6 Imagine that unemployment in the country as a whole [increased/ decreased/
increased or decreased].
For the first three versions, the positive outcome is getting a better job and the
negative outcome is losing a job. For the last three versions, the negative outcome is
increasing unemployment and the positive outcome is decreasing unemployment.
The neutral outcomes are, once again, either the negative or the positive outcome.
The housing and employment outcomes have different inferential strengths and
weaknesses. The balance across negative and positive outcomes is strong for house
prices but weaker for employment status. As such, there might be different causal
processes involved in losing a job contra getting a better job, whereas the causal
processes involved in increasing contra decreasing house prices are more similar. At
the same time, it might be hard for voters to figure out what implications increasing
or decreasing house prices will have for their personal economic situation: that is,
whether the housing outcome they get is in fact desirable or undesirable. Conversely,
almost all voters should understand that getting a better job is a desirable outcome,
and that losing a job is an undesirable outcome. All in all, the housing outcomes
thus provide a harder test of the self-serving bias hypothesis and the employment
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outcomes an easier test. As such, by including both outcomes the experiment should
provide a fair overall test of the hypothesis.
I analyze the survey experiment by setting up two linear models, which use
voters’ attributions of responsibility for the housing and unemployment outcomes as
the dependent variables. The independent variables are the different experimental
treatments. The models are estimated using an OLS regression with robust standard
errors.
Results
Figure 9.3 presents the results from the main survey experiment. In the top panel,
I examine the effects of the personal housing and employment outcomes. Across
both types of outcomes, a similar pattern emerges. Voters who were assigned to
a positive outcome were less likely to think that the government was responsible
for securing this outcome than those assigned to a neutral or negative outcome. At
the same time there was no statistically discernible difference between receiving a
negative economic outcome as opposed to a neutral outcome. This conforms fairly
well to the predictions made by the self-serving bias hypothesis. That is, when voters
had a personal stake in the attributional process, they adjusted the extent to which
they implicated the government in a self-serving way, downplaying the role of the
government when faced with a desirable outcome.
In the bottom panel of the figure 9.3, I examine the effects of the national housing
and employment outcomes. For the national housing outcomes there was practically
no difference in the extent to which voters assigned responsibility to the government
for positive, negative or neutral outcomes. For the national employment outcomes
there was no difference in how voters assigned responsibility for positive or negative
outcomes. Voters who were assigned a neutral national employment outcome, how-
ever, were less likely to assign responsibility to the government than those who were
assigned to a positive or a negative outcome. The absence of systematic differences
in attributions across negative and positive national level outcomes is also in line
with the self-serving bias hypothesis, because there is no self-serving motive when
it comes to assigning responsibility for national level outcomes that voters had no
hand in shaping.
One finding from the experiment does not line up that nicely with the self-
serving bias hypothesis: there is no difference in the extent to which voters hold the
government responsible for neutral and negative personal economic outcomes. One
explanation for this might be that the “neutral” condition, which asks voters to assign



























































































































Figure 9.3Mean level of beliefs about government responsibility for economic out-
comes across valence ("Negative", "Neutral" and "Positive") and (personal and na-
tional). Mean levels reported separately for housing and employment outcomes.
Estimated using an OLS regression with robust standard errors (n = 1, 002 for hous-
ing, n = 1, 002 for employment). Vertical lines are 95 pct. (thin) and 90 pct. (thick)
confidence intervals.
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responsibility for either a positive outcome or a negative outcome, is actually more
negative than neutral. The literature on the negativity bias thus suggests that negative
information crowds out positive information (Olsen, 2015; Rozin and Royzman, 2001).
If this is true, then it might make sense that the respondents assigned to the “neutral”
condition respond in the same way as those assigned to the “negative” condition.
Validating the Results Using an Additional Survey Experiment
The results in the experiment above were, by and large, consistent with the self-
serving bias hypothesis. However, do the findings actually reflect that voters are
self-serving when it comes to assigning political responsibility? One might have
two concerns in this regard. First, the differences in the way voters attribute re-
sponsibility for national vis-á-vis personal outcomes may reflect that voters have to
operate on different ‘levels of analysis’. That is, the attributional differences might be
borne out of voters dealing with aggregates (i.e., national house prices and national
unemployment rate) rather than individual instances (the price of one house and
the employment situation of one person). Second, voters might simply hold the
government more responsible for negative outcomes that affect them personally
than for positive outcomes that affect them personally even if these outcomes are
completely outside the scope of the government’s control. That is, voters might be
lashing out blindly when something happens to them personally.
To address these concerns, I ran an additional online survey experiment with
263 undergraduate political science students from a Danish university10. The survey
included two experiments (presented sequentially), each meant to address one of
the two concerns.
First, respondents were randomly split into two groups. The first two groups
were randomly assigned to either the positive or the negative personal housing and
employment outcome (cf. above). The other two groups received the same positive
or negative outcomes, but with a small tweak. Instead of it being their own house
or their own job, it was now “someone’s” job or “someone’s” house.11 This is a
more subtle difference than the national/personal split made in the main survey
experiment, however, it should still regulate whether the first plausibility criteria is
satisfied. As such, if voters are asked to evaluate who is responsible for someone
10The survey was conducted in February 2017 on the platform psytoolkit. The sample consisted of
55 pct. female students with an average age of 22.4 years.
11The exact wording was “Imagine that someone in Denmark [lost their job/got a better job]” and
“Imagine that the price of a Danish family’s house [increased/ decreased]”.



























































Figure 9.4 Effect of being presented with a negative rather than a positive outcome.
Effects estimated using an OLS regression with robust standard errors. From left to
right, the sample sizes used to estimate the effects are 141, 132, 143, 130, 263. Vertical
lines are 95 pct. confidence intervals.
else’s economic situation, then the self-serving motive should not influence voters’
attributions, and there should be no valence asymmetry in attributions.
Second, respondents were presented with either a positive or a negative hypo-
thetical personal outcome related to their own academic performance. In particular,
they were presented with one of the following outcomes: “Imagine that you get a
[bad/good] grade on an exam”. This outcome is arguably completely outside of the
government’s control, and therefore we should not expect the self-serving bias to be
relevant. 12
After being presented with each of these different hypothetical outcomes, re-
spondents were asked to evaluate the extent to which the government would be
responsible for this outcome. I used the same question wording and scale as in the
main experiment.
Figure 9.4 presents the effect of being presented with a negative outcome on
how responsible the respondents thought the government was across the different
outcomes. Three things stand out. First, the results from the main survey experiment
replicate. Those who got a negative as opposed to a positive personal outcome were
more likely to think the government was responsible across housing and employment
12In effect, the second plausibility criteria is not satisfied for this outcome.
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outcomes. Second, there is no statistically significant difference for the housing and
employment outcomes when voters were simply asked to imagine the outcomes
happening to “someone” instead of themselves. Accordingly, it is not as though there
is something special about small-scale outcomes. It is only when the small scale is
the voters’ themselves, and self-serving motives thus become relevant, that there is a
valence asymmetry in political attributions. Third, there is no difference between
those assigned to the negative and the positive academic “Grades” outcome. This
suggests that when outcomes are completely outside of the government’s control,
there is no valence asymmetry in political attributions, consistent with the self-
serving bias hypothesis.
All in all, the additional experiment increases our confidence in the self-serving
bias hypothesis, as the results suggest that the conditional valence asymmetry in
attributions identified in the main experiment is driven by voters making self-serving
judgments.
Conclusion
A lot of research in social psychology have shown that people tend to exculpate
themselves for undesirable outcomes yet implicate themselves in desirable outcomes.
In this article, I have argued that this self-serving bias in attribution has important
consequences for how voters attribute responsibility for policy outcomes. In particu-
lar, I have found that when responsibility for a policy outcome is shared between
individual voters and their government, voters tend to shift blame towards the gov-
ernment when the outcome is undesirable and away from the government when
the outcome is desirable. This type of valence asymmetry in attribution, however, is
only present in settings where voters have a personal stake in the outcome.
I found evidence of such a self-serving bias in political attribution in a number
of different places. For one, I showed that voters in Denmark, the US and Latin
America are more prone to punishing their government if their personal economic
conditions worsen than they are to rewarding their government if their personal
economic conditions improve. This is a valence asymmetry which is not present
when it comes to national economic conditions. I have also shown that there is a
correlation between voters’ evaluations of their own personal economic situations
and the extent to which they believe the government can influence their personal
economic situations, but no correlation between voters’ evaluations of the national
economic situations and their beliefs about whether the government can influence
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the national economic situation. Finally, I have shown that if we ask voters to evaluate
how responsible the government is for randomly assigned hypothetical outcomes,
then, to the extent that voters have a personal stake in the outcomes, voters are less
likely to hold the government responsible for desirable outcomes as opposed to
undesirable outcomes.
These findings have important implications for existing work. The focus in the
literature on how voters attribute political responsibility has gravitated towards
attribution for events which are national in scope, like the national economy (Al-
cañiz and Hellwig, 2011; Duch and Stevenson, 2008) national emergencies (Healy,
Kuo and Malhotra, 2014; Malhotra and Kuo, 2008) or how the government handles
public service provision (Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; although see Tilley, Neundorf
and Hobolt, 2017). Yet this study underscores the importance of also focusing on
how voters attribute blame for outcomes which are more personal in nature (Ansell,
2014; Feldman, 1982; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979). In
particular, it seems that voters can potentially attach political significance to personal
economic outcomes, although, as this study has shown, whether voters do so depend
on the nature of these outcomes. This is a conditionality that might help explain
why previous studies have struggled to pin down the exact importance of personal
economic grievances (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013;
Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Stubager et al., 2014).
Some caution is in order, however, before drawing broad implications from the
results of this article. While the analysis covered a number of different countries
and studied the self-serving bias using both observational and experimental data,
the types of outcomes voters were asked to assign responsibility for were quite ab-
stract. As such, it is unclear whether the self-serving bias would still be present if
voters were faced by a concrete event, like actually becoming unemployed, where
the amount of information about the causal process that led to this event is more
dense. Furthermore, while the different empirical studies this article has undertaken
do complement each other, they deal with potential methodological problems in
sequential order rather than in tandem. As such, none of the studies provide a perfect
test of the self-serving bias with strong internal and external validity. However, until
such a test is conducted, we can tentatively conclude that there is a self-serving
bias in attribution of political responsibility, which shapes how voters assign polit-
ical responsibility in settings where it is unclear whether outcomes are a result of
government intervention or individual’s own behavior.
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What implications does the self-serving bias in political attributions have for
the incentives faced by reelection minded politicians? On the face of it, the self-
serving bias should dissuade governments from pursuing policies which redistribute
economic resources among voters. If voters who gain from economic redistribution
do not credit the government for this gain, while voters who lose out blame the
government, then redistribution is a lose-lose situation for governing politicians. This
implication is similar to the one usually drawn from the literature on the negativity
bias (e.g., Hood, 2010; Nielsen and Moynihan, 2017; Weaver, 1986). However, the
fact that the self-serving bias is conditional on the plausibility criteria laid out above
complicates thing a little. As such, the self-serving bias should only discourage
politicians from pursuing re-distributive policies when these policies leave room for
interpretation as to whether the government or the individual citizen is responsible
for the outcomes this policy might make more or less likely. If there is any such
ambiguity as to who is responsible, the findings from this article suggests that voters
will seize upon it and attribute responsibility in a self-serving way. Accordingly, the
self-serving bias might not dissuade politicians from spending money on direct cash
transfers, where there is little ambiguity as to whether low-income beneficiaries are
better off as a result of the policy, but it might dissuade politicians from investing in
public services like education, where the low-income beneficiaries might rationalize
that they would have been able to do just as well even in the absence of the public
service. Accordingly, the self-serving bias in attribution of responsibility might have
a detrimental effect on the provision of efficient redistributive public policies.
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Supplementary materials
S1: Estimating the Valence Wsymmetry
The basic model used to look at how voters respond to economic conditions in study
1 is a linear probability model in line with this one:
Pr(yit = 1) = β0 + β1natworit + β2natbetit + β3perworit + β4perbetit + ϵit (9.1)
Here y is the dependent variable, support for the incumbent, natwor and natbet
are dummies indicating whether the respondent believes the national economy
is doing better or worse, perwor and perbet are dummies indicating whether the
respondent believes their own economy is doing better or worse, and ϵit is the error
term.
When we want to estimate the valence asymmetry we are really interested in
the sum of the effects of the “better” and “worse” dummies. That is, we want to
know how much negative effect is left once we take the positive effect into account.
Based on equation one, the valence asymmetries can be described as β1 + β2 = θn
and β3 + β4 = θp. However θn, the valence asymmetry for the national economy, and
θp, the valence asymmetry for the personal economy, are not estimated directly in
model 9.1.
Instead, I estimate a slightly modified version of model 9.1. In particular, I
incorporate θp and θn into the models by decomposing the “worse” effect into the
valence asymmetry (θp/n) and the “better” effect (β4/2).
Pr(yit = 1) = β0+(θn− β2)natworit+ β2natbetit+(θp− β4)perworit+ β4perbetit+ ϵit
(9.2)
This can be rearranged in the following way.
Pr(yit = 1) = β0+θnnatworit+β2(natbetit−natworit)+θpperworit+β4(perbetit−perworit)+ϵit
(9.3)
This linear probability model includes θp and θn directly, and it can be estimated
by creating new variables for national and personal economic perceptions which
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subtracts the “worse” dummies from the “better” dummies. This is how I estimate
the valence asymmetries which are plotted in figure 9.1.
S2: Surveys Included in Study 1
Election surveys from Denmark: 1990, 1994, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015. For
details see http://www.valgprojektet.dk/default.asp?l=eng.
Election surveys from the US: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and
2012. For details see: http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_
cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf.htm
Election surveys in the Latinobarómetro: The countries included in the Lati-
nobarómetro, and the number of years that these countries have been part of the
study, can be seen in table S.9.1. For details see: http://www.latinobarometro.org/
latContents.jsp
Table S.9.1 List of included surveys from the Latinobarómetro






Costa Rica 1996 2010
Dominican Republic 2004 2010
Ecuador 1996 2010
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S3: Asymmetry in Economic Experiences
In study 1, I find that there is a larger difference in support for the incumbent between
those who think the economy is doing worse (as opposed to the same) than there
is between those who think the economy is doing better (as opposed to the same).
This is consistent with a self-serving bias in attribution of political responsibility.
However, an alternative explanation is that the experience of those who are doing
worse deviates more from the experience of those who are doing the same, than the
experience of those who are doing better deviates from those who are doing the
same. That is, the distribution of economic fortunes might be skewed, so that a lot of
people experience something very bad and only a few people experience something
very good. Could this explain the findings presented in study 1?
To find out, I revisit the Latinobarómetro data. I examine the surveys from after
2000, because these include amore detailed version of the question concerning voters’
experience of the economy. In particular, voters could report their personal and the
national economy as doing "a little" or "much" better or worse.
If there is a negative skew in economic experiences, we would expect the pro-
portion answering "much worse" to be larger than the proportion answering "much
better". I calculate these proportions for the question concerning voters’ own, and
the national economy, in table S.9.2.
Table S.9.2 Composition of economic experiences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worse, own Better, own Worse, national Better, national
Proportion extreme (i.e., ‘much’) 0.26 0.14 0.37 0.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 43990 51047 75053 41600
Standard errors in parentheses. Data from the Latinobarometro.
As can be seen from table 2, there is some evidence of a negative skew in economic
experiences: 14 pct. of respondents who thought their economywas doing better said
it was doing much better, whereas 26 pct. of respondents who said their economy
was doing worse said it was doing much worse. Even so, it seems unlikely that
this can explain the valence asymmetry identified in study 1. As such, I found
that the effect of the national economy was perfectly symmetrical, however, voters
experience of the national economy was more asymmetrical than their experience of
their personal economy. Twelve pct. of respondents who said the national economy
was doing better said it was doing much better, whereas 37 pct. of respondents who
said the national economy was doing worse said it was doing much worse.
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In summary, there is some evidence that those experiencing a deteriorating
economy are more likely to believe it is rapidly deteriorating, whereas those who
experience an improving economy are more likely to believe that it is only improving
a little. However, this asymmetry cannot explain the findings in study 1, because this
experiential asymmetry applies to both national and personal economic conditions,
whereas the attributional valence asymmetry identified in study 1 only applies to
personal economic conditions.
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S4: Tables Underlying the Different Figures
Tables S.9.3, S.9.4, S.9.5 present the OLS regression models used to produce figure
9.1.
Tables S.9.6, S.9.7 and S.9.8 present the OLS regression models used to produce
figures 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4.
Table S.9.3 OLS regression of voting for presidential party (ANES)
(1) (2)
Worse off - own economy -0.10∗ -0.10∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Better off - own economy 0.06∗ 0.06∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Worse off - national economy -0.26∗ -0.26∗
(0.01) (0.01)











Standard errors in parentheses
Dummies for election survey omitted in model 1 and 2.
Ideology dummies and dummies for strength of partisanship omitted in model 2.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table S.9.4 OLS regression of voting for party in government (DNES)
(1) (2)
Worse off - own economy -0.06∗ -0.04∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Better off - own economy 0.00 0.02+
(0.01) (0.01)
Worse off - national economy -0.10∗ -0.11∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Better off - own economy 0.12∗ 0.12∗
(0.01) (0.01)









Standard errors in parentheses
Dummies for election survey omitted in model 1 and 2.
Ideology dummies and dummies for strength of partisanship omitted in model 2.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Table S.9.5 OLS regression of approving of incumbent president (Latinobar.)
(1) (2)
Worse off - own economy -0.06∗ -0.06∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Better off - own economy 0.04∗ 0.04∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Worse off - national economy -0.13∗ -0.13∗
(0.00) (0.00)











Standard errors in parentheses
Dummies for election survey omitted in model 1 and 2.
Ideology dummies and dummies for strength of partisanship omitted in model 2.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Supplementary materials | 251
Table S.9.6 OLS regression of beliefs about government’s capacity to affect national
and personal economic condtions
(1) (2)
Personal National
Worse - Own 0.05+ 0.04+
(0.03) (0.02)
Better - Own -0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Worse - National 0.05 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Better - National 0.02 0.03+
(0.02) (0.02)
Female (ref: male) -0.03+ -0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02)









Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Table S.9.7 OLS regression of attribution to government
(1) (2)
Employment Status House Prices
Worse - Own 0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Better - Own -0.16∗ -0.09∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Neutral - National 0.16∗ -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Worse - National 0.11∗ -0.05+
(0.02) (0.03)







Standard errors in parentheses. Reference category is “Neutral - Personal”.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table S.9.8 OLS regression of respondents’ attribution to government (additional
experiment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment (self) Employment (other) Housing (self) Housing (other) Grades
Negative Outcome 0.12∗ 0.02 0.09∗ -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant 0.25∗ 0.48∗ 0.37∗ 0.66∗ 0.37∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.05)
σ 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.23
R2 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00
Observations 140 132 141 130 263
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
S5: Variable Descriptions for Economic Variables
The ANES use the following question with answers falling in one of three categories
“better”, “worse”, and “the same”:
• Own: “We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days.
Would you say that you and your family living here are better off or worse off
financially than you were a year ago?”
• Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better,
stayed about the same or gotten worse?
The Latinobarometro used two set of questions for the economic perceptions ques-
tions. From 1995-2000, the following questions were used:
• Country: “Do you consider the current economic situation of the country to be
better, about the same, or worse than 12 months ago?”
• Own: “Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be
better, about the same, or worse than 12 months ago?”
From 2001 and on the following questions were used:
• Country: “Do you consider the current economic situation of the country to be
much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse than
12 months ago?”
• Own: “Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be
much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse than
12 months ago?”
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TheDNES used the following questions, with answers falling in one of five categories:
“better’, “a lot better”, “worse”, “a lot worse” and “the same”:
• Country: “How is the economic situation in Denmark today compared to one
year ago?”
• Own: “How is your and your family’s economic situation today compared to
one year ago?”
The DK-OPT survey used the following questions, with answers falling in one of five
categories: “better’, “a lot better”, “worse”, “a lot worse” and “the same”:
• Country: “How is the economic situation in Denmark today compared to one
year ago?”
• Own: “How is your and your family’s economic situation today compared to
one year ago?”
254 | D: A Self-servingness
S6: Descriptive Statistics
Table S.9.9 Descriptive statistics, DNES
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Vote for governing party 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 13379
Ideology (right-wing) 5.26 2.45 0.00 5.00 10.00 12841
State of personal economy 0.91 0.87 0.00 1.00 2.00 13379
State of country’s economy 1.19 0.86 0.00 1.00 2.00 13379
Some college 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 13379
Age 48.69 16.85 17.00 48.00 106.00 13368
Woman (ref: man) 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 12089
Strength of party identification 0.79 0.86 0.00 1.00 2.00 13363
Table S.9.10 Descriptive statistics, Latinobarómetro
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Approve of president 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 143191
Ideology (right-wing) 25.68 38.69 0.00 6.00 99.00 143191
State of personal economy 0.85 0.86 0.00 1.00 2.00 143191
State of country’s economy 0.89 0.77 0.00 1.00 2.00 143191
Some university 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 143191
Age 39.29 16.27 16.00 36.00 99.00 143191
Woman (ref: man) 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 143191
Strong feelings about president 50.55 49.22 0.00 99.00 99.00 143191
Table S.9.11 Descriptive statistics, ANES
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Vote for president 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 12431
Ideology (right-wing) 4.78 2.41 0.00 4.00 9.00 12431
State of personal economy 1.18 0.80 0.00 1.00 2.00 12431
State of country’s economy 0.97 0.78 0.00 1.00 2.00 12431
Some college 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 12318
Age 49.13 16.77 17.00 49.00 93.00 12362
Woman (ref: man) 1.54 0.50 1.00 2.00 2.00 12431
Strength of party identification 3.04 0.96 1.00 3.00 4.00 12388
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Table S.9.12 Descriptive statistics, DK-OPT survey
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Government responsible for national economy 0.77 0.24 0.00 0.75 1.00 943
Government responsible for repondent’s economy 0.72 0.29 0.00 0.75 1.00 943
State of personal economy 2.11 0.60 1.00 2.00 3.00 943
State of country’s economy 2.49 0.68 1.00 3.00 3.00 943
Some University 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 943
Age 52.68 17.49 19.00 55.00 97.00 943
Woman (ref: man) 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 943
Table S.9.13 Descriptive statistics, main experiment
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Government responsible for house prices 0.48 0.24 0.00 0.50 1.00 1002
Government responsible for employment status 0.52 0.26 0.00 0.50 1.00 1002
Age 52.83 16.66 18.00 55.00 88.00 1002
Man (ref: woman) 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 1002
Age 52.83 16.66 18.00 55.00 88.00 1002
Table S.9.14 Descriptive statistics, additional experiment
Mean SD Min Median Max n
Government responsible for housing (self) 0.50 0.22 0.10 0.50 1.10 141
Government responsible for employment (self) 0.43 0.21 0.10 0.40 1.00 140
Government responsible for employment (other) 0.51 0.21 0.10 0.50 1.10 132
Government responsible for housing (other) 0.49 0.20 0.10 0.50 1.00 130
Government responsible for grade 0.33 0.23 0.10 0.30 1.10 263
Age 22.37 3.02 18.00 22.00 44.00 262
Man (ref: woman) 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 263
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